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ABSTRACT

Contents of these hearings include the testimony of the following witnesses, as well as materials appended as pertinent to the hearings: (1) Dr. Francis Keppel, Chairman of the Board, General Learning Corp., New York, N.Y.; (2) Mr. Joel Berke, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., and Dr. Robert J. Goettel, Syracuse University Research Corp., New York, N.Y.; (3) Dr. Christopher S. Jencks, Associate Professor, Harvard Graduate School of Education; (4) Dr. Robert Lekachman, Professor of Economics, State University of New York at Stony Brook; (5) Dr. Norman J. Boyan, Dean, Graduate School of Education, University of California at Santa Barbara; and, (6) Dr. George B. Kleindorfer, Lecturer in Education, School of Education, University of California at Berkeley. [Several articles reprinted as part of the hearings' transcript have not been reproduced here.] (SB)

ED 061 390

EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY—1971

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON
EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY

OF THE

UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY

PART 22—EDUCATION INFORMATION

WASHINGTON, D.C., DECEMBER 1, 2, 3, 1971

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CONTENTS

EDUCATION INFORMATION

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 1, 1971

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Page
Keppel, Dr. Francis ... 10949
  Prepared statement of ... 10951
Berke, Mr. Joel; and Gottel, Dr. Robert J ... 10954

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1971

Jencks, Dr. Christopher ... 10971
Prepared statement of Robert Lekachman ... 11018

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1971

Boyan, Dr. Norman J ... 11023
  Prepared statement of ... 11026
Kleindorfer, Dr. George B ... 11034
  Prepared statement of ... 11042

APPENDIXES

Appendix 1. Material submitted by the witnesses:
  From Dr. Francis Keppel:
    Article: The New York Times, November 28, 1971—Princeton Is Urged To Give 3-Year B.A ... 11047
  Guidelines for the collection, maintenance, and dissemination of pupil records ... 11049
  From Dr. Christopher Jencks:
    Letter of February 23, 1970:
      The structure and functions of a voucher system's information agency ... 11088
Appendix 2. Material pertinent to the hearings:
  Education Report: Vouchers and Pubic Education, by Robert Lekachman ... 11115
  Education Vouchers: An Evaluation—The Washington Research Project, by Irene Solet ... 11121
  Education Vouchers, by Judith Areen ... 11132

EDUCATION INFORMATION

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 1, 1971

U.S. Senate
Select Committee on
Equal Educational Opportunity,
Washington, D.C.

The Select Committee met at 10:10 a.m., pursuant to call, in room 1318 of the New Senate Office Building, the Honorable Walter F. Mondale, chairman of the committee, presiding.

Present: Senator Mondale.

Staff members present: William C. Smith, staff director and general counsel; Bert Carp and Donald S. Harris, professional staff; and Leonard Strickman, minority counsel.

Senator Mondale. The committee will come to order.

This morning we will hear from Dr. Francis Keppel, chairman of the board, General Learning Corp. of New York; Mr. Joel Berke, The Brookings Institution; and Dr. Robert J. Goettel, Syracuse University Research Corp. We are very pleased to have you with us this morning.

Dr. Keppel, will you lead off the testimony.

STATEMENT OF DR. FRANCIS KEPPEL, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, GENERAL LEARNING CORP., NEW YORK, N.Y.

Dr. Keppel. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I think I can save you time by not attempting to read this because it only makes two points.

Senator Mondale. We will place your statement in the record,* Dr. Keppel.

Dr. Keppel. It is difficult for me, sitting in this chair, not to go back for 5 years and take a look at the difference between 5 years ago, roughly at the time of the passage of that educational legislation in the mid-sixties, compared to today; specifically with regard to the issue before you, sir; namely, information about education.

A number of us spent a good deal of time in chairs like this and provided a whale of a lot of data to the Members of the Senate and the House on the problems of, primarily, the public and private secondary system and also higher education. Most of that data I would have to summarize as socioeconomic data, on buildings, poverty of families, various types perhaps of training and teachers. There was practically no data that I was able to bring in my former position as Commissioner before the Congress that had to do with what pupils learn.

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*See prepared statement, pp. 10951–53.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS BY NATIONAL ASSESSMENT

It was not that we did not want to provide it. We did not have it. One of the major changes—and it is the thrust of my testimony—in the last 5 years is that with the development, clumsy as it is, of the National Assessment of Educational Progress, which is carried out by the Compact of the States, and by other means, we now have accomplished three things.

I do not want to overstate, Mr. Chairman. I spent too much time in this chair overstating things, I am afraid. At any rate, the following has happened: Techniques for sampling and methods of administration of measures of what pupils learn, have been worked out. It is now going on across the country on a national sample basis.

Second, the resistance of the educational fraternity which was very strong in the middle or early part of the last decade, and to a degree exists today, is eroding fast. The key fact on this is that half a dozen States have gone to the Compact of the States in effect seeking help in how to adapt or use perhaps the techniques and the measures of the National Assessment in their own State. I would expect and hope that that would go further.

This is greatly strengthened, of course, by the current enthusiasm for what is called accountability. I am not sure anybody knows what it means, but there is a general feeling that the educators ought to be held responsible for what the children learn and not for the age of the building.

Third, there is an extraordinary hopeful possibility that out of this movement we can develop measures by the school—the program within the school building—which will make it possible—not now, sir, but in due course—to rifle-shoot direct funds to improve the performance within a school building.

I am making a contrast here between the school and the school system as a whole—all the primary, junior high, and high schools, treated as a unit—because the important data on equal educational opportunity gets lost in that aggregate. It would seem to me essential that we disaggregate it; get the unit of measure down to the school itself, the place where the individual in charge can be held more responsible. in my judgment, than the superintendent.

On the other hand, we would not, by these techniques, be overburdening the individual children with a whale of a lot of measures. A pretty good case can be made that too much testing is not good for children. By sampling technique, it is, as far as I can see, possible to reduce the amount of testing and still give the responsible authorities like yourself the data that you need for public policy.

Therefore, I would hope that the committee, in considering equal educational opportunity, give support to the development as rapidly as possible, through R. & D. programs, of the measures, the techniques for using them, and the way of reporting the results, both of the inputs—which I believe my colleagues will speak to—on the financial side and the result on the learning side. That those be reported school by school, publicly.

This seems to me to be the essential ingredient for increased consumer knowledge about the school, the capacity to influence that school, and in effect, the choice of school—to the degree to which the individual family can move to find the schools they want.

Socioeconomic Factors

Without this information, Mr. Chairman, it seems to me we are wasting our time. It has been pointed out rather vigorously in the last few years, largely through the Coleman report interpretations, that the educational system really does not make a lot of difference. It is the setting in which the pupils live, their families, the social environment, that are more important than schools. I suppose, since I have been an educator all my life, I do not quite believe it. I remain with hope that if this information system is actually put in place and studied over the years, we can show that the schools, properly managed, can have a lot more influence than it is now fashionable to say. Certainly, I would hope this is the view of your committee, sir.

We have an immense investment in public education and private education. Despair, which is quite widespread at the present time, may erode that investment. I doubt if we can really turn that around without the information system into which you are inquiring. My colleagues will go into detail about information that is now available, but not adequately interpreted or put to use. I am pleading not against them, but in addition to them, that a special emphasis be put on learning results that could be tied into the economic facts affecting education.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. FRANCIS KEPPEL

Mr. Chairman, better information about education is needed both to define the term "equal educational opportunity," and to approach it in practice as a social goal.

Only a decade ago, many doubted our technical ability to collect, store, and use data about the process and results of schooling. There was resistance on the part of educational authorities against the collection of data that would permit comparisons of educational results. In any case, the Nation seemed above all to lack equal financial support for the pupils, special help for those with physical or social handicaps, and a better way to recruit and train the teaching staff. On these matters facts were available and action could be and was taken.

We have since recognized that equal education opportunity is not alone a matter of equal support, special help or teacher education. Education is not a matter of schooling alone, but of the entire life of the learner, so the three factors mentioned are necessary but not sufficient conditions for reaching the goal. They leave out the essential factors of management, resource allocation and reporting to the consumer and the public. The key to each of these is a system of information.

In the mid-1960's it was not feasible to work out a stricter definition of an educationally deprived child than to measure his need by his family income. We lacked any way of getting the kind of detailed and comparable information that would have made it feasible to isolate particular educational deficits of schools and then target the financial remedy for the particular educational disease. We simply lacked data on what children were learning. The testimony presented to the Congress in support of educational bills was filled with socioeconomic facts about old buildings, ill-prepared teachers, inadequate materials, broken windows, and percentage of dropouts. From these facts it was reasoned that the children in some schools were not getting an even break, and that if these schools were given special financial help, the children would learn more—and would be able to compete on equal terms with their fellows when they reached maturity.

I do not retract from this testimony today. Hope and action still seem better than despair and inaction. But it was, on hindsight, naive primarily because we overestimated what schools in general (and above all a particular school) could do. We lacked data on what the results were in different schools with comparable student bodies. The facts presented to the Congress dealt with the conditions in which pupils were forced by the attendance laws to learn. They dealt with inputs rather than outputs.

Since then, some progress has been made. Part of that progress has been down the painful path to modesty—at least for the educators. The data from the report now known by its author's name, the Coleman Report, has suggested the limits of what school in general can do to provide equal educational opportunity. It has made clearer the great influence the home and the social setting seem to have. Alas, the report has also created the general impression that it doesn't make much difference what the schools try to do. The lives of the children of disadvantage seemed doomed to play an endless revival of an American tragedy. Later reports on the effect of the several acts of Congress of the mid-1960's have been interpreted as reaching the same conclusion. As one looks back, it seems rather naive that any of us expected dramatic results in a few years from Federal actions that provided only a small percentage of financial help with no precise notion of how to apply that help. It is as though we expected a pin to do the work of a crowbar in moving a rock whose weight and center of gravity were unknown. But it is perhaps just as naive to assume on such a short experience, and with such inadequate financing and administration, that nothing can be done—especially since there is hope of the new factor of far better information to measure operations.

The national assessment of educational progress is slowly winning its way into the confidence of the educational fraternity. The earlier resistance has changed, in a group of States, to requests for cooperation so that comparable measures can be used within the States in such results as what the pupils learn in reading, science, citizenship, mathematics et al. Better measures have been devised, sampling methods worked out and difficult technical problems of administration are being worked out.

Even though political and professional resistance to a better information system is waning, there is a long way to go before local school systems, and above all individual schools, assemble data on educational investments (teachers salaries, materials, and so forth) and procedures on the one hand, and student learning on the other. Good starts have been made, in the city schools of Detroit, for example, but in general data is aggregated in such a way that it is almost impossible to focus on the individual school as a target. The mounting pressures for "accountability in education" of recent years may result in public demand for annual reports of this sort, made available to parents and to the community served by the particular school. But before that happens a great deal of research and development has to be done.

The capacity of the computer to store and analyze this information at a reasonable cost represents a powerful resource. Not much use of this resource has been made by American schools either for creating internal management information systems or for public reporting. The committee could make a major contribution by urging the allocation of energy and resources to such an R. & D. program, including the setting up of demonstrations. When the Congress and the executive branch are satisfied that the technical problems are under control, the Office of Education could then both collect data on such a basis and make public reports. Neither is possible today.

You will have noted that this testimony puts special emphasis on the need of assessing what the institution, the particular school, is accomplishing, rather than on a school system as a whole or on how the individual learner is performing. Presumably, in years to come, this committee and the Congress will want to have aggregate data in order to understand the extent of variation from the goal of equal educational opportunity as expressed in measures of what pupils have learned. A child who cannot read or cipher up to a minimum standard cannot take advantage of educational opportunities. But for the national purpose, if remedial action is to be effective, this information has to be applied to the basic management unit—the individual school—where something can be done and where responsibility can be lodged.

There are a great many tests that are now used to diagram the problems of the individual learner and to predict what he can next handle effectively. These tests can, of course, be improved and will be improved in years to come. But it seems to this witness that higher priority should be assigned to institutional measurement as the key to getting a more accurate notion of how far we have to go in defining equal educational opportunity, in pinpointing places where special attention is required, and in making clear to the public the progress—or loss—in reaching the goal.

It is my personal hope, based on all too little evidence, that in the longrun it will be shown that the school can play a larger part in achieving equality of opportunity than now seems to be the case. Adequate evidence is not in, and adequate management controls are not in place. I hope you will be patient as those of us in education get at the job with the new tools at our disposal and with the new energy that sheer necessity demands.

Thank you very much.

Senator **Mondale**. Thank you, Dr. Keppel.

FEDERAL ROLE

What is your opinion of the adequacy of the structure and role of the Federal Government in assisting with the development of usable and relevant educational data?

Dr. **Keppel**. Assistance?

Senator **Mondale**. How effective is it in developing the data that you believe to be needed?

Dr. **Keppel**. Perhaps I could best answer that by explaining how I thought it necessary to operate 10 years ago.

The Commissioner of Education at that time, as I have indicated, had no data on learning outcomes. He had a lot of data on buildings and money, but none on learning. It seemed at that time extremely unlikely that the Federal executive branch would be able to create the measures and apply them throughout the Nation on outcomes and we therefore encouraged private sources—the Carnegie Corporation, Ford, and others—to start the National Assessment Program. There were at that time two reasons.

The first one was that there was strong professional resistance to being measured and the chances, frankly, of getting funds to carry out any such enterprise from the public sources were negligible. I think that has changed. Indeed, national assessment is being financed in good part by the Federal Government today.

The second reason was that it did not seem to me that the Office of Education had the staff qualifications to do it. It is my impression—but here I lean on my colleagues who have looked at it much more closely—that the last half-dozen years has shown a good deal of strengthening in the technical sense on the Federal side in being able to carry out such information collection. That is my impression but I could not pretend I am a good witness.

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION

Senator **Mondale**. We have before us in the Higher Education Act, the National Institute of Education, or the National Foundation of——

Dr. **Keppel**. It is the National Institute of Education.

Senator **Mondale**. I think that is designed to do a better job of research, and a better job in experimentation and demonstration.

Dr. **Keppel**. It is.

Senator **Mondale**. If we ever get that bill to conference, I assume it will be adopted. What is your view toward that proposal, or other proposals that you may have in mind, to assure that the Federal Government is doing an effective job in this research and experimentation?

Dr. **Keppel**. With regard to the National Institute of Education, I have testified strongly in favor, as it happens, on the other side of the Hill. I believe that one of its major tasks would be to improve the quality of measuring instruments and the techniques of data collection. I very much hope that bill, if it gets through conference and so forth, will get underway.

The best way I can think of to be sure that we get this information—the information I am speaking to with regard to learning results—is to have the school systems get their money in part on the basis of it. That really gets the show going.

Now, I am not quite confident that we are ready for it yet, because I am not sure our measures are good enough, but that is the way we would like to go. To a degree, it is being done in some of the States today. I think that is really the way to get better use of the data we have.

Senator **Mondale**. Are you concerned that if you use that strategy you might get false data?

Dr. **Keppel**. I am, sir. I am in the business world and I have observed with astonishment the enormous creativity of my associates in thinking up data at budget time. Of course, I am concerned.

On the other hand, I do not think that—I know many of my fellow educators disagree—the danger of false data is great enough to carry the argument against trying.

Senator **Mondale**. Very good.

Mr. Berke.

STATEMENT OF MR. JOEL BERKE, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, D.C.; AND DR. ROBERT J. GOETTEL, SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY RESEARCH CORP., NEW YORK, N.Y.

Mr. **Berke**. Senator, it is an honor to be here again and I would like to begin the testimony that Dr. Goettel and I will present jointly today by endorsing the statements made by the previous witness and say we agree with every statement Dr. Keppel has made, and that we, too, feel the importance of having data on learning outcomes; and the last comments particularly, in gearing financial systems to that data is something that we have proposed and recommended and I think I discussed it last time I was before this committee with Dr. Kelly of Teachers College and Ford Foundation. So we are delighted to follow Dr. Keppel.

Data on Financial Aspects of Educational Equality

Our own emphasis today is going to be on somewhat different kinds of data. This committee is well aware of the relevance of finance to equal educational opportunity and Dr. Goettel and I would like to address ourselves today to the adequacy or inadequacy of the data furnished primarily by the Office of Education but also by other agencies on the state of educational finance and education as it relates to, and equal educational opportunity, as it relates to financial questions.

Our concern with this issue goes back some time. As a matter of fact, in the study which you issued as a committee print, "Federal

Aid to Education—Who Benefits?"* my colleagues and I had a chapter in which we pointed to the importance of this data gap.

Two years ago, Dr. Goettel and I met—as a matter of fact, when I was a member and he was on staff of an advisory committee to the late James E. Allen when he was Commissioner of Education, which concerned itself with this problem which he, too, like every commissioner who preceded him, felt, namely, the inadequacy of data to make decisions on; and more recently we have conducted a study which is within a week or two of completion for the President's commission, looking into the adequacy of information that is available on education.

We have a statement today. I think it is brief enough for us to read through it with you. In it we will spend some time covering the problem as we see it because it is a problem that is not widely appreciated, and so I think it is worth dwelling on the problem itself; but then we would like to move on to things which will summarize the conclusions of our study and more importantly for your purposes I am sure a series of recommendations that we have to make which we would like to discuss with you.

So, with that, let me proceed to our statement and we will answer your questions as you raise them and we will answer them jointly because this is a joint statement.

Senator **Mondale.** Very well.

Deficiencies in Education Data

Mr. **Berke.** As we see the problem that we are addressing ourselves to, it turns particularly on the fact that participants in educational policymaking—be they public officials, researchers, educators, interested citizens—are handicapped by deficiencies in the available information on the state of American education. The data base that should be drawn upon in evaluating current policies and in designing new programs is woefully inadequate. This inadequacy may be traced to two causes: First, and more important, data are not organized in ways that would facilitate policy formulation; and, second, data are scattered among a variety of agencies. The problem is particularly acute in connection with the development and implementation of national priorities in education.

A few questions that policymakers might reasonably raise will illustrate some of the shortcomings of current educational statistical reports. To give an example or a series of examples of the problem, I would like to illustrate by pointing out some of the questions that policymakers might reasonably raise and indicate that the answers are not easily available.

If one seeks to know the total fiscal impact of all relevant Federal programs on education in particular school districts, data are unavailable in any one place or in any single report. Similarly, if one would like to know how much Federal support is being provided for urban school districts, or impoverished rural districts, as I know you have asked, Senator, in the past, or districts with high proportions of nonwhite students, one cannot find information in accessible form. Suppose one were interested in designing an educational aid formula which would take into account the total services—both educational and for general governmental functions—being supported out of a given community tax base.

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*U.S. Senate Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity, committee print, April 1971, U.S. Government Printing Office; reprinted October 1971.

Again, such data must currently be pieced together from a variety of sources. I could go on and on. I guess the point I want to make here, Senator, is that these are not really problems for Dr. Goettel and myself, because we are researchers. We can pull that data together from a variety of sources and we can put it together in ways we need. However, it is a problem for policymakers at all levels. There are other important areas of information shortages, the educational impact or the achievement outputs of the schools to which Mr. Keppel was addressing himself is one that we feel also, and, of course, the status of education and finance in the nonpublic schools of the Nation is another area where data is woefully inadequate.

FAILURE TO ORGANIZE DATA FOR POLICYMAKING

Let me turn now to the failure to organize the data for policymaking purposes which we consider the major shortcoming of current Federal data on education.

Formulating effective public policy for the support of elementary and secondary education requires a knowledge of:

1. The demand for various kinds of educational services, both at present and in the foreseeable future;
2. Estimates of the costs of those varied demands;
3. A conception of equity in the distribution both of educational services and of the costs of those services;
4. A continuous monitoring and evaluation of the financial, and to the extent feasible, the educational impact, of Federal programs in particular and of American education more generally.

Unfortunately, data about education is currently presented in undigested, unaggregated form, leaving those who are not themselves experienced manipulators of statistics at a loss to understand the significance of all the painstakingly collected and refined information.

In short, there is currently little attempt to present and interpret information in policy-oriented categories like those above. Much of the collection of statistical material on education is dominated by a laudable desire for accuracy and comprehensiveness. Equally needed conceptual values, notably the relation of data to issues of public policy, however, are not served. Overall, the fit between the needs of those who try to think and plan systematically for the future of American education and the statistical tools at their disposal is faulty. The hit or miss quality of many of our Federal programs and the hunchbacked nature of much of our thinking on educational problems is traceable in large part to the inability of policymakers to draw upon relevant information as they pursue their deliberations.

OVERVIEW NEEDED OF ENTIRE EDUCATIONAL PROCESS

Now, the second cause for inadequate data is that data is scattered among and between Federal agencies, and these include such agencies as the Office of Education and its subdivisions, the Office of Economic

Opportunity, the Departments of Labor and Commerce, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, the Census Bureau, and the Office of Management and Budget. All these are Federal agencies currently collecting educational data or processing it in some form.

State educational agencies and regional associations are additional sources of information, as are private organizations like the National Education Association and the National Catholic Education Association. The fact that multiple reporting and analytic centers exist is not itself a problem. Indeed, it is not only an inevitable situation, it is a positively beneficial one. The real problem is that no single agency—and that includes the U.S. Office of Education—has undertaken the task of providing an overview of the entire educational landscape.

In regard to Federal programs in particular, the U.S. Office of Education has largely limited the sweep of its vision to those programs and those data sources administered by the Office of Education. Thus data on early childhood education expenditures is scarce at the National Center for Educational Statistics because that is a Federal agency. Shortages of data on aspects of State and local finance relevant to the need and capacity for educational support has come about because data collected for the Census of Governments and by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations has seldom been drawn upon by the Office of Education.

In short, the responsibility the Office of Education has carried since its founding in 1867—"to collect such statistics and facts as should show the condition and progress of education"—has been subjected to a restrictive and self-defeating interpretation on the basis of jurisdictional lines that are unrelated to the substance of its mandate.

Now, that is essentially the problem as we see it. In the spring of 1971, the President's Commission on School Finance agreed to fund a 6-month project directed by Dr. Goettel and myself to look into the problems outlined above and to develop recommendations designed to remedy the shortcomings in available information related to the support of American education. That study is now within 2 weeks of completion. In it, we have analyzed the adequacy of information available to those who seek to develop better ways of financing education. We have examined and cataloged both the availability and the usefulness of information on the important questions on the Nation's educational agenda through interviews, questionnaires, and staff analysis. We have met with local, State, and National officials of both executive and legislative branches, and have studied reports of previous panels which have looked into the information gap in education.

I would like to turn to my colleague, Dr. Goettel, to resume our testimony and say something about what we have found, and, finally, the recommendations we would make.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Dr. GOETTEL. Well, on the basis of the research activities that Joel Berke has indicated, our major conclusion is that the present system of educational information fails to serve the requirements of those who are most in need of timely, reliable, and relevant information about the Nation's educational problems.

As Joel Berke has said, it is somewhat interesting to note that the category of users that appears to be best served by the efforts of the U.S. Office of Education are researchers in the field, whereas the policymakers, Congressmen and staff, executives in the executive branch are least served.

From the policymaker's viewpoint, this failure has four critical dimensions:

1. Information is not organized and presented within a policy-relevant framework. There is little indication that Federal education data collection begins with the most basic of questions: Data for and about what?

2. Information that is collected and disseminated is rarely analyzed. As a result, U.S. Office of Education information typically is presented according to the alphabetical order of the States or the enrollment of school districts, two characteristics which usually have little relevance to the major issues facing the Nation.

3. The format and presentation of the information about American education as well as long delays in publication discourage use by policymakers.

4. Numerous gaps exist in the availability of data required to answer questions relative to the education agenda of the 1970's.

Such gaps occur for three reasons:

(*a*) Suitable comparisons from district to district or State to State are often not available in any form. Examples include pupil-achievement data, cost-benefit data, and "needs" data in some basic instructional areas.

(*b*) The second kind of gap that exists concerns data which are available for some aggregations of school districts, municipalities, and States are not available for other aggregations or levels. This is one of the principal reasons why it is so difficult to relate fiscal data about education to data about other State and municipal services.

(*c*) To be useful to policymakers an item of information must be presented in relationship to another item to create an index which permits analysis and conclusions. As often as not, publications present raw data which are of little use to policymakers.

In addition to these four basic conclusions, there are a number of other conclusions that we have drawn from our studies over the past few months.

AVAILABILITY OF FEDERAL FUNDS

State information systems have expanded and improved dramatically in the past decade, largely as a result of the availability of Federal funds—NDEA Title X and ESEA Title V. Grant variations continue to exist among States in both ability and, probably more important, in our view, the willingness to provide the Federal Government with data, and, I might add also, the willingness to collect certain kinds of data about the nature of education in their own States.

A number of States are rebelling against information requests from Washington citing duplications, lack of established need for information, and the high cost of collecting information not routinely collected.

The National Center for Education Statistics has made major efforts to improve data collection procedures in recent years. As you are aware, the NCES was created in 1965. However, the Center is severely limited in that almost 90 percent of elementary and secondary education data are collected by program management bureaus of USOE, Office of Civil Rights, Bureau of the Census, and the Department of Agriculture. Though interagency cooperation is improving, and NCES is making a gallant effort in this regard, greater coordination is in order.

NCES has by far the smallest budget of all major statistical agencies in the Federal Government. Given the pressing need for relevant and timely information and the multiplicity of problems associated with complete dependence upon State and local education agencies, the current budget of $5.7 million is grossly inadequate.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Now, drawing from these conclusions, we have developed three broad recommendations that we believe are addressed to the broad nature of the problem of collecting and providing policymakers with information about the condition and progress of education in our Nation.

We would suggest, first, that information on education which explains spatial trends in:

1. The demand for education,
2. Its costs,
3. The patterns of allocation of educational services and costs—that is the equity dimension, and
4. The impact both fiscal and, to the extent possible, educational of Federal programs should be produced by an analytical staff located in the National Center for Educational Statistics of the U.S. Office of Education.

The function of the analytical staff would parallel the activities of such agencies as the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Office of Business Economics. While the Center has made important progress in upgrading its statistical competence in the last few years, more adequate analysis will require the addition of personnel trained in demography, economics, education, public finance, sociology, and other areas of social science expertise. We would also add that the presence of such analytically inclined personnel within the staff would also contribute to intelligent decisions about which data should be collected to answer the major policy questions.

In addition, and we found that this final part of this first recommendation appears to be exceedingly important to policymakers, we think it would be useful if an editorial staff were attached to NCES which would insure readability and clarity of format in NCES publications.

The second recommendation that we make is that to guide improvement in NCES information gathering, analysis, and dissemination, an advisory committee should be created. Composed of recognized scholars and other policy-oriented users of educational data, the committee should be charged with producing an annual report to the Congress, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare and to the Commissioner of Education on:

1. The important trends in the condition and progress of American education, and
2. The state of the Office's information collection, analysis, and dissemination program.

Such a committee, with a staff of its own, would parallel in a general way the functions provided by such committees as the Advisory Commission on the Education of Disadvantaged Children. Specifically, it would provide the immensely useful function in regard to data services of asking the essential question: "Information for what?" Ambitious organizational changes like those envisioned in the "Common Core of Data for the Seventies," will serve a useful function only to the extent that a body of analytically and policy-oriented people influence the selection of items to be collected and the manner in which they are organized and presented to the public.

The third recommendation: Ultimately, however, independent, high-level analysis of the state of American education and educational finance will come only from a body roughly comparable to the National Bureau of Economic Research. Funded perhaps, by the National Institute of Education and the Education Commission of the States, such a body could develop the prestige and competence to attract distinguished senior scholars and the most able junior colleagues. Drawing upon the data of NCES, private interest groups, and university-based research; cutting across jurisdictional levels both horizontally among the agencies of the national government and vertically among State education agencies and local education agencies, such an agency is the primary hope we have for the development of the all important capacity to provide critical analyses and evaluations of the information collected about the condition and progress of American education.

That concludes our formal statement, Senator.

Senator **Mondale**. Thank you very much for that statement. It makes me feel better. I thought this committee was unable to comprehend the data given to us, but apparently you have difficulty, too.

I believe the public spends about $42 million a year now on elementary and secondary public education?

Dr. **Keppel**. It is a little more than that now, sir.

Senator **Mondale**. How many children attend public schools?

Dr. **Keppel**. I think, 45 million. I am not sure.

Mr. **Berke**. 45 million.

STATISTICS DIFFICULT TO USE

Senator **Mondale**. And we spend $5.7 million in the National Center for Educational Statistics to find out what is happening. That is all.

Apparently your studies caused you to conclude that these statistics we gather are either collected in a way—or disseminated in a way—that they are largely useless to public policy bodies; whether it is to the executive branch or the political leaders of the Congress. It is material which is very, very difficult to use.

Mr. **Berke**. That is the result of our interviews and our questionnaires, Senator.

Senator **Mondale.** One of the questions this committee has been struggling with is: What makes a difference in schools? I gather when the Office of Education was created in 1867 they were supposed to keep data on that, were they not? They were supposed to be developing information to help answer that question. We have not been able to find out, after 2 years of hearings, what makes a difference. We have some guesses but that is all.

Is this because no one really knows? Or is the knowledge buried somewhere, but not getting out? If we do not know what works, what good is a data system?

Mr. **Berke.** Senator, I would reply to that a number of ways I think. In terms of effective cost-benefit studies in education, I do not know of any that are very convincing, and I think the other two witnesses ought to reply to this as well.

I think part of the problem is that the analytical tools have not been applied or have not been sharpened sufficiently to give us those answers. I think there is a shortage in the research as well as in the available data. However, I would say that what has contributed to this problem has been a lack of attention to it over the years.

I think if U.S. Commissioners of Education had been able to implement within the Office a concern for problems of this kind we could have been and would have been much further ahead. Maybe Dr. Keppel will want to comment on this. I am not sure if the problem has been in the willingness and the desire of the top levels of the Office to develop useful data like that or that somewhere in the filtering mechanism of the bureaucracy it gets lost, but most of the data that we see does not permit you to answer a question like that, which would seem to be the most obvious question that people would ask when it comes to schools.

Dr. **Keppel.** Well, I do not disagree with Mr. Berke, Senator, as to what he said. I will add to it if I may. It is worth recalling that when the Office was established in 1867 the Commissioner was provided with two clerks in the beginning—and the next year one was dropped. Therefore, what he had as the basis for his report—which, by the way, in those days were rather well-written essays and I do not think we have improved on the style since then—was clearly a personal kind of feel for the situation.

In the intervening period, up until I would guess in the mid-1960's or late 1950's, the fact of the matter is that the Federal Government really did not have much of anything to say about what was going to happen in the schools. Even now, it is hard to have a strong influence without more than 7- or 8-percent of the dollars involved.

The problem was: Did the Office of Education have the leverage to get the facts, even the raw facts, in time and in the form out of the States and the answer was "No," to put it bluntly. We just did not have an effective connection with the States and I cannot say that I blame the States, because they were running the show.

As a result of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, Title V, with Federal funds going in for technical support for the States in this area, I guess there has been an improvement. But I also judge it is very spotty. That is, the quality of data that comes varies from State-to-State, which clearly makes the task of analysis at a national level infinitely more difficult because some of the data may be fairly hard and some fairly soft, so we have to be careful about what we say.

DATA ON LEARNING FINANCIAL INPUT RELATIONSHIP

Of course, the key question of what you should ask of the educators, not just the Office of Education but the educational profession, is: Is learning data really related financially to input, and is there an effective relationship between those two?

As Mr. Berke has pointed out, we do not have a way of looking at that question as yet, and the educators are understandably hesitant to get too deep into it when they have a feeling that it would make the headline of the local newspaper. Reports might be made on the basis of some index—or whatever you want to call it—which would probably be unfair to them.

In short, before educators can answer your question, Senator, a lot of hard research and development through the National Institute of Education—or whatever body Congress creates—has got to be done before public policy can rest entirely on the basis of analysis of the input/output of the schools. It should be started through R. & D. and I am optimistic about it, but I do not think we are yet able to write legislation based on formula of that type.

When the Elementary and Secondary Education Bill was going through the Congress, the late Senator Robert Kennedy asked the Commissioner at the time about the definition of an educationally deprived child, and the answer indicated that the only way we could get at a definition that was workable from the point of view of congressional action was family income. That was the way, as you recall, which the formula was written. Senator Kennedy said, and I am quoting now:

> I don't know if it would be possible to work out a stricter definition, but I think it would be of help to the committee.

Lord knows, he was right, but the witness had to say we could not do it. I would have to say the same thing today—except that the reaction of the profession to this kind of analysis is changing fast, and the hope of the National Institute of Education which might be provided, have the means to move toward a "stricter" definition.

Senator MONDALE. Dr. Keppel, what do you think of the Berke-Goettel recommendations in terms of trying to do a better job of collecting, analyzing, editing, and evaluating the data?

COORDINATION AMONG GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

Dr. KEPPEL. I would agree with them, sir. Developing effective relationships between Government bureaucracies is a task at which I did not succeed and I do not think anybody does really. But better coordination is possible and I am a little distressed, to tell you the truth, that it has not happened more.

It is not that I disagree with these gentlemen, Senator; it is rather I would like to add something, if I may, but I do not know if it falls within the terms of reference of your committee. If it does not, I apologize.

Senator **Mondale**. Since we do not have any power, they give us free rein; if we had power, we probably would not be able to listen.

Dr. **Keppel**. I feel quite at home, sir. Their set of recommendations understandably is aimed at the Federal Government basically. Every one of these refers to what the Federal Establishment might do.

I think the real job has to be done inside the States. Might it be possible for the committee to revise—and this might be a fairly specific possibility, although I cannot pretend to be competent on the detail of it—Title V of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act in such a way as to require—not finance—a different method of State collection of data, including data on individual schools? If that would be possible, I would urge it, because we are now at the stage where we were not 5 or 10 years ago. There is now a basis for the States being able to do it, and I believe a desire to do more of this.

In short, my comment is not that there is anything wrong with these recommendations; but I would not hesitate to say that the Federal interest in education is now sufficiently raised to justify taking the step that I have just recommended.

Senator **Mondale**. What would you think of that recommendation?

Importance of School-by-School Data

Mr. **Berke**. Our work to date suggests that much of the progress in improving State data systems has come about because of Federal programs, and so I would see this as a useful route. I would agree. I would also agree—and I am sorry it did not appear in our statement—it was one of those lapses that we all have—that we did not emphasize school-by-school data, as Dr. Keppel has. I think this is important.

As I have said in other places, and it is in the statement on information gaps that you already have—this is where the incidence of educational programs is, in the schools, and even in the classrooms, and so until we have data on that as opposed to things like school districts which are amorphous, we are not really looking at the state and the condition of education in America.

Senator **Mondale**. The data is not broken down by schools, is it?

Mr. **Berke**. No, sir.

Dr. **Keppel**. May I interrupt for just a minute?

Senator **Mondale**. Yes.

Dr. **Keppel**. You might be interested in some data that I saw in Detroit which the superintendent pulled together with regard to costs, salaries, maintenance costs, equipment and so forth, and learning results of third grade and sixth grade, I believe, done school by school in the city of Detroit. This has actually been done and it might be a useful addition to the committee's facts. I will try to get this.

Senator **Mondale**. We have a draft of those with our data.

Mr. **Berke**. Mr. Chairman, Dr. Goettel directed a study recently for us in Syracuse in which we went into three rather large school districts—Syracuse, Rochester, and one of the decentralized districts in New York City—and tackled precisely that problem of getting school-by-school data. I think it would be useful to the committee if he were permitted to comment on that study.

Dr. **Goettel**. Senator, I want to start out by disagreeing just a bit with my colleagues, disagreeing but also saying that I think school-by-school data is critical in terms of achievement levels and in terms of whatever we can do on an input/output relationship to try to find out what is happening in schools.

Requirement for School-by-School Data

My concern, though, focuses on who should have that information. There is no doubt in my mind that the school districts—in fact, I might go as far as saying that States should require school districts to publish such data for their citizens. Very, very few States—well, no States require that of districts now and very few districts, at least outside of the large urban areas, do that sort of thing.

The question is: Why do we need school-by-school data at the level of the Federal Government? In other words, what kind of information do we need? What kind of policy question requires us to collect that kind of information? If there is a question to be answered, is it a question that needs to be answered regularly; that is, every year, every other year, every 5 years; or is it a question that should be answered by some researchers in the National Institute of Education on a one-shot basis?

I do not want to suggest answers to those questions right now, but I think we need to begin asking those questions before we require States to start supplying the Federal Government with data about individual schools, because I can assure you that this is one area that the States are very, very reluctant to make a request to local school districts about; and frankly, I think I have some sympathy with the State on that score.

The attitude out in the States is that the higher up we go from school district to State to Federal Government, the greater aggregation of data should occur. Of course, now what we are talking about is a need for some very specific disaggregations of data and before we make that kind of request and particularly build it into something like Title V, I think we have to know exactly why we want to burden the States and all the school districts with that.

Dr. **Keppel**. I did not intend to suggest that information on individual school districts should be sent to Washington. That building down there is not big enough to handle it. My intent in talking about Title V was rather to suggest something like a requirement that if the States are going to get this Title V money, they have to publish within the States—down to the school district level—every 2 or 3 years, data on input and output, but not to send it to Washington.

The aggregate, larger kind of data that you have to deal with could be handled in a different way. In my point of view, the national assessment program is entirely right in using a sample, in no sense broken down by school or school district. This was the purpose to provide the Congress of the United States with a general sweep of results and a sense of direction.

Senator **Mondale**. I know Michigan has a system of testing for 4th and 7th grades. We had hearings* on the Michigan school system dealing with desegregation—what works and what does not work. We found that the best data was the school-by-school data and that had not been released publicly. I do not think they are afraid of us, but I think they are reluctant to release that information to the public. Could that be right?

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*See Parts 19A, hearing of Nov. 1, 1971, and 19A-1, staff charts on Michigan's Educational Assessment Program.

DATA SHOULD BE PUBLISHED PUBLICLY

Dr. **KEPPEL**. I am sorry, sir, I have made up my mind on this one. I think the school-by-school data must be released publicly—as a matter of public policy. Otherwise, I do not know how we would maintain the active interest in the schools which we need.

Senator **MONDALE**. I think this commentary has been very useful. We had a witness from California who said, "We really ought to go into a school and break it down classroom by classroom, because," he said, "in even some of the worst ghetto schools you will have a tracking system, with some children in a good class, just booming along and doing exceedingly well. But, if you look at the school's overall statistics it is abominable; however, there are some people doing very well in these schools."

The question is: How can we improve that? Should we have quality integration within a school? That is a good question.

Dr. **KEPPEL**. The question is right, I believe. I have seen them myself and so have you, when you just see light and life in the classroom which is across the hall from one that is dark and dead, I tend to think the school is just a practical unit of measure. It gets to be a fantastic job, also, but also for a pretty cold-blooded management reason; you have got to put the finger on somebody, Senator. I think it should be the principal, the management. That is the point at which judgments can be made, and if the fellow after 4 or 5 years is not doing very well, out he goes.

Mr. **BERKE**. Senator, I would like to comment on that, if I might. I think people from California might even take it further and take it right down to the individual child if they could.

I think, as researchers, we probably have an obligation to attempt to refine the tools of information to carry it right to the classroom and perhaps the individual student, but I would agree entirely with Dr. Keppel, and I think I speak for my colleague as well because this is something we have discussed many times, that the school is an appropriate level of aggregation. It is an appropriate level analyzing data for a number of reasons, and I agree with both of Dr. Keppel's points.

ACCOUNTABILITY RESTS WITH PRINCIPAL

I would add that research suggests that school principals are highly influential people in what happens in their schools and I think putting the finger on that individual is a very useful way to do it, because principals do make a difference in everything—they inspire their staff or they do not inspire their staff—and this is one way to place public attention on that.

Senator **MONDALE**. How do you fire a principal?

Dr. **KEPPEL**. It's a difficult job.

Senator **MONDALE**. You mean it has been done?

Dr. **KEPPEL**. Yes, it has been done.

Dr. **Goettel.** What it amounts to, in dynamic school districts where you are getting dynamic leadership at the central office level, there are a number of very creative ways to get rid of principals. There may be problems in terms of tenure laws, but there is nothing at all that prohibits transferring a principal from one location to another in most school districts.

Senator **Mondale.** A lot of them get promoted to the central staff where they run a larger section of the schools.

Dr. **Keppel.** That certainly has happened and I am not sure that it has not sometimes been in the interest of the public on relative allocation of resources.

One of the problems here is that the principals do not have the very information that we are talking about inside the big city systems. I have tried to look at that in two cities. This Detroit data is relatively rare, with the result that the man does not really have the management tools in his hands very often.

One clear indication of this is that the tenure for administrators in the public school systems is nonsense. It does not make any sense to me—yet there are situations in which they have tenure.

Senator **Mondale.** In our hearings in San Francisco the superintendent testified that when he arrived at what he called the "Pentagon"—the big headquarters of the San Francisco school system—at the first meeting he said: "I am going to send most of you back out to the schools. I cannot imagine what I will do with all of you here, and you are all going to go back and teach." Then, I believe, there was a big protest meeting. In San Francisco there are legal protections of some kind right up to the top, but apparently the voters of San Francisco voted out that tenure protection and some are going to have to start teaching again.

It seems that—in addition to trying to get adequate budgets, data, data collection, processing, and an adequate in-house sort of editorial analysis process—we are going to need some sort of concentration process with the result. That is what I think is unique about the Council of Economic Advisors and Joint Economic Committee and why it has succeeded where everyone else has failed. By mistake they set up an institution with tension in it, an institution that has high credibility, so the top professionals are willing to spend part of their careers there, wth a tremendous public involvement—that is, the annual report, the monthly reports, the Joint Economic Committee—and then the tension between the executive and the Congress with the kind of policy-related questions always being asked and the pressure for data that is usable policy.

Council of Social Advisors

For some years now, I have introduced a proposal for a Council of Social Advisors to deal with human problems like the Council of Economic Advisors. It passed the Senate last year and died a predictable death in the House. We will try it again this year. But if such an institution were established, it would seem one of its key questions every year should demand that there be a report on educational achievement. There should be data required to be gathered and reported on what someone called the "hot facts" of what works and what does not work. Then that data would be in the social report and I think you could expect the Congress would continue to ask the right questions—because, really, the little simple phrase that the Congress asked in 1867 is what we should have been working on. There have been hundreds of millions of dollars worth of data collected on all other matters which do not mean anything. What really counts, when it turns to Congress, is what works and how can we make it work better. I believe we have not been asking the right questions in the public census; and, in a sense, when the public asks the questions they are turned off, or denied, or dissembled. I believe one of the things we could do to restore confidence to public education is to insist that the right questions be asked and answered in a way that is understood by the layman.

I think your proposals here make a lot of sense. Nonetheless, I still think with the ones which Dr. Berke and Dr. Goettel made, you could still have a lot of in-house data and treatment of these questions.

Mr. Berke. Senator, our third recommendation was intended to get at that. We decided not to use the device of the Council of Social Advisors only because it had been around a while and we wanted to put another element into the discussion, so we talked about some agency that was part private, only tangentially associated with the Office of Education, or HEW or any of the other existing agencies.

We agree wholeheartedly with the need for this sort of activity, that you simply cannot expect it to come out of a body like the Office of Education for many of the reasons that Dr. Keppel talked about; the constituency is very much the chief State school officers. They simply, for budgetary purposes, cannot be expected to make the really controversial statements. They do not have the prestige to attract at the middle levels the kind of people that you are referring to who can ask the questions and use the analytical techniques to get the answers to those questions that another agency could. So I agree with the need for that.

We happened to select a different device but we are not wedded to it by any means. The Council of Social Advisors would be an ideal approach.

Approach Educational and Social Issues Jointly

Dr. Keppel. May I comment on that, Senator? I happen to be an enthusiast for the conception of the Council of Social Advisors and have testified in favor of it. It is not solely the general idea that you are putting forth, but speaking specifically and particularly from the educational point of view, I think it would be wise to have education included as a part of a larger confrontation type of approach that you have in mind included with other and larger social issues.

If anything is clear, it is that the schools do have limited capacity to achieve equal educational opportunity. They have to be thought of in terms of other social policies. Therefore, to include education in the larger framework would be greatly to the benefit of future educational progress. I presume you have in mind a kind of joint congressional review structure.

Senator **Mondale.** We would have a President's Council of Social Advisors with a requirement to develop social data to disseminate in an annual social report, then a joint social committee to react to it.

Dr. **Keppel.** I can say this with a cheerful point of view since I am not in office any more. I do not know whether those in office now would agree, but the fact was, as Commissioner of Education, in going to Congress I was always going up on specifics either with regard to new legislation or with regard to getting existing programs funded. That was the nature of the relationship between the Executive Branch and the Congress—the two committees of the Senate and the House, on getting legislation through, and the appropriations.

The result was with the few exceptions such as the one I quoted from the late Senator Kennedy, that the kinds of questions to which you refer were not asked. It certainly was not the fault of the individual Members of the Congress at all because the witness came before them on a specific issue.

It would have been immensely beneficial, if there had been a joint social committee.

Senator **Mondale.** The real problem here is that the Congress has given up on educators. It really does not think they know what they are doing, or know how to do it, or are capable of doing it. It does not expect real answers from educators. It just thinks the thing is a big flop, and does not know what to do about it.

You began your testimony by saying you think money makes a difference. Well, we ought to know something about that, should we not? I remember when Mr. Marland, who was a good man, came up for confirmation and I said, "All these school systems are falling apart and children are not learning." Then I asked, "What do you think works?" And he said, "We have studies on the way."

I am not being critical of him, but he spent his whole life in this business and he has run some of the major school systems. However, this sort of epitomizes this inexcusable mindlessness of the lack of a strategic understanding and approach to the central theme in American life: Give children a decent education.

We must move much more swiftly to have a rational and responsible approach. I believe the suggestions you made make a great deal of sense, and I hope we can have some progress.

Dr. **Keppel.** I suppose this is defensive, Senator, but I am at the age where I can afford that.

INDICATORS OF SUCCESS

One of the problems, as far as the public attitude is concerned towards the schools, is that there is a general kind of assumption that they are failing. This cuts very deep into public thinking, as the Coleman report shows. Yet little snippets of information point in exactly the opposite direction.

Let me quote from a report* from Princeton, a college in New Jersey—I speak as a Harvard man——

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*See also Appendix 1, p. 11047.

Senator **Mondale**. A new one.

Dr. **Keppel**. Relatively new. A committee there was studying its program and they recommended a 3-year B.A. with this quotation: "Almost all Princeton freshmen while still in secondary school receive instruction which in the recent past would have been regarded as at least equivalent to one semester of college work." And Princeton is seriously thinking of changing its programs and sharpening them up because the secondary schools from which their students come are doing, evidently, a good deal more academic and scientific work than was the case even 10 years ago.

This is the kind of fact that gets buried in the general discussion. I am appalled at how badly we reported to the Congress, partly because we did not have this kind of data. If we had had trend lines going back 10, 15, 20 years on the extent to which secondary school students were taught physics, and the increased percentage that do the calculus, the improvement in some secondary education would have been made clearer.

I am defensive, I will grant you that: yet I think the American primary and secondary school system, and its university system, are doing a whale of a lot better than the public now thinks, and it is our fault for not having made some of these facts clear.

I hasten to say that they are also doing very badly in the rural areas and in the cities.

HOW CHILDREN LEARN

Dr. **Goettel**. Senator, one of the problems is that it is not just educators but I think there are a good number of—maybe all—psychologists would say we just do not know very much about how children learn, particularly those children who do not come from home environments where learning is a major activity all of the time.

I know this is apologizing for educators, but the question that we have been dwelling on for the past 45 minutes or so is: What works and what does not work—and there are some very critical policy questions that relate to education, educational management, the delivery of educational services, school finance, that we can begin to cope with that will not answer the question of how do children learn, but will work, at least in terms of data.

STATISTICAL EXPLANATIONS FALL SHORT

As I noted before when we talked about the importance of principals, that is one of the problems we have. When you put someone in who can turn his staff on and start things happening in the school, we just do not have any way to quantify that. We can quantify it in terms of whether or not he has a master's degree or 30 points toward that thing we place such a high value on in education, a doctorate. We can quantify it in terms of job experience. But such data do not really help us understand why something is happening that we know is good. We know only that it is not occurring.

But to get back to my other point, I think just as we focused in recent weeks on the concerns of fiscal equity and intrastate fiscal equity, this is one of the areas that we don't have a great deal of information on today, and there is a reluctance on the part of the Federal Government to do something about it.

The National Education Finance Project has done some initial work in this area, and I think one of the suggestions that we did not want to address in our comments today but one of the suggestions we think the U.S. Office of Education should consider in looking at the equity question is: Are there ways that they can build in the kinds of data that the NEFP has developed simply to look at *Serrano* type concerns in every one of the 50 States because we feel that that is an important concern for the Federal Government.

Senator **Mondale**. Does the OE statistical office have a national advisory committee data approach, and so forth? Is it a civil service staff?

Dr. **Goettel**. Well, they work with a committee from the Chief State School Officers. I believe there are six State School Officers or their representatives who are on that committee. In addition they work with the committee for Education Data Systems, which is comprised of representatives from the information collection bureaus in each State department of education. The point is that here they are turning to the States for this kind of advice and not looking to Federal level policymakers.

Senator **Mondale**. I must leave to vote. We will adjourn; and thank you very, very much for your help.

The committee is in recess, to reconvene at 10 a.m., on Thursday, in room 1318 of the New Senate Office Building.

(Whereupon, at 11:20 a.m., the Select Committee was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., on December 2, 1971, in room 1318 of the New Senate Office Building.)

EDUCATION INFORMATION

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1971

U.S. Senate
Select Committee on
Equal Educational Opportunity
Washington, D.C.

The Select Committee met at 9:50 a.m., pursuant to call, in room 1318, of the New Senate Office Building, the Honorable Walter F. Mondale, chairman of the committee, presiding.

Present: Senator Mondale.

Staff members present: William C. Smith, staff director and general counsel; Bert Carp and Donald S. Harris, professional staff; William Hennigan, minority staff director; and Leonard Strickman, minority counsel.

Senator Mondale. This morning we have with us Dr. Christopher Jencks, Harvard Graduate School of Education, to testify on the question of voucher proposals.

Dr. Jencks, we are glad to have you with us this morning.

Dr. Jencks. Glad to be here. I am sorry for any inconvenience caused by our not communicating yesterday.

Senator Mondale. I guess we all tried.

Dr. Jencks. My secretary and staff seemed to have fouled things up badly. I will take that up with them.

Senator Mondale. Please do.

STATEMENT OF DR. CHRISTOPHER S. JENCKS, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, HARVARD GRADUATE SCHOOL OF EDUCATION

Dr. Jencks. I am Christopher Jencks, Associate Professor of Education and former President of the Center for the Study of Public Policy, a nonprofit educational research corporation located in Cambridge, Mass.

In December of 1969 the Center received a grant from the Office of Economic Opportunity to study the feasibility of using vouchers or grants to parents to finance elementary education. I would like today to summarize briefly for your committee the results of our study.

Basis of Voucher Plans

The basic idea behind all so-called voucher plans is that parents should have more choice about the schools their children attend. Advocates of voucher systems propose that instead of appropriating money directly to schools and then assigning students to these schools, the government should give money directly to parents. Parents would then use the money to pay for the cost of educating their children at the school of their choice.

Beyond this simple idea, however, there is no consensus among voucher advocates. There are dozens of different voucher proposals, and they have very little in common. Anyone who studies the different plans with care will find that they would have drastically different effects. Some, for example would increase racial segregation in the schools, while others would decrease it.

Some would keep parochial schools alive financially, while others would probably kill them. Some would encourage educational innovation, while others would help perpetuate traditional arrangements. This makes it silly either to favor or to oppose vouchers in general. One must favor or oppose a particular voucher plan. The merits of a plan depend on the details, not on the general slogan.

Vouchers To Maintain Segregation

There are three general kinds of voucher plans. The first variety is designed to maintain racial segregation by giving parents money to send their children to segregated private schools. This is the kind of voucher plan that was developed in the South during the 1950's.

Voucher plans of this kind have repeatedly been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court and by lower Federal courts. I can see no reason to anticipate any change in the Court's attitude on this matter even in light of its changing composition. Nor do I know of any serious effort to launch such a voucher program at the present time.

Senator Mondale. Were those State-supported systems, the school systems in the South which would give a per capita grant to a student which could be applied to a private segregated academy?

Mr. Jencks. That is the basic idea. There are five States that adopted proposals of that kind and in all cases they were thrown out by the courts. The most recent Supreme Court decision on this made it clear that they would throw out any other program of this kind which didn't have some kind of safeguards built in to preclude a segregated academy receiving public money.

At the present time, I don't know of any serious effort to launch a voucher effort of this type, the kind that support segregated academies. That isn't to say there aren't a lot of people that would like to; but, as far as I know, that is not a live issue in the South—nor, as far as I know, in the North.

Nonetheless, civil rights groups have repeatedly opposed experimentation with vouchers on the grounds that once the idea of a voucher system becomes respectable, segregationists will find a way to turn it to their own ends.

Vouchers for Parochial Schools

The second variety of voucher system is designed to support parochial schools. These are systems which have been introduced in a number of State legislatures in the South in the last couple of years. Voucher systems of this kind have never been reviewed by the Supreme Court. A good argument can be made for the view that vouchers which provide a completely free choice between religious and nonreligious schools do not violate the first amendment. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court's recent decision regarding aid to parochial schools suggests that the majority of the Court would probably reject this argument. Those who hope to keep the parochial schools alive by using vouchers are therefore likely to be disappointed.

VOUCHERS TO PROMOTE INNOVATION

The third variety of voucher system is designed not to maintain segregated schools or parochial schools but to promote educational innovation. The voucher system designed by the Center for the Study of Public Policy is of this type. This is also the system that has been under discussion between the Office of Economic Opportunity and public school systems around the country. It has very little in common with systems whose primary purpose is to maintain segregation or to maintain the parochial schools.

The reasons for the differences which I will outline in a moment have to do with the regulations that are imposed on schools that want the cash vouchers. Those regulations make it essentially impossible to maintain a segregated school and they are in many ways incompatible with the notions that the parochial schools have about how they would like to operate.

The Center has proposed an education voucher system for elementary education. The system would work in the following manner:

1. An Educational Voucher Agency (EVA) would be established to administer the vouchers. Its governing board might be elected or appointed but in either case it should be structured so as to represent the community it served. The EVA might be an existing local board of education, or it might be an agency with a larger or small geographic jurisdiction if the voucher experiment were conducted in a part of a school district or if the voucher experiment were conducted in several school districts. The EVA would receive all Federal, State, and local education funds for which children in its area were eligible. It would pay this money to schools only in return for vouchers. In addition, it would pay parents for children's transportation costs to the school of their choice.

PER CAPITA PAYMENTS

The effect of this is that every school's budget is a function of the number of students that it enrolls in a straightforward way. An eligible school, regardless of its character, gets so much a child. This, incidentally, is one way to bring a State's educational finance scheme into conformity with the kinds of requirements that the *Serrano* decision sets up for financing. Every school gets the same budget both between districts and within districts on a per capita basis.

2. The EVA would issue a voucher to every family in its district with children of elementary school age. The value of the basic voucher would initially equal the per-pupil expenditure of the public schools in the area. Schools which took children from

families with below-average incomes would receive additional incentive payments. These "compensatory payments" might, for example, make the maximum payment for the poorest child worth double the basic voucher. In effect the vouchers of low-income children would be somewhat lower than the average public school expenditure now.

Senator **Mondale**. Have you worked out a figure—for example, in Massachusetts—of what the basic voucher need is?

Dr. **Jencks**. I haven't done it for Massachusetts, but in California in the districts that we have been working in, it varies quite dramatically from district to district, which, of course, is the basis for the *Serrano* decision. In San Francisco, if I recall, the numbers we came up with were around $1,200 a child; 60 miles away in Allen Rock, where we have been working, it was only $900 a child.

Senator **Mondale**. What would you add for compensatory payment?

Dr. **Jencks**. That is a matter which OEO has been negotiating with local districts, and therefore what I say is my opinion and not OEO's opinion, but in general they have been talking about a figure which would be half to a third of the basic voucher increment for compensatory funds for those people who are eligible. When we proposed this we had a notion of a sliding scale which could run up to double the value of the basic voucher for a child who was absolutely at rock bottom, but the average compensatory payment would be still something like one-third of the basic voucher. The sliding scale means that instead of being just in or out, you get an amount more or less proportional to your income.

Senator **Mondale**. Fine.

REQUIREMENTS FOR PARTICIPATING SCHOOLS

Dr. **Jencks**. Going on with my prepared statement.

3. Now to become an "approved voucher school," which means in order to cash the vouchers that you receive, a school has to meet a set of requirements, and these requirements are crucial to the voucher system we have developed, and make it quite different from the voucher systems that have been discussed in most State legislatures up to now. The requirements are as follows:

a. A school would have to accept each voucher as full payment for a child's education and charge no additional tuition. That means from the parents' point of view all schools in the system are free, just as public schools are now.

b. A school would have to accept any applicant so long as it had vacant places.

c. If it had more applicants than places, a school would have to fill at least half of its places by picking applicants randomly and fill the other half in such a way as not to discriminate against ethnic minorities. The net effect is that, for instance, a school with 25-percent black applicants will end up with 25-percent black students.

d. The school would have to accept some uniform standards established by the EVA regarding suspension and expulsion of students. That means you can't get around the requirement that you admit a cross section of the applicants by letting in students who aren't very smart and then throwing them out the morning after the applications procedure is over. Exactly what those procedures would be is a very difficult question. Our general rule has been that procedures for expulsion would have to be the same as those of the public schools, but the question as to just whom the public schools can expel and whom they can't is in itself very troublesome. I don't want to make any commitment on that, except all the schools in the system would have to have the same rules.

e. That participating schools must agree to make a wide variety of information about its facilities, teachers, program, and students available to the EVA and to the public.

f. Participating schools would have to maintain accounts of money received and disbursed in a form that would allow both parents and the EVA to determine where the money was going. Thus a school operated by the local board of education—a "public" school—would have to show how much of the voucher money was actually spent in that school and how much was going to support the central administration or to a school down the street. Similarly if there were a school operated by a profitmaking corporation, it would have to show how much of its income was going to the stockholders and how much was actually being spent on education in the school where the vouchers were being cashed.

g. All schools in the system would have to meet existing State requirements for private schools regarding curriculum, staffing, and the like. Those vary enormously from State to State, so that the meaning of that requirement is quite important in New York State where there are many requirements for private schools, but is much less important in a State like California where there are virtually no requirements for private schools.

The basic assumption is that whatever rules a State has established as the minimum requirements under which a school meets the compulsory attendance laws would apply to the schools of this system.

4. The EVA could also set other requirements for schools wishing to cash vouchers. The aim of the voucher system is, however, to keep these requirements to a minimum. This is usually the case with respect to existing State requirements for private schools. If the EVA begins to establish elaborate rules regarding the structure of governing boards, the subjects taught, the qualifications of the teachers, and so forth, the net result could be to stifle innovation and narrow choice rather than to improve the situation.

5. Just as at present, the local board of education—which might or might not be the EVA—would be responsible for insuring that there were enough places in publicly managed schools to accommodate every elementary school-age child who did not want to attend a privately managed school. No child would have to go to a

privately operated school. If a shortage of places developed for some reason, the board of education would have to open new schools or create more places in existing schools. Alternatively, it might find ways to encourage privately managed schools to expand, presumably by getting the EVA to raise the value of the voucher.

ENROLLMENT PROCEDURES IN VOUCHER SCHOOLS

6. Every spring, each family would submit to the EVA the name of the school to which it wanted to send each of its elementary school-age children the following fall. Any child already enrolled in a voucher school would be guaranteed a place, as would any sibling of a child enrolled in a voucher school. So long as it had room, a voucher school would be required to admit all students who listed it as a first choice. If it had more applicants than places, a school could select among applicants for up to one-half of its places. It could not, however, select these applicants in such a way as to discriminate against racial minorities. It would then have to fill its remaining places by a lottery among the remaining applicants. All schools with unfilled places would report these to the EVA. All families whose children had not been admitted to their first-choice school would then choose an alternative school which still had vacancies. Vacancies would then be filled in the same manner as in the first round. This procedure would continue until every child had been admitted to a school.

7. Having enrolled their children in a school, parents would give their vouchers to the school. The school would send the vouchers to the EVA, and if the school met the requirements established by the EVA, it would receive a check for the value of the vouchers.

FALLACY OF PUBLIC/PRIVATE DISTINCTION

If established, a system of this kind would blur the traditional distinction between "public" and "private" schools. In my view, this would probably be a good thing, since the traditional distinction is in some ways misleading.

Indeed, a lot of our thinking about the voucher system is based on an attempt to rethink the question of where the line between public and private should be drawn, and what it makes sense to think about as public schools or private schools.

Since the 19th century, we have classified schools and colleges as "public" if they were owned and operated by a governmental body. We go right on calling colleges "public," even when they charge tuition that many people cannot afford. We also call academically exclusive high schools "public," even if they have admissions requirements that only a handful of students can meet. We call neighborhood elementary schools "public," despite the fact that people from outside the neighborhood cannot attend them, and cannot move into the neighborhood unless they have a white skin and a down payment for a $30,000 home, or both. And we call whole school systems "public," even though they refuse to give anyone information about what they are doing, how well they are doing it, and whether children are getting the education their parents want. Conversely, we have always called schools "private" if they were owned and operated by private organizations. We have gone on calling these schools "private," even when, as sometimes happens, they are open to every applicant on a nondiscriminatory basis, charge no tuition, and make whatever information they have about themselves available to anyone who asks.

Definitions of this kind conceal as much as they reveal. They classify schools entirely in terms of who runs them, not how they are run. If we want to describe what is really going on in education, there is much to be said for reversing this emphasis. We would then call a school "public" if it were open to everyone on a nondiscriminatory basis, if it charged no tuition, and if it provided full information about itself to anyone interested. Conversely, we would call any school "private" if it excluded applicants in a discriminatory way, charged tuition, or withheld information about itself. Admittedly, the question of who governs a school cannot be ignored entirely when categorizing the school, but it seems considerably less important than the question of how the school is governed.

Regulatory System Principles

Adopting this revised vocabulary, the Center proposed a regulatory system with two underlying principles:

1. No public money should be used to support "private" schools, in our sense of the word private.
2. Any group that operates a "public" school should be eligible for public subsidies.

What benefits might result from such a system of educational finance? I have spent several years sorting through the welter of claims made for vouchers. My main conclusion is most of the claims are silly.

There are two things which I think a voucher system should be expected to do.

1. New kinds of schools could be established, new kinds of people could be drawn into teaching, and new ideas could be tried out, with far less difficulty than under the existing system of educational finance. If a group of public school teachers wanted to do things differently, for example, and if the school administration were unwilling or unable to support their efforts, they could establish their own school—subject only to the requirement that they persuade some parents that their school made sense and that they enroll enough students to balance their books. This possibility has, of course, always existed for teachers who were willing and able to cater entirely to children whose parents could afford to pay tuition. But, under a voucher system, innovators could recruit students from all economic groups instead of just the children of the rich. While we expect that teachers would be the primary instigators of new schools, we also anticipate some schools sponsored by parents, community groups, business corporations, and perhaps even local public school systems.

> 2. This last possibility highlights the second potential benefit of a voucher system. A voucher system is not just a device for supporting innovative schools "outside" the public system. It is also a device for supporting new kinds of schools "inside" the public system.

Traditionally, public schools have had a very hard time developing unusual programs, because attendance at the neighborhood public school was virtually compulsory for everyone living in a neighborhood. Here I am talking about elementary schools. This meant that public schools could not do anything that would be really unpopular with large numbers of parents. Almost everything new falls into that category, so public schools have tended to avoid trouble by offering children mostly the same kind of schooling their parents had. This is inevitable in institutions which must serve a very diverse clientele on an involuntary basis. But there is no reason why public school systems should not be able to establish innovative and experimental programs on a voluntary basis for those who want them. If some people want a Montessorri school, and others do not, a public school system should be able to satisfy both groups by establishing both kinds of schools, instead of having to engage in a protracted squabble about whether to have only one or the other. The same thing applies to open classrooms and to many other potentially controversial programs. Once parents have a choice about where they send their children, the public schools can set up all kinds of alternatives on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.

OBJECTIONS TO VOUCHER SYSTEM

There are some problems, nonetheless. One common objection to a voucher system of this kind is that many parents are too ignorant to make intelligent choices among schools. Giving parents a choice will, according to this argument, simply set in motion an educational equivalent of Gresham's Law, in which hucksterism and mediocre schooling will drive out high quality institutions. This argument seems especially plausible to those who envisage the entry of large numbers of profit-oriented firms into the educational marketplace. The argument is not, however, supported by much evidence. Existing private schools are sometimes mere diploma mills, but on the average their claims about themselves seem no more misleading, and the quality of the services they offer no lower, than in the public schools. And while some private schools are run by hucksters interested only in profit, this is the exception rather than the rule. There is no obvious reason to suppose that vouchers would change all this.

A second common objection to vouchers is that they would "destroy the public schools." Again, this seems far-fetched. If you look at the educational choices made by wealthy parents who can already afford whatever schooling they want for their children, you find that most still prefer their local public schools if these are at all adequate. Furthermore most of those who now leave the public system do so in order to attend high-cost, exclusive private schools.

While some wealthy parents would doubtless continue to patronize such schools, they would receive no subsidy under the proposed system, because—and this point should be emphasized—most of these private schools either spend far more money than the public schools or have an admission system which is in no sense nondiscriminatory. In our conversations, these schools show very little interest in participating in a voucher system that would require them to change. So a voucher system really is completely irrelevant as far as this tiny handful of exclusive private schools is concerned.

Nonetheless, if you call every school "public" that is ultimately responsible to a public board of education, then there is little doubt that a voucher system would result in some shrinkage of the "public" sector and some growth of the "private" sector. If, on the other hand, you confine the label "public" to schools which are equally open to everyone within commuting distance, you discover that the so-called public sector includes relatively few genuinely public schools. Instead, racially exclusive suburbs and economically exclusive neighborhoods serve to ration access to good "public" schools in precisely the same way that admissions committees and tuition charges ration access to good "private" schools.

If you begin to look at the distinction between public and private schooling in these terms, emphasizing accessibility rather than control, you are likely to conclude that a voucher system, far from destroying the public sector, would greatly expand it, since it would force large numbers of schools, public and private, to open their doors to outsiders if they wanted to get public funds.

A third objection to vouchers is that they would be available to children attending Catholic schools. This is not, of course, a necessary feature of a voucher system. The courts, a State legislature, or a local EVA could easily restrict participation to nonsectarian schools. Indeed, some State constitutions clearly require that this be done.

OEO in its negotiations with a number of States and school districts has indicated its willingness to go along with whatever arrangements with Catholic schools the State wanted to make. In some States the constitution is quite explicit that no State and local funds may go to Catholic schools. OEO has taken the position that the Federal Government would abide by the State law.

The Federal constitution may also require such a restriction, but neither the language of the first amendment nor the legal precedent is clear on this issue. Until the Supreme Court rules, this issue must be resolved on political grounds.

If I may make a small addendum, it is my personal conviction that Catholic schools should be allowed to participate in this kind of a system, but it is not an integral feature of the kind of program we have been discussing. Neither OEO nor the Center has any firm position on the matter.

EFFECT OF VOUCHERS ON SEGREGATION

A fourth objection to vouchers—and I think this is the one which this committee and other people are probably the most concerned about—is that they would promote, or at least maintain, segregation. This fear may seem surprising in light of the rules described above. The rules insure that any student has the same chance as any other of attending any school in his district that appeals to his parents. No longer would blacks be forced to attend all-black schools simply because they lived in all-black neighborhoods. If blacks apply to good schools outside their neighborhoods, they must be admitted in exact proportion to the percentage that apply. On the other hand, the regulations do not force students to attend a school simply because some judge, legislator, or school administrator has decided that that is the right kind of school for the child. Blacks would not be required to apply to predominantly white schools. They would simply be guaranteed the right to attend them if they wanted to do so.

If you believe that blacks would not want to attend predominantly white schools, and if you also believe that they should be made to attend such schools whether they want to or not, then you should oppose this experiment. This is not a compulsory busing scheme, and it will not produce those results.

Some opponents of vouchers agree that a system with the regulations described above would not create more segregation and might in fact create less than the present system. But they fear that the regulations would be altered or ignored by State and local authorities. This is a reasonable fear. Certainly all our experience with Federal regulations suggests this is something to worry about. But we can see no more reason to suppose that a regulated voucher system would be perverted to racist ends than that the existing system of neighborhood public schools will be used for racist ends. If a local school board or EVA wants to maintain segregation, and if the Federal Government is not prepared to blow the whistle, segregation can be maintained without vouchers as easily as with them. If either the local school board or the Federal Government is committed to preventing discrimination, they can do so at least as easily in a regulated voucher system as in a traditional public school system.

My conclusion is that the issue with-respect to segregation is a matter of political will, and if the will exists you can deal with the segregation problem with a voucher system or without a voucher system. If the will doesn't exist you are out of luck.

DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS

Finally, I should say that I am not here to offer an endorsement of the voucher system I have described. I helped develop the proposal, but for that very reason I am acutely conscious of the many uncertainties involved. I would be appalled if Congress or a State legislature were to consider imposing a voucher system across the board. What I would like to see, and what OEO has been considering, is a limited number of demonstration projects in communities that are interested in trying out the idea. If such demonstrations take place, they will allow everyone to judge for themselves whether a voucher system is as good as its advocates claim, as bad as its critics claim, or simply another in the long series of proposals that turned out not to make any difference one way or the other. Without a demonstration, discussions of vouchers will continue to be mostly rhetoric.

Senator MONDALE. Thank you very much, Dr. Jencks. What is the state of the OEO effort; how much money is involved; how many communities are experimenting with voucher systems; and, what magnitude of financial or community involvement is hoped for?

Dr. JENCKS. Money committed so far has been a series of grants to the Center for the Study of Public Policy which have totaled about $0.5 million, first to develop the plan, then to get a lot of people involved who were interested in providing technical assistance to communities, advice to interested State legislators, and so on, plus a series of planning grants to specific school districts. There are presently three such planning grants, and there are several more under negotiation.

In addition there was a planning grant made to Gary, Ind., which conducted a preliminary study of the subject and then decided not to participate in a voucher demonstration project at this time. This was largely because the superintendent felt that the political situation in Gary was too delicate, and that there were too many other problems to take on something so controversial at this time.

The three planning grants which have gone a step further are in Allen Rock elementary school district, which is part of San Jose, in San Francisco, and in Seattle. OEO is now considering several other planning grant applications from other districts.

Those planning grants have a two stage process. The initial grant is usually for some sum between about $20,000 and $50,000 for a preliminary feasibility study in the district, and then more substantial sums, on the order of $100,000, to develop a full scale scheme for what the city might do if it wanted a voucher demonstration project.

I don't know the exact amount of money that has been committed overall by OEO but as a rough guess I would say it is between three quarters of a million and a million dollars over the last 2½ years.

If the thing goes forward—and it is not at the moment clear that any school district has met all the requirements for going forward, including the requirement that it wants to go forward—the order of magnitude of money would be a couple of million dollars a year of OEO money, plus anywhere from five to 10 times that amount from State and local funds already available in the district. That is, a couple of million dollars of OEO money would go to education, and probably another million dollars of OEO money would go for evaluation, research and technical assistance that goes with a demonstration project.

The total OEO commitment depends, of course, on the number of sites which are actually involved. If we are talking about, let's say, $2 or $3 million a year a site for two sites you get a number on the order of $5 million a year. If you get many more sites, which would be much more desirable in terms of learning something, the sum of money would be larger.

STATE LEGISLATION

At the moment, however, there is no school district that is firmly committed to going ahead with the demonstration project. Now that is a long and complicated story. A demonstration project requires that a whole series of things be done. In most States it requires that there be enabling legislation passed by the State legislature. At this point, no State legislature has passed such legislation.

Senator **MONDALE**. Has it been tried?

Dr. **JENCKS**. The only State where there has been a serious effort to pass such legislation is California. The bill in California was defeated by a one-vote margin in the Senate Finance Committee. It was passed by the assembly and passed out by the Education Committee, and then defeated in the Finance Committee by one vote about 2 weeks ago. Presumably if the two districts that are interested in participating, Allen Rock and San Francisco, decide they do want to go forward, there will be another attempt to pass enabling legislation next year, but that is dead for this year in California.

No other State legislature has given serious consideration to the matter. There have been discussions with the legislative leaders in some States, and some of them have indicated that they thought such a piece of enabling legislation could be passed without great difficulty. Others have indicated they thought it would be difficult to pass.

There are a few States which have either existing legislation under which a voucher demonstration could be done or a provision by which the State Board of Education can waive the provisions of it being done.

So it is not the case that every State requires enabling legislation.

There is also at this point no school board which has firmly committed itself to going forward. All three boards that are actively involved in this, Seattle, San Francisco, and Allen Rock, have decided to take the next step at each point of choice, but they have not gone to the point of saying, "Yes, we want to do it."

Senator **Mondale.** Would a city the size of San Francisco have to agree to make it citywide?

Dr. **Jencks.** No; I should have clarified. The kind of demonstration we are discussing is a demonstration that would involve something on the order of 10,000 elementary schoolchildren. In a city the size of San Francisco this means that the San Francisco School Board would designate an area of the city as the target area for the voucher project. They could designate whatever area seemed to be appropriate and establish an EVA which was specific for that area of the city. The voucher experiment would just cover that part of the city.

Senator **Mondale.** Well, how would you avoid excluding the lower income groups of the area?

Dr. **Jencks.** I think OEO would require that, in order to be acceptable, a demonstration area would have to be mixed so that you would get many ethnically and racially mixed schools in it.

In the case of San Francisco I think this is not a problem. I don't think there is a chance in the world that Judge Wygal would approve such an experiment unless it had this characteristic. I am not sure he would approve the experiment no matter what characteristics it has, which is another complication in San Francisco.

Another problem arises in Seattle, which is engaged in rather complicated litigation with respect to racial balance in the public schools. All of our negotiations with Seattle are under the additional constraint that they will have to satisfy whatever court orders finally come down on the integration of the public schools.

OEO FUNDS

Senator **Mondale.** Take the existing per capita public contribution and then you add something from the Federal Government into the voucher—how much money would OEO be contributing to sort of sweeten the pot? About how much is sweet enough?

Dr. **Jencks.** Well, one of the problems with interesting local districts in this experiment, I would say, is that OEO has been very reluctant to engage in what, without prejudice, I would call bribery. The Federal contribution has been designed to meet all the additional costs of the experiment, which means some direct educational costs. That is, for instance, a city in which parochial schools were to participate, there would be public money going to support costs which had previously been borne entirely privately. Similarly they would pick up any other direct costs.

But the only additional money which would flow to the public school system is the extra payments for compensatory vouchers. Therefore, the magnitude of the compensatory payments that are attached to the vouchers of low-income children has become crucial with respect to how much money the local school district is actually going to get out of this.

I think it is fair to say, for better or worse, that OEO has not been very openhanded in its negotiations on this point. They have agreed to the principle and they believe in the principle, but they have not been conducting these negotiations in such a way as to make a school district want to participate simply because of the money they would get out of it. And I think this helps account for the fact that there isn't a long queue of applicants at OEO waiting to get on this gravy train.

My guess is that something on the order of $1 million in compensatory payments might flow to a local district, and if you spread that over 10,000 children, you are talking about something like $100 a child. The compensatory payments, of course, would be more than $100 a child. That is, compensatory payments might be $300 a child for a third of the students. But the net increment to the district prorated over the whole population would be on the order of 10 percent. In some districts it could be less than 10 percent, in some districts it would be more. But it is not enough to make a district go in for this.

Senator MONDALE. OEO just pays for the additional cost—no dividends to the taxpayer?

Dr. JENCKS. Right. And that is one of the things that OEO has always been committed to; they were absolutely committed to the principle this should not be used to substitute Federal money for local tax efforts.

Senator MONDALE. But, it is not big enough for them to say, "Well, we are going to get a lot of new money to really give these poor children a chance." The $100 a head doesn't make enough difference.

Dr. JENCKS. No, OEO has not been at all oriented that way. From the point of view of a demonstration project, you can say that is good because it means you are treating vouchers as an issue independent from extra money, or you can say it is bad because it makes the experiment suffer under the same financial constraints as public schools.

Senator MONDALE. So it would be fair, at this point, to say no school district has committed itself solidly toward the project?

Dr. JENCKS. I think that is correct.

Senator MONDALE. Three of them are actively looking at it?

Dr. JENCKS. Right. In addition, several are looking at it that have not at this point had OEO grants.

Senator MONDALE. We have no experience with the voucher system in being——

Dr. JENCKS. That is correct.

Senator MONDALE. Of the kind that you have designed.

EXAMPLES OF VOUCHER-TYPE SYSTEMS

Dr. **JENCKS.** That is correct. We have no real experience with any sort of voucher system if the truth were told. We have brief experience with the systems that were set up in the South, but in every case that I know of they were liquidated by the courts within a year or so of the time they were set up.

Senator **MONDALE.** There might be examples of impacted aid given to the voucher system.

Dr. **JENCKS.** There are examples which I haven't discussed but which might be of some interest. There are a number of school districts in northern New England which do not maintain public high schools but instead provide payments to parents to send their children to either a neighboring high school or private academies, depending on the parents' choice. Those arrangements are essentially very ad hoc. That is, they exist under regulations which are developed by the local school board. They don't have any very elaborate theory behind them. They are simply an example of a poor district saying that children should go to high school, that we can't run a high school, so we pay out money for high school directly to parents.

Senator **MONDALE.** You know, the Federal impact aid has done very significant things in some States with Indian reservations. We were working with the new Indian Education Act in my State which would get rid of that impact aid and set up a new category of independent student assistance. Some of the Indian educators said this is the worst thing you could do because, right now, there's $800 or $900 a head on these Indian students at or near reservations. Now that the impact aid money has risen that high, we find that all those public schools—that used to resent an Indian getting close—are often competing for these children. They go to see their parents, do everything they can to encourage the children—to make the children want to come there—and, for the first time, the Indians are wanted. Of course, it is the money riding on their head that helps a little there. I wonder if there aren't some sort of ad hoc voucher systems, of that kind, that might be looked at.

Dr. **JENCKS.** There are a number, and we have actually been interested in the Indian situation for just that reason. And although I haven't done a detailed study of it, there is some interesting experience from Denmark where they set up a system of this kind. It is interesting particularly in light of the question of how many people will want to pull out of the local public schools. The Danish experience, as I understand it, has been that about 10 percent of the population did not want to attend the regular public school, but instead set up one or another kind of experimental school.

Now, of course, there are drastic differences between Denmark and the United States; there are no big ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities.

EDUCATORS' ATTITUDES ABOUT VOUCHERS

Senator **MONDALE.** It is my impression that most of the professional education groups would like to see this whole idea dropped. If so, how do you evaluate their motivations and reasons?

Dr. **Jencks**. Well, there are several factors. First, I would say that I think your impression is accurate.

Next I would say that our experience in dealing with the professional groups has been rather as follows. The conversation tends to go "we are against vouchers, now can you tell us what they are." And the opposition has been linked to a series of ideas about the proposal which made people think they were against it because they thought the proposal was something other than what it was. However, many were against it even after they understood what it was about.

The initial response has been on two bases. First, when somebody says vouchers, some people think of segregated systems; and if they are against segregation they are against vouchers. Second, the NEA and the education groups in general have been opposed to any money going to the private sector. In their mind that basically means Catholic schools, and as you know, there have been resolutions passed at NEA meetings, and so forth, opposing any form of aid to private schools on any terms whatever, and asking for repeal of whatever aid there is. I think that kind of orientation has played a big part in their opposition.

Now beyond that I think there is a very strong feeling on the part of a lot of people in the education establishment that they have built up a set of working relationships with the existing public authorities and local school boards, and so forth, and that they therefore have some voice in how things go at the local level and at the State level.

They don't know what would happen if you were to have a system of this kind, and therefore it involves a big risk. In effect they would rather live with the devil they know than the devil they don't. That seems to me entirely understandable. But it is exactly the state of mind which makes it very difficult to do anything new.

The last thing, I suppose, is that there's a very strong feeling among a lot of people that this is a device for getting business into education and that that is a bad idea. There is a strong feeling among a lot of public school people that the profit motive is a bad motive and that schools run for profit will be bad schools, and that a voucher system will produce a lot of Pappy Parker's Fried Children. I don't think there is much basis for this kind of anxiety, because I don't think it will turn out that you can make very much money running schools. People who have run private schools for the rich have generally found that proprietary schools were not get-rich schemes. Very few of those schools are run on a profitmaking basis.

The private corporations that have gone into performance contracting have found this is not as profitable or easy to do as they had imagined. And frankly, I think the whole argument that business is going to be able to run schools more efficiently than those "socialists" known as public educators is a lot of nonsense. I think it will turn out that the public school system, in terms of simply keeping costs down and operating within a tight budget, is run as efficiently as it would be on almost any basis.

Senator **Mondale**. Robert Lekachman—I guess you have read his articles—says:*

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*See Appendix 2, p. 11115; Vouchers and Public Education, *The New Leader*, July 12, 1971.

In the present climate of opinion, a generalized voucher plan would not have a ghost of a chance to win politically if it remained faithful to Jencks' criteria: tuition ceilings, rewards for schools that educate difficult children, 50-percent lotteries, plus effective supervision over publicity, admissions, suspension, and compulsion. And if by some major miracle liberal vouchers were inaugurated, middle-class parents would place enormous pressure upon voucher authorities to influence the operation in favor of their own children, EVA's would either cave in or find their tasks radically redefined by legislatures responding to middle-class pressures.

I think you have already responded to that.

Legislative Concern Over Segregation

Dr. Jencks. There is one point I would like to make that is relevant to that, which has to do with our actual experience in negotiating with legislatures. In general the legislatures that we have been dealing with—and, of course, they are not a cross section—have been inclined to place more restrictions on what voucher schools could do than the Center has proposed. They have not tried to eliminate restrictions. They have been extremely concerned about the possibility that this kind of a system could be used to bring about segregation, for instance. And in a general way this is not surprising, because the strongest single group with an interest in vouchers is the public school system, and its strongest interest is to insure if there is going to be a voucher system it should be one in which the public schools can compete on an equal basis with the private schools. So there is a very powerful lobby built in, pushing to maintain a system in which the public schools do not become a dumping ground for the children who can't get into private schools.

Now this may not be true once a voucher system is in operation, but it certainly has been true up to this point. So I don't think the local and State politics are anywhere near as gloomy as Mr. Lekachman does. That is not to say I would like to set up such a system in Georgia. There might be a number of problems.

Neighborhood Schools Under Voucher Plan

Senator Mondale. Your voucher regulations do not require any bias in favor of existing feeder patterns?

Dr. Jencks. No, except insofar as the district is drawn that way. That is, if you do the demonstration in San Francisco they might.

Senator Mondale. Since it is related to elementary schools, if a family lived half a block from their traditional elementary school they would not be preferred over someone who lived 3 miles from there?

Dr. Jencks. That is the case. Under our proposal, if there are surplus applicants, there must be a lottery for at least half the places in the school. But with respect to the remaining places, the school board or the school might accord preference to local children over children from farther away. The only restriction is that the school can't accord preference to local children if, in so doing, it accords preference to white children. It would have to work out its admissions so that it gets the right racial mix.

Senator Mondale. Let me see how this works. Let's say we have 10 elementary schools in a community; one which has a reputation of being absolutely the best one, and one absolutely the worst. Presumably if all the facts are out and people were choosing wisely, the parents who are now sending their children to the absolutely worst would apply for the absolute best—children that are at the absolute best presumably will apply to stay where they are, also many, many others around the community will spot the one with the good reputation. Now how do you sort that out?

Dr. **Jencks.** Okay, the first point is that in order to do this you have to guarantee that any student who is already in the school can stay there. So you start with grade one.

Senator **Mondale.** Now what is the second?

Dr. **Jencks.** All the children who are already in the best school get a free ride. The question is what happens to the children who want to come who will be going to the first grade. In the extreme case, that is everyone applies to the same school, the school may fill half their places any way they want.

Senator **Mondale.** And they might opt for the neighborhood solution?

Dr. **Jencks.** They might opt for the neighborhood solution. Presumably they can only take half the people they defined as being in that neighborhood—of course, they can always double the number of places. If everybody wants to go to a school, you make the school bigger. If nobody wants to go to a school, you make the number of places less. In short run you can assume there will be too many people, that there are not enough classrooms, and so forth, and as a result there will be a surplus of applicants. Now if the school with the reputation of being best happens to be, let's say, in an all white area and the whole district is 25-percent black, then it will get 25-percent black applicants. It fills half its places by choice. Now it can't fill this first half with only neighborhood people, because they will be all white, and that will break the rules. So it takes three-quarters of the first half from white applicants who live in the neighborhood and a quarter from black applicants from outside the neighborhood. Now it has half its places filled. Then there is a lottery for the second half among the remaining applicants. The school ends up with about 25 percent of its students black, about 37 percent of its students white children from the neighborhood and another 37 percent white children who were chosen at random from all the people all over the city who applied.

So the system essentially has some bias in favor of its neighborhood, but it could not end up being a neighborhood school in anything like the traditional sense. The majority of the students will come from outside the neighborhood.

Senator **Mondale.** Don't you have difficult transportation problems?

Additional Funds for Busing

Dr. **Jencks.** You could easily have a difficult transportation problem, and OEO has contemplated financing what is an additional payment for a busing system which would get children to the school of their choice. The cost of busing obviously varies enormously according to the character of the district and the degree of concentration. There are some school districts that we have been dealing with where schools are geographically heavily concentrated so there are four or five schools within walking distance of a child. There are other districts—

Allen Rock, for example—that already have children going to school on a bus, so that nothing would change all that much—just the bus routes essentially.

The question of how this whole thing works really depends on the degree to which people want to attend schools other than the nearest school. You can conjure up real horror stories in which everybody goes to the schools miles and miles away because that is where they want to go. It doesn't seem very likely, but there is no way to find out but to try it.

Senator MONDALE. How legitimate is the desire to attend the neighborhood school? Are you aware of any studies to help us understand?

OPEN ENROLLMENT

Dr. JENCKS. Well, we did a little work on this this summer. Looking at what happened in open enrollment situations of most kinds in the South they had been constructed to avoid integrating the schools, and in the North they had been constructed in the early 1960's when it looked like a good solution—our conclusion was that in the black community almost everything depended on the way the thing was presented and on the politics which lay behind its having been established. In some open enrollment situations you had virtually no black parents who wanted to take advantage of this option. Virtually all of them wanted to attend the neighborhood school whether it was all black or not. In other open enrollment situations, it was the opposite.

The extreme case would be something like Project Concern in Hartford, where the thing is presented as if the student had just won a prize—you get to go to a school in the suburbs, although of course if you don't want to you don't have to. The scheme is presented in a way that leads the parent to expect that the child will attend a better school than the one he is now in, that the whole classroom is going, and that it is all settled, and so on. In that situation you get something between 80 and 90 percent of the parents saying yes.

I think our inference from that was that it just depends very strongly on the way in which the thing is structured rather than on the simple question of whether or not the school is the neighborhood school. And the public opinion surveys suggest the same thing, to me at least: the way you word questions about what people want has a fantastic effect on the way in which people answer them. If people really perceive a qualitative difference between schools, most of them seem to prefer the school which is supposed to be better even if it is not in the neighborhood. If they see this as something that has been imposed on them to meet some arbitrary requirement, that for instance somebody thinks a school should be integrated but that actually it is not a better school, whatever that means, then they resist it. And obviously if they think the school is going to be worse as well as not being in the neighborhood, then they will resist it in a real fashion.

But our assumption has been that in a situation in which parents were choosing schools, they would normally think that the school they chose was better. But a lot depends on the degree to which the schools become different from one another. That is, in a traditional rich neighborhood there isn't much difference among the schools. However, if you get a system in which there is a Montessorri or a Lesershire school, then there will be a lot of parents who will want that school regardless of whether it is close or far away.

Senator **Mondale**. Your voucher system, as you say, is designed to promote education innovation. Now, it would dramatically change the ability of the lower-income parents to select a school of their choice. Why do you see this as a need? What is it about the present system that causes you to believe that this approach is so terribly important?

Politics and Innovation

Dr. **Jencks**. Well, there are two kinds of problems. One is the constraint on educators which I talked about. If you are running a neighborhood elementary school which everybody must attend, and if you want to do something which has never been done before, you are almost certain to encounter opposition. Even if all you want is to have the new math instead of the old math, there are going to be parents who say: "Why don't you teach it the way you used to; this isn't mathematics, this is something else." And the more unorthodox is the thing you want to do, the more parents are going to be confused and upset and hostile. The safe and easy political course in that kind of situation is always to go on doing what you have always been doing, and generally speaking that has been exactly the course that school administrators have felt they have had to take.

To maintain any course, no matter how traditional, which will be acceptable to the majority of parents, when parents disagree as much as they do about what is good education, usually takes all the energy of the school superintendent and the school principal. If they stay in office and are not lynched, they feel they have done pretty well for that year. To go out on a limb and try some crackpot new scheme thought up by God knows who is a very risky business. Superintendents therefore are willing to innovate only in a community which either has no influence over the schools at all, for example, in a big, bureaucratic school system where in effect they can institute a change and assume that, even if parents are unhappy, there is no real possibility of protest or else in a community where innovation per se is seen as a good thing—for example, in a suburban district where whatever is the latest thing is what people want.

But in the normal course of events, when you are operating essentially on a compulsory basis, innovation is almost impossible. A choice system seems to me to be the only device which will allow innovation within the public sector. Most innovations appeal to a minority at first—you come up with some new idea, somebody wants to do something different, and the first year, perhaps 10 percent of the people think it is a good idea. Twenty years later the majority will agree. But in the present system, you can't get going until the majority think it is a good idea.

The other argument is much more simple minded: If parents feel they have a choice and are exercising a choice, they may take more responsibility for their children's education—be more interested, pay more attention, be more attentive to what the schools are doing, get more involved in school affairs, and so forth. Now, that is chancy, but it is certainly at least a reasonable theory that when people feel they have some control, they begin to get more involved.

But as far as innovation is concerned, I really think the crucial element is this question of how the local politics work. The only way that I can see to get innovation in the public sector is to allow it to be voluntary.

Senator **Mondale**. We will take a recess.

[Short recess.]

Senator **Mondale**. I would like to change the subject for a minute. Have you completed your work on the report on education equality?

Dr. **Jencks**. I am working on it. I wish I could say I had completed it.

Senator **Mondale**. I have read the rough draft. This committee has a very short life, as far as March of next year. We have been given the task of recommending national policies to achieve equal educational opportunity in this country. For nearly 2 years now, we have had day after day of hearings. We have listened to practically everybody we had reason to believe had something to say; and, as an overlapping study, we have had to grapple with the school integration/desegregation problem.

In your study, as I understand it, you attempt to grapple with available research materials to determine what they disclose as to what might work, what hasn't worked. It strikes me as very close to the same problem.

If you were to advise this committee as to what key recommendations ought to be made to encourage national policies toward more equality in educational opportunity, what would the elements of the Jencks' plan be?

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EQUALITY IN EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY

Dr. **Jencks**. Well, leaving vouchers aside for the moment, I think that the main conclusion we have drawn from the research that we have looked at is that a policy designed to encourage equal educational opportunity does not guarantee equal results, and what is more, is not a particularly good way of achieving equality among adults. In fact, the main conclusion I draw from the research we have examined is: That if you want to establish equality among adults, you want to make incomes more equal or occupational status more equal or people's political power more equal or whatever, and that school reform is not a particularly promising way to go about that. Even if we make the schools absolutely equal, we will have done relatively little to deal with the problem of inequality among adults in America.

Now, if that is the case, then it is very important to separate the question of equal educational opportunity and the rights of people to a good education from the question of whether or not this is going to produce equal scores on certain kinds of tests or equal incomes among adults, or whatever. And my approach to the problem has, therefore, come to be one in which equal educational opportunity means that people get a chance to get the kind of education that either they or—when they are younger—their parents want for them. That everybody has the same opportunity to get that kind of education. The emphasis is on what people want rather than on an education which will result in their reading at exactly the same level as somebody else.

This is related to a more general comment about schools, which is that during the 1960's we all tended to look at schools in a very instrumental way. No one tried to make schools good places for children to be in simply because people spend a fifth of their lives going to school and it is therefore reasonable to want schools to be nice places where people are treated with decency and respect. The reason we wanted to fuss with schools was because we believed that the first fifth of life would influence the next four-fifths. It wasn't enough to make the schools good in their own right; we wanted to make them good because they would affect adult life.

I think that emphasis was probably wrong. I have come more and more to think that the school integration question is analogous to the question of desegregating public facilities. You don't say that you want to desegregate men's rooms because the urinals in one place are not as good as the urinals in another. You want to desegregate things because people have a right to that, and because it is not decent to discriminate against people. The seats in the back of the bus do not have to be any harder to make it unreasonable and unjust to put people in the back of the bus.

My approach to both the school desegregation question and the more general question has come to be one in which equal educational opportunity is thought of as the right to attend a school where the student is treated well, where people don't abuse him, where he gets a chance to learn something, where he doesn't feel he is wasting his time, where 7-year-old kids smile instead of going around looking gloomy all day long. That is, of course, very unpopular with people who want to use the schools to save the world.

But I suppose that what follows from this is that our idea of what will do any good is very different from the ideas and standards we have traditionally had.

The report that you have looked at mostly uses the standard of what will affect test scores, and, to some extent, what will affect whether or not students in a given school will go on to college. The reason those were chosen was because it was presumed that people who go to college and people who achieved high test scores would get better jobs and have better opportunities than those who do not.

I think I would say that those criteria may be misplaced. There may not be much the schools can do about better jobs and better opportunities. But you can arrange the schools so the plaster doesn't fall on the children's heads; and you can surely arrange for the students to get a hot lunch so they have enough to eat and feel like going to school, and don't spend all day feeling pain in the pit of their stomachs; and you can surely arrange schools so that the teachers treat the children in a way that you would want children to be treated, instead of treating them as if the teachers were jailers maintaining control over a group of restless inmates. And it is these kinds of qualities that I now feel are much more important than the things that we have been manipulating.

How do you go about doing that? The voucher system we have been talking about is one device which, at least in my mind, is a promising way both to make the schools more responsive to parents and children and also to equalize the distribution of resources, so that you don't have a situation in which some schools have twice as much money to spend as a place across town and are therefore much better able to create a better atmosphere and a decent place for children.

I am not sure how responsive that is to your question.

SKILL LEVELS

Senator MONDALE. Well, I guess I am a little more old-fashioned. I think there is a great deal in what you say about a sense of humanity and respect. Also, a great deal to be said about looking upon childhood and studenthood as a time that ought to be enjoyed in its own right as a part of life, and not just a period when the pressure is on, in order to prepare you for real life later. I agree with all those things. I believe in the importance of enjoyable architectural surroundings and physical facilities, health care, and so on—I agree with all that. But, I also think that it is true that a poor black child that goes to a black ghetto school who doesn't really learn to read or to count or develop skills—achieve a level in skills necessary to go on to higher education, or develop motivation—has a set of life chances that are horribly unfair. While these other things should be dealt with, we still should be able to give a simple answer—if it is possible—what strategy or strategies will permit that child to have the same opportunity as the child out in the quality white suburban school.

Dr. JENCKS. Let me say two things in response to that. The first is that I agree with you that people should be taught to read in school. Second, I am quite convinced that until relatively recently the black child who was able to read didn't have a much better chance than one who couldn't. By the evidence we examined, the payoffs for doing well in school were extraordinarily small for black children. And if you look at soldiers and look at their AFQT scores—which are a good example of the standard test achievement that we have been talking about and that most analyses have focused on—and look at the soldiers again when they are 30 years of age, you find that black veterans who scored as high as whites are barely making more money than those with an average score for blacks. This doesn't encourage you to believe that raising black people's test scores is the solution to equalizing their income. Blacks with high scores make a little more money, but it is a difference of a couple hundred dollars, whereas the income gap between blacks and whites is a matter of a couple thousand dollars. Now that may be changing.

Senator MONDALE. You wouldn't criticize the black parent saying, "that may be right, but I still want my child to have the tools." I am not going to buy the argument that discrimination in this country is such that there is no point in learning?

Dr. JENCKS. I agree with that, and I agree also that everyone should learn to read. It is rather fun to be able to read and understand something, even if it doesn't result in higher income.

Senator MONDALE. Would you say one of the reasons for discrimination is that, traditionally, the schools have not delivered into the hands of the poor child the tools he needs to attack the situation?

Dr. **Jencks**. Well, I think that is true, and I think you can make a more general argument that even though the individual black who did well in the test wasn't much better off economically or socially than one who didn't, that was in part because the majority of blacks were not up to the white level in performance. In effect what both employers or other people did was to treat all blacks alike. Even if you happened to be a college graduate, or to have a Ph. D, or be very good at something, the white community, which had power over opportunities, did not recognize that fact. The result was that everybody was penalized for things which some black people had had imposed on them by the character of their background and previous treatment, and so forth.

I am not certain in my own mind to what extent schools as opposed to communities and families and neighborhoods, can contribute to solving that problem. But if you think about a strategy for dealing with this, I think that it is probably most crucial to emphasize the development of some kind of minimum educational standards which you can establish and expect people to meet. One of the problems with all of the programs we have dealt with is that the criteria for success are always relative. You set up a compensatory program with the objective of getting children up to something called grade level. Well, this is at best an illusory objective; grade level is defined as where the average child is, so half the school always has to be below grade level.

Senator **Mondale**. It is a sloppy standard, but it is a fact. In a rich, white suburban school, practically all of them are up 80, 95, 100 percentile. In a poor black school, they are all down 5, 10 percent. So that there is a tremendous difference.

Dr. **Jencks**. There is no question at all about it. I think what I am saying is the following: If the standard is simply whether a school is above or below grade level, then even if the black school is doing a relatively good job it is almost inevitable, given the disadvantages with which those students start, that they will be at least a little bit below a school doing an equally good job in the suburbs. The question of concern is how big the gap is. If the difference is a very small percent you probably wouldn't worry much about it.

Senator **Mondale**. We have some problems with what you are saying.

COMPENSATORY PROGRAMS LACK OBJECTIVE STANDARDS

Dr. **Jencks**. Well, let me finish what I was going to say. I think that one of the problems that has led to discouragement with most of the compensatory programs aimed at boosting the quality of the schools has been that there haven't been a set of objective standards which everybody could hope to get their students to meet. There hasn't been a floor which people have been trying to get every student up to. In that sense it is almost built in that a very large proportion of these programs will fail. This in turn contributes to the stereotype that these programs can't succeed. I think now we are in a situation in which people feel very demoralized. The teachers feel they have to have an excuse for having failed, so they then say the students can't learn, and then you have a vicious circle in which expectations of the students go down.

Senator **Mondale**. Are you saying that these inner schools are on a treadmill, they are doing better and better, but the standards are moving over the horizon?

Dr. **Jencks**. No, I am not saying they are actually doing better, although there is some evidence that in historical terms they are doing better. For instance, if you look at the overall level of reading performance in the United States from the 1950's to the 1960's you will find that everybody is reading better. That means that although the ghetto school is reading a year behind grade level in the fifth grade and the suburban school is reading a year ahead of level at the fifth grade, they are all reading better than sixth graders were reading 20 years ago. What I am saying is that if you want to maintain the belief that people can learn and that they are going to succeed, it is useful to have a standard which isn't a competition that some people are bound to lose, but is a competition against an objective criteria which everybody can succeed at.

Senator **Mondale**. But it is also true that the consequences of not being able to handle numbers, writing, and the rest, are much more serious than they were 30 years ago. And it is also true, not just on a relative scale, it is an absolute fact, that there are hundreds of thousands of children that don't learn anything. They come out of school not being able to read or count.

CREDENTIALS MANDATORY

Dr. **Jencks**. I think the question is more complicated than we thought it was at first. We started off with the assumption that the consequences of not being able to read were greater. The examination we made showed we are not so sure.

We find two things.

First, if you compare people with the same amount of schooling, some of whom do well in tests and some who do very badly, the differences in their adult success is very small.

In other words, it seems to be the credentials rather than the skills that count. An employer won't employ a guy who reads well and doesn't have a high school diploma, but he will employ a person with a high school diploma even if he doesn't read well.

This is one of the reasons why it is important to teach these skills. If the people don't have the skills, they fail in school. They feel discouraged and drop out and don't get the credentials they need in adult life. It is clearly the case that the skills people have are one of the factors that influence how long they stay in school, although that is not the only factor.

A good deal of progress has been made in the last 20 years, for instance, in narrowing the gap in the credentials that black and white students have, even though the test score gap has not been narrowed anywhere near as much. Judging by the experiences of whites, this ought to make quite a difference. If you have the credentials, if you have a college degree, it is not that important to do well in a reading comprehension test unless you are in a very narrow range of occupations.

That is only a partial answer.

Again, I don't want to argue that skills are of no consequence, but at least the evidence we have suggests that the skills are mainly important in getting the credentials and it is the credentials that are important for the next 50 years. The relationship between degrees and income or degrees and occupational status is no different now than it was 50 years ago, or 40 years ago, which is about as far back as the evidence goes.

On the other hand, there are a lot of people who manage to do quite well for themselves in job terms who don't have college degrees or don't have a Ph. D. or don't score high on tests, but who have a lot of the other qualities which are important to success in the world.

Senator MONDALE. Unfortunately, I must leave, however I would like to have the staff continue if you have some time.

Dr. JENCKS. I would be perfectly willing to do that.

Senator MONDALE. We will be holding a seminar next week where we will try to go into the subject of your report. I believe the work that you and your colleagues have done on this effort to evaluate research data, is very important to our committee's report. If you could help us, we would be most grateful.

Thank you very much.

Dr. JENCKS. Thank you.

[At this point the hearing was held as an open forum discussion, between the committee's staff and Dr. Jencks.]

Mr. HARRIS. You were talking earlier about one of the missions of the school system being to create an environment where the child was relatively happy, where the school environments were relatively equal, where the parent and the child had some choices, basically a whole battery of things which I would describe as sort of making the child feel good about his situation.

Dr. JENCKS. Right.

Mr. HARRIS. What you didn't address, very specifically anyway, was the functioning of that school in terms of providing him with specific skills so that when he gets out, at whatever point that is, he has some choices about what he does next.

PROVISIONS FOR BASIC SKILLS

Dr. JENCKS. Right. I have two feelings about that. One is that most of the things schools teach seem to be important to children, not because of the substance of what is taught, but because mastering it gives him the feeling he can do something. If he does well, he gets the idea he can do things well. Actually, knowing the five principal products of Venezuela is not a technically useful piece of information. It is very rare that the substance of the curriculum is important. What is important is that you don't come out of school feeling like you never understood what was going on—that you don't develop a way of responding to the world based on the feeling that you don't know what is going on.

There are certain basic skills I wouldn't say that about, for instance the ability to read and to write. But I am not at all sure how important arithmetic is. There are a lot of people who work in offices who can do only simple arithmetic.

But at least reading and writing have a value outside that of developing some kind of self-confidence, or a sense that you can control the world, or that you can do the things people expect of you. It is directly translatable into certain kinds of adult things.

The argument I was trying to make for minimal standards is that the understanding of what objectives the school was being held to and what objectives the child is being held to is, in most cases, very vague. There is a lot done in bad schools to obscure precisely what they are trying to do, because if they were to make it explicit, you will see that they failed.

In talking about developing some standard which you would expect every child to meet at some point or other—I think of this in terms of elementary schools—there ought to be some notion that every child who finishes elementary school should be able to read at a certain level. I don't know what that level is, but it obviously can't be grade level. You have to pick a level of competence and a set of tasks people will be able to do.

Now, it turns out the area in which we have had a standard to some degree is arithmetic. If a child can't do long division, he can't do it. We are much more vague about what we are testing with reading tests. In a lot of ways they are not quite reading tests. A typical reading test is largely a reasoning test. There is a passage to read followed by a set of inductive jumps. It doesn't quite test whether or not a child can read but rather whether he interprets what he has read in the same way as somebody else does. That is, of course, a much more difficult thing.

Mr. HARRIS. What I am asking is whether or not you are willing to hold the schools accountable in the same way you want to hold them accountable for not letting plaster fall on their heads or not having heat in the winter time, to be able to provide basic skills.

SCHOOLS ACCOUNTABLE FOR ACHIEVEMENT

Dr. JENCKS. I certainly want to hold them accountable in exactly the same way as they are about the plaster or the heat. That is, I think there is an obligation that everybody involved knows what is happening. Some progress has been made in this area in the past few years in terms of test scores—even though I don't think the test scores are the "be all" and "end all." I think the parents should know what is going on; this is absolutely crucial. The student or parent may decide he doesn't care about reading and I think that is fine. But schools ought not refuse to release scores because people will be angry. The question of the reading scores is something that parents have to decide about.

Mr. HARRIS. Especially those children whose parents know they can't read.

Dr. JENCKS. Right. So long as they think or believe this is the primary purpose of going to school, it seems the schools are under an obligation to respond.

I don't feel it is as important as a lot of people think. I think there are a lot of other things which are more important which are harder to get at. The reason parents jump on the reading scores is that the other things are much harder to get hold of. The parent doesn't know how the teacher treats his child in class. If she did, she might be a lot more angry about that than about the reading scores. If there were a scale from 1 to 100, on which it could be said your child has been treated 10 or 20, you might produce a riot. Of course, there isn't a way to do that. So the people come back to things they can put numbers on. The only sort of information parents have is what the student says to the parents. This gets into the question of how much parents believe the students' complaints.

I think if my parents believed everything I said when I was in school, they would have gone down and rioted. But they figured children are children.

Mr. **Harris**. You probably could read when you were going through that period?

Dr. **Jencks**. That is true.

And in addition, probably because they brought me up to explain a lot I did. Some other child is brought up to take a lot of things for granted. He puts up with a lot in school, because he thinks that that is the way the world has to be. He adapts to the world he experiences in the classroom, and he goes out into the real world and reacts the same way. He tries to protect himself against something that may be done to him.

This is an unpromising situation when you get into a lot of jobs. You are always defending yourself. You are never able to take much responsibility or to exercise much initiative because you are always waiting for someone to hit you.

You may be right, of course, but if that is the way you act on the job, there is a vicious circle of what you expect and how the employer reacts to your behavior, and so on.

I certainly am not arguing against the right of parents and students to know about reading scores or their right to make a fuss about them if they do not meet their expectations. I am arguing two things. One is that reading scores are a lot harder to change than a lot of other things are. The second is that the payoffs from changing them are a lot less than they are chalked up to be, and that that is historically particularly true for blacks.

That is not an argument for not changing them, but rather an argument that nobody should expect that solving the reading score problem will solve any other problem. The payoffs of keeping children in school seem to be better than the payoffs to teaching them anything, which is a grotesque commentary on that. If you raise a child to some educational attainment you do much more for his income than if you raise his test scores.

Mr. **Harris**. That is true, but again, his educational aspirations or attainments are directly related to his perception of how well he is or is not doing.

UPWARD BOUND PROGRAMS SUCCESSFUL

Dr. **Jencks**. That is true, but it is not all as true as one might assume. A classic example is the Upward Bound programs, which have been successful. A lot of children go to college as a result of those programs. You can see it by comparing them to their brothers and sisters.

Yet when you look at their test scores, you will see that the scores did not go up. Their SAT scores are low. But they went to college and they stayed there and they graduated and they did so in about the same proportion that you would expect of the general population, despite the fact that they had low test scores.

They had to work harder at it. If they had been better at reading, they would not have had to work so hard.

However if the government had spent that same money trying to raise the test scores of high school students, I think those students would not now have BA's or the same chance of success.

Mr. HARRIS. I am not really getting at test scores as such, but rather that Upward Bound really provides the child who was close to leaving school with some sort of extra stimulus, extra support.

Dr. JENCKS. Right.

Mr. HARRIS. To stay in school, to tolerate, perhaps, the bad scores for another year, to tolerate lousy teaching for another year, to tolerate the whole process.

Dr. JENCKS. Yes.

And another thing is to teach a student how to cope with getting into college, how to cope with dealing with the system, to give some advice and encouragement. All that makes a difference.

Again I am not arguing that the test scores are unimportant. But if you think of points of intervention, points at which you can hope to make a difference for a relatively plausible amount of money, using people doing the things they know how to do, a program like Upward Bound, which focuses on how students can get the most out of the system, seems to have done a lot more than the Title I kinds of programs which intervened earlier and focused on trying to teach children more reading skills.

We spent a lot more money on Title I and I would say got a lot less out of it than we did out of the Upward Bound approach. This is not to say it was not worth trying.

If you have limited resources and limited human skills, it seems to turn out that we know better how to motivate people than we know how to teach them to read.

The experience with teaching people to read suggests that we do not know much about teaching people who do not know how to teach. Basically what most reading teachers do is put a child in a situation in which he can teach himself. If he does not, and most do not, he won't learn. I may be unduly pessimistic about this. It can be you may be able to train teachers to teach people to read, but the experience thus far has been very discouraging.

I am not an expert in curriculum and I am not saying there are no promising developments in the field. But I am making a political judgment that we have spent a lot of money over the past 6 or 7 years without seeming to have derived much out of it.

My tentative conclusion from that is that it is very hard for teachers not to be a certain kind of people. The kinds of people who become teachers are people who, after they have been teaching for a while, have a hard time dealing with children who do not have certain characteristics.

Either we have to change the characteristics that children have when they come to school so that they come with more of the attributes they need to take advantage of the teachers, or we have to find ways of running schools that are drastically different from the ones we now have so that we get people teaching who are able to deal with these kinds of children.

The second solution, vouchers, is a way of saying, let's try a lot of different things, and have different places called schools and opportunities for different people to become teachers, rather than get into the box where all teachers have to have a Masters degree and have to have met a lot of requirements, all of which tends to insure that the people who teach are a particular type of person.

Mr. **Smith.** We have some comments about your Carnegie Study which I guess I should say for the record is in the form of a confidential preliminary draft, so it is not for publication yet.

But I would like to refer to three matters and ask you to expand on them.

PRESCHOOL EFFORTS

First, you don't seem to have much hope for preschool efforts, which is the first negative opinion we have seen on this strategy. Is that a fair——

Dr. **Jencks.** There is a different opinion among us on this. We have mentioned Mike Smith, who works on preschool programs and is now involved with Headstart and Followthrough. I think he has considerably more hope than I do that something can, in principle, be done with this.

There is no disagreement among the people we have worked with or, indeed, among any people who have looked hard at the evidence, that the things we have done in preschools up to now have not had a long-term impact on test scores.

That was the conclusion of the Westinghouse report, and although we and other people have picked that apart technically and shown that there are a lot of mistakes in it, it is one of those things in which, despite all the mistakes, the conclusion is probably accurate.

Mr. **Smith.** I am told that there are some additional studies ready to be released by HEW and Mr. Zeigler which show some long-term success with Headstart. We have not seen them yet.

Dr. **Jencks.** I have not either. But the people I talk to, even the ones who are rather enthusiastic at this point, are inclined to concede that at the very least there is not much evidence that there are long-term effects, although they argue that we have not given the program a fair chance.

I think, in many respects, that is true. My own inference is not that you cannot have a long-term impact. I am convinced that, for instance, any systematic study of a large number of preschool programs will show that some of them do have a long-term effect. But my guess is that you will find that only a few of them do, and my second guess is that you will not be able to identify why some succeed and others fail. This is our experience with elementary schools.

It is not that no elementary school ever takes low-achieving students and raises their scores. Some elementary schools are better than others. At least that seems to be the inference so far. We have no clean study of this, but it looks that way. The trouble is that the difference between a good and a bad elementary school and the results of this difference in terms of test scores, is not related to anything that a policymaker can get his hands on. It does not seem to be either resources or expenditures. It seems to be rather the social composition of the school.

SOCIOECONOMIC INTEGRATION

There is a report that suggests that socioeconomic integration, which of course gets to the same things as racial integration, can help on scores. It does not close the gap, but in terms of test scores, there seems to be evidence of some improvement.

I am tentative about this still, but nevertheless it seems that you cannot identify any characteristic of a school which produces high scores or translates students with low scores into students with high scores. Aside from the socioeconomic characteristic, we do not seem to be able to identify any characteristic related to effectiveness.

That is discouraging. It does not do much good to say that Headstart or preschool programs can help. But we have to say that we do not know how to set up a preschool program that works as opposed to one that does not.

Mr. SMITH. Do you conclude that the most helpful thing we can do is in the socioeconomic area?

Dr. JENCKS. I would say yes, that at the moment it is the only thing that seems to have an effect on test scores. I would say the most helpful thing we could do in terms of political and economic costs versus benefits is at the other end of the spectrum, is something like the Upward Bound program, getting more students into college. There is much less resistance to this than to the things you have to do to get integration at the elementary school level, which, in fact, provides almost no benefit to the students. Any single strategy should start when students are in high school. That is unorthodox, because you usually think that you have to start at the beginning. But you can do the most for the people when choices are directly in front of them. There is nothing you could do today which would prevent a guy from dropping out of school 10 years from now which would be as effective as something you could do to prevent him from dropping out of school 10 weeks from now.

OPTIONS OF HIGH SCHOOL LEVEL

Mr. SMITH. If you have already lost most of them, you won't be able to help them in that respect.

Dr. JENCKS. I am not arguing that you should wait until the college level. But you should start in the ninth grade, which is when people start to drop out. My orientation is toward adolescents and the choices they begin to make about how they go out into the world and in what context, and less toward preschoolers. I am not knocking preschool programs. They have all kinds of advantages.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. You would start in the ninth grade, would you not?

Dr. JENCKS. Two things seem important. The first is giving the students a much more realitistic sense of the options available to them, and some idea that there are things they can do to insure themselves a kind of success. This is the main thing Upward Bound has tended to do. It has convinced students that there are strategies they can pursue which are not failure strategies. Not only that, but that there are a set of people who are committed to making them succeed, because their own success is defined in terms of how many people they get into college and how many people stay there.

I think that this almost certainly has to be done outside the existing high school system, and that one of the reasons Upward Bound has worked is that they brought students into new institutional arrangements with people who had very different attitudes toward them than the traditional high school teacher had. They were always able to set up arrangements outside the high school and work with the students in the summer, and so forth.

The program is mostly voluntary. And it seems to me that the whole morale of an Upward Bound program or any successful program depends on the idea that people want it.

Again we know relatively little about exactly what works in this field. There are a lot of failures. It is not that every guy who went into this business was a success.

I have been much more encouraged by the overall impact of a whole series of different things that have been done to encourage people to stay in school and go to college and get the credentials they need to compete, than I have been by programs designed to affect their test performance.

DIRECT AID TO STUDENTS

There are some things you can do which are relatively straightforward. One is that if you give anybody a scholarship to go to college, he goes—even if he never considered it before. He may feel that if somebody will give him money to go to college, there must be something in it. That is a rather simpleminded thing to do. It is one of the great arguments for direct aid to students rather than aid to institutions, because it gives the student an investment in himself.

Another thing you can do is to have an open admissions policy. If you tell people from the time they are in seventh grade that they can go to college and that they don't have to have such and such an average or whatever, it has an impact on the possibilities. You have to have a structure which encourages people to believe that college is possible. Scholarships and open admissions is one thing. The other thing is to work with children so their perceptions of how to manipulate the system are more realistic.

If you talk to children now about what is available to them, you find that they have wildly improbable ideas about what colleges they can go to and what they have to do to get there. They have a vast amount of misinformation. I would say the same is true of their counselors. The level of sophistication among these people about the way the world works is very low. And if you compound a counselor who is not very sophisticated about the way the colleges work with a counselor who has no idea at all about the way the mind of the student he is trying to counsel works, you are in a losing situation.

EFFECT OF INTEGRATION ON ADVANTAGED CHILDREN

Mr. SMITH. Let me raise a second matter here. You seem to believe that integration with poor, disadvantaged children hurts advantaged children with cognitive learning even though you find that the poorer children probably do better. Is that a fair conclusion?

Dr. JENCKS. It is a fair conclusion from very shaky data.

Mr. SMITH. I have seen a lot of data that says that advantaged children, at least in a classic Coleman type setting, do at least as well.

Dr. JENCKS. Let me describe exactly what my sense of what the evidence shows. The first thing is that as far as high schools are concerned, there is no effect. It is elementary school we are talking about primarily.

There are two different kinds of studies that have been done. One is the busing type, or quasi-experimental. You take children and you move them around. I know of no evidence that busing disadvantaged children to a school lowers the achievement of the children already in that school. I have never seen any such evidence from, for instance, the Berkeley situation, where you really move a lot of people in.

We are talking about studies that are evaluating only a few years, but in the short run I do not know of any evidence that white or advantaged students are hurt by this.

Mr. SMITH. That is clear in Berkeley.

Dr. JENCKS. The reverse situation is that the black students gain much. The typical finding is that not much happens. That is not absolutely true. Project Concern shows gains. They are not big, they are not consistent, but that is a characteristic situation. Looking across at the integration studies, when you bus or massively integrate by whatever device, you get modest inconsistent gains for the disadvantaged students, which generally means black students.

If you look at natural integration, that is, if you compare schools where integration was already existent with schools where whites have not had a lot of black schoolmates, you don't find the same pattern. You find that the blacks in naturally integrated schools are better off and the gains are larger and more consistent than in the busing studies. But the whites in those schools are worse off than whites in schools of a uniformly middle-class composition.

You cannot help feeling that there may be selection involved in this case; that is, that the students in naturally integrated schools are the same on all the outward criteria.

Maybe it is different if you look around Washington and find a school which is really integrated. But it is true that generally the whites lose. But you could argue, and it may well be true, that the whites who keep their children in those schools may be different from suburban parents in some way that accounts for the discrepancies.

Also, the data is very shaky; that is the other thing.

Mr. SMITH. You are talking about cognitive skills?

Dr. JENCKS. Yes.

Mr. SMITH. There are a host of other benefits that may derive from integration.

Dr. JENCKS. Yes, right. All we can say in terms of elementary schools is that, in my view, the fact that you don't usually find big stable differences can be attributed to the fact that those measures are highly unstable and not very sensitive and don't measure what you want to know anyway. You have to go on intuition and on what people who have been involved in the situation say about it.

Mr. SMITH. What should we be measuring?

MEASUREMENT OF CHILDREN'S ATTITUDES

Dr. JENCKS. Well, the things that seem to me the most important are things that have to do with what is called control of the environment, or the feeling that a child has that somehow what he does makes a difference. This is hard to manipulate in terms of the real world; there is a chicken and egg problem here. But schools can give children the feeling that they are going to succeed, that they can make things happen, that they can do what is expected of them, that if they go about it the right way they may be able to get what they want; or schools can give children the feeling it doesn't make any difference what the hell they do. That doesn't mean the feeling that they necessarily won't get what they want, but rather that life is a happenstance; one day you get what you want; the next day, maybe not. There is no incentive for figuring something out, no incentive for getting into control of the social or intellectual situation, because in the end what happens is some horrendous disaster which lands on you.

You can make an effect on all this, I think, by controlling the way a school is run. I can't prove that of course. There are various efforts to measure this which are not very good. You can ask children questions designed to elicit whether or not the world is their oyster. You can usually find some consistent patterns, but it is very hard to measure. I am not at all sure that when you measure it, you get what you want. For that reason I tend to trust much more the feelings of people who are dealing with those children.

Mr. SMITH. So you are better off just going into the classroom and asking the teacher whether it was successful or the busdriver?

Dr. JENCKS. Yes, I am much more inclined to trust the wit of the people involved to tell whether something is working or not than otherwise. But that is hazardous because in a large organization people tell you everything is working, and this is sticky.

One of the reasons for trying to get parents more involved in the schools is the feeling that they are more likely to be objective observers.

COGNITIVE SKILLS AND ATTAINMENT

Mr. SMITH. One of the most interesting conclusions was found in one of the last chapters of your report which showed there was a close correlation between cognitive skills and educational attainment. If you look at the latter rather than the former there is strong evidence that such things as smaller classrooms and more counselors was more helpful.

Is that a fair interpretation?

Dr. JENCKS. I would have to retract that. The reason that was confidential was that I wrote that paragraph based on preliminary evidence; and when we looked at it harder, it faded.

Mr. SMITH. That seems to be the problem in this field. The harder you look the fewer concrete conclusions you have.

Dr. JENCKS. That is one reason that document was put out in that form. We have been mucking around with test scores, and other people have also been doing it. There is a big literature on the subject, so I feel fairly confident about a couple of things. We have a pretty good idea which studies to trust and which ones to treat as anomalies. With some other things you are always in the grip of the latest study. Some guy has a study of 60 people and has found thus and so. Everybody runs off after that hare for a while until it doesn't replicate or doesn't come out. Maybe it depended on how he asked the questions, or whatever. But I think one of the few payoffs from the enormous amount of research that has gone into this field has been that I have a fair degree of confidence that certain strategies have proven unsuccessful in enough different studies and in enough different places, so that I now feel that what we say is probably true.

I don't feel that about some of the conclusions we drew about what keeps people in school, because we were analyzing the Coleman data and there are a lot of problems with that. You have a problem with any conclusion you come to from one body of data without looking at four or five others.

Mr. SMITH. Do you have anything?

PROFESSIONAL OPPOSITION TO VOUCHERS

Mr. STRICKMAN. I would like to get back to professional organizations.

Mr. HENNIGAN. Mine are broadly related to what you are saying. Let's do yours first.

Mr. STRICKMAN. Okay.

Senator Mondale touched on questions of professional organizations and their uniform opposition to the voucher proposals. Has there been any thought or discussion in San Francisco or Seattle or any of the other places where the demonstration projects are, of negotiation with unions regarding their relationship to schools participating in the voucher experiments?

Dr. JENCKS. The situation with the teacher organizations is more complicated than I guess I made clear. The national organizations are all against it. State organizations are all against it in general. That of course typically means three people. When you get to the local organizations you get even more of the response that I was describing—"We know the national organizations are against it, we must be against it, now tell us what it is."

After you tell them, there is a mixed set of responses. We have not gotten uniform opposition from all the teacher organizations. You get caught up in bizarre conflicts, "Well, the NEA is against it, so the FTA has to be for it." Well, that is not a very inspiring reason, and it gets even more complicated and tied up in personalities and so on. We have tried to work with different teacher organizations at the local level, and in some cases I think we have had a good deal of success.

Mr. STRICKMAN. Aren't teacher organizations frequently collective bargaining units? Aren't they concerned insofar as they see the bargaining unit as their vehicle for vast improvement in salary, working conditions, and all sorts of other benefits, and they perceive a potential threat in making each school an island unto itself which will destroy the notion of collective bargaining on a citywide basis? And as a result they will lose these advantages which they have derived up to now?

Dr. JENCKS. I think it is a reasonable concern from the point of view of the teachers. There is half an answer, but it is an answer which sabotages the main purpose of the voucher plan. That is, there is no reason in principle why you can't have a collective bargaining agreement with multiple suppliers.

Teachers are specialists in their line of work. They can get attractive contracts. The deplorable feature is that the contract includes a full set of restraints, which means the schools end up like each other, because union contracts specify teachers have to do "The following 17 things."

Mr. STRICKMAN. Recognizing this is so, and you have this problem, do you have any feeling or has OEO in its administration of ongoing attempts in San Francisco to develop an experimental project, attempted any compromise with the teacher's union in San Francisco?

JOB SECURITY GUARANTEE

Dr. JENCKS. The main thing we have done is to make a set of guarantees for the teachers already in the public system. That is to say, given that this is an experiment, we can provide individual teachers with guarantees of job security. In a big school district like San Francisco or Seattle, this is easy to do because if there is a drop in public school enrollment, you have the rest of the city to pick up the extra teachers and move them around in. It is conceivable you can even do that in a district in which you can't move people; you can guarantee the existing teacher his job, even if new schools hire outsiders.

That makes it more expensive to OEO, of course.

Mr. STRICKMAN. Also, doesn't it undermine in a way the vitality of the experiment?

Dr. JENCKS. Not necessarily so much. That is, if you say that no public school teacher will lose his job, you can also keep the thing financially viable with a ceiling on private suppliers, say, 25 percent. If the public schools lose 25 percent of their enrollment and they keep the same number of teachers, they can cut class size or whatever. Of course, management is not ecstatic about this. They would like to hire people that don't meet the standard certification requirements, and we tell them that we have just guaranteed jobs to all those teachers who are on the payroll and that they will have to wait for natural attrition.

Mr. STRICKMAN. To guarantee tenure may be a cut against one of the desirable things about a voucher system in theory, in any event.

Let me pursue another question, if I may, about the voucher system. I take it in theory one of the justifications, rationales at any rate, behind it is to make the schools more responsive to the needs of the students by making them clients in a sense.

Dr. JENCKS. Right.

Mr. STRICKMAN. I take it at the same time that your projection would be that there would not be offered at any one time a great many more places within the schools as a total than there are at present—in the public school systems, that is—while the selection process you describe takes place.

Is there any reason to think that other than the top schools, the schools that provide the greatest attraction, that this responsiveness is going to be a reality any more than freedom of choice was a reality?

Dr. JENCKS. If there are no more places, the whole thing fails. If the absolute number of places equal the number of students, then nobody is under any pressure to do anything. If you have the same number of places, it is a game of musical chairs, although with the virtue that children in a lousy neighborhood now have in principle the right to attend a good school on the other side of town. The fact is, I don't think you could do that politically. If you don't expand the places in good schools, if you only displace people going to "good" schools and replace them with children from "bad" schools, the program is not politically salable.

So the assumption is that you have to generate more places in the kinds of schools that people want.

FINANCIAL BACKING UNDER VOUCHER PLAN

Mr. STRICKMAN. Where in the economic structure that you envision—I didn't perhaps understand—where is the financial backing for these new places going to come from? I took it that the OEO contribution to the projected experiments was in essence a contribution for administrative costs and the projections of students moving around, that kind of thing. Where are the new schools as such, the new teaching materials, where is that going to come from other than out of the same sources that public education is generating revenue right now?

Dr. JENCKS. The notion of what the public school is spending is defined as what the public school is "really spending," which includes the amortization of capital cost and a lot of things which don't appear in calculations of per-pupil expenditure. So the private school, assuming it operates at the same level of efficiency, should be able to use a chunk of the voucher as rent or amortization. You have the question of whether or not you can amortize experimental facilities over a long period of time. The OEO is talking of a loan fund that would allow schools to generate new facilities for the period of the demonstration.

There is clearly a problem of maintaining surplus space in a system if you are operating with no margin of profit. You have to fill every seat in order to break even. But the presumption is that the compensatory funds, which will be something like 15 percent of total expenditure, will give you some surplus to maintain some vacant space.

Mr. STRICKMAN. Let me interject for a moment, most urban school systems and suburbs have a fantastic overcrowding problem right now, and the notion of expanding those may be a notion that says we go from three sessions a day to five.

Dr. JENCKS. There are a number of problems involved here which don't always work out the same way in the same place.

We had a long negotiation with San Diego. They have a third of their children in portable classrooms—by and large portables are better than the nonportables, really. So, expanding the schools was not complicated. You just move in more portables.

Mr. Strickman. That is not always easy.

Dr. Jencks. I agree. You couldn't do this in New York. The whole idea of doing a voucher experiment there would be hopeless. It would take 3 years to get the thing going. A voucher system depends on having space and flexible arrangements about the use of space that you can take advantage of.

From the point of view of the principal of any given school, the marginal cost of adding another student and relative to fixed costs provides an incentive to expand the school. On the other hand, if you are talking about a centralized school administration making decisions about the school, there is no greater incentive to expand, because the cost will be enacted somewhere else in the system. If the principal is in charge of his budget—which is a feature essential to vouchers—he can add a student at $900 or $1,200, increase his fixed cost by $600, and have $600 to play with to spread over the school.

If you have an expensive new program you want to add, the most obvious way to do it is to expand the school, which raises your fixed costs some, but brings in a lot more revenue than it does additional costs.

Mr. Strickman. Is the result that: That which is good expands, and expands to the point where you have another problem?

Parental Choice

Mr. Harris. The way you are talking about this now and when Senator Mondale was here, is that there is a "best" school someplace which probably in your terms and my terms really isn't that good; the children read a little better, the teachers are a little more responsive to the children and parents, and it is a "good neighborhood." What you are saying is that, we will give those now attending the worst schools a choice about attending what is currently defined as the "best" schools. Now, what I am saying is that those so-called "best" schools are educationally not that much better and——

Dr. Jencks. I don't think I am saying that. I think a lot of parents will react to the system that way. I don't think that there is a best school somewhere, but on the other hand, I don't think it is my part to tell the parents who think the school over there would be better than the one they have over here, that it is just a shabby illusion.

Mr. Harris. What is it you are selling them?

Dr. Jencks. What I am selling——

Mr. Harris. Not you, the school.

Dr. Jencks. There will be different schools. There will be schools that sell "best" in the traditional terms. There will be schools that say, "Well, for 20 years, we had upper middle-class white students. Even if we don't have them now, everybody thinks we are good because everybody always thought we were good."

There will be, I hope, a lot, and certainly some schools which sell substantively different programs.

Mr. Harris. Okay.

Dr. Jencks. The relative appeal of a school which has an interesting program and a school which has a tradition of having upper middle-class students, I can't predict.

Mr. Harris. One is a traditional, one is an open classroom, one is a technical.

Dr. Jencks. Yes.

Mr. HARRIS. But, then first, I don't recall your talking about the information system that has to go along with that model to inform people of what the difference is and what happens with the voucher.

Dr. JENCKS. We have done a lot of work on that but I didn't talk about it.

Mr. HARRIS. Secondly, doesn't it then ultimately come down to who is the best public relations expert?

Dr. JENCKS. Probably partly. It is hard to tell how much. The only examples we have of this now are colleges and preschools. There are private schools at the elementary and secondary level but the market is so peculiar there it is hard to make judgments about it.

If you look at the colleges, clearly public relations is important. On the other hand, it isn't public relations in the simple sense. The factors that go into convincing people that this college is better than that one are not often factors that the college itself has a lot of control over. They are very complicated and illusive things.

Mr. HARRIS. And for that reason, colleges are a little different because parents are somewhat less removed than in the elementary or preschool.

Dr. JENCKS. I would have said they were more removed. For instance, with respect to preschools, parents can go and look and many do.

Mr. HARRIS. Right. And people make decisions about sending their child to X school for the wrong reasons. Granted——

Dr. JENCKS. I agree.

Mr. HARRIS. Granted, there is a certain group of people sending their children to Dalton or to the Commonwealth schools, and so forth. But among those I would say there is a high percentage going for the wrong reason, not for what the program is but who the parents are.

Dr. JENCKS. Absolutely.

Mr. HARRIS. And what social class they are in and how much money they have.

Dr. JENCKS. There is a self-correcting feature with respect to that particular criteria; that is, if you will admit any student, it is hard to maintain a snob-appeal school unless you assume that only snobs want to go to snob-appeal schools.

The desire to go to an upper middle-class school exists, and there will be a lot of applicants who will make it less snobby. Pretty soon you reach an equilibrium in which the only way that the Dalton school can go is with progressive education, rather than by merely having classy parents connected with it.

Mr. STRICKMAN. Another factor may involve teachers also. Teachers have the same public relations job done on them as parents have done on them.

Mr. HARRIS. I presume there is choice for teachers as well.

Dr. JENCKS. That is hopeful. The question of what the school system does about that. We have just begun to face the question of how a school system deals with its teachers.

Some systems give their teachers a choice, some don't. Every teacher, of course, has the option of not working for the system.

Mr. HARRIS. In your concept is there a difference or diversity not only in the program, substantive concept of what happens in the school but also in terms of the governance of the schools?

Dr. JENCKS. One of the nice features of the thing is that since anybody can start a school, anybody theoretically is eligible. If a group of parents want to start a parent-controlled school, they can do that; or teachers can start a teacher-controlled school. If the Holy Mother Church wants to start a school, it can do that. In effect, it is a free for all. In a sense, that is exactly the thing that differentiates a voucher system from anything else—you can have anything you want. But that is exactly why there is a lot of resistance to it. So we may end up with a system which has all kinds of constraints placed on it.

Mr. STRICKMAN. Are OEO districts involved in seeking exemptions from certification requirements or accreditation requirements, whatever they may be?

Dr. JENCKS. The legislation introduced in California did contain that. It allowed those requirements to be suspended. But essentially the program allows the public schools the same latitude for experimentation that private schools have. But even in California some requirements apply to all schools, and they are not suspended.

SOCIOECONOMIC SEGREGATION

Mr. HENNIGAN. I would like to pursue the question of different client preferences both in terms of academic offering, behavior patterns tolerated in the school, and the system of government. If you went to a voucher system as you have argued it, it seems you would have a sorting out in three categories of preferences.

First, lower class preference for strong reading, writing, and arithmetic; a disciplined but not necessarily unfriendly environment, but make that child learn. You would have a lower-middle class reference, but some desire for broader values, educational training, possibly some consideration of college entry.

And then at the middle- and upper middle-class level as assumption that the school takes care of all of that, that the child is conditioned in the home to accept these as necessary parts of his growing equipment; a concern there with the broad humanizing experiments, a great deal of self-expression, or creative environment.

My concern with the voucher experiment—I shouldn't say concern—my question is if you allowed it to operate in a relatively free academic market, you would probably tend to increase socioeconomic segregation somewhat independent of race, although you may have simply because there are more urban poor blacks, more blacks concentrated in the lower middle-class preference schools.

It would mean those in the upper middle class would be freer in their choices. Do you see this happening? I think most of us thinking of equal education, it will infer a homogeneous process which means a self-defined system in the upper middle class.

If you go to the voucher you will get some increase in racial integration but a great increase in socioeconomic segregation. Do you see it that way?

Dr. JENCKS. Well, I see the process you are talking about taking place. My guess is that it would not produce a great increase in socioeconomic segregation.

My guess is that it will be reduced for this reason: You have eliminated the constraint of residential segregation. The question is whether people will be more segregated if you segregate them according to the house they live in than if you segregate them according to the school they like.

My guess is that they are more segregated if they are segregated according to the house they live in rather than by the school they would like to go to.

You can do studies to see whether tastes are more highly correlated with income or with housing patterns.

Mr. Hennigan. To go from a different direction then, if you had this type of free choice operating and this separating out which would mean a degree of socioeconomic segregation taking place, yet everyone was relatively content with the system, it would mean accepting as an operating principle in the national educational policy the fact there are different preferences graduated according to class which is a difficult thing to legislate, given our approach to the 14th amendment applications.

14th Amendment Requirement

Dr. Jencks. In the past we have been oriented toward two things. First was equal access; and second was equal resources.

We have not assumed that the 14th amendment required us to constrain the poor to want what the rich want. The amendment constrains the State to offer the poor what it offers the rich—although we haven't done that very much.

The voucher system is compatible with equalizing resources. It is not compatible with the notion that equalizing resources means that every school has to have the same racial mix or socioeconomic mix. My guess is that you would have more racial integration and maybe somewhat more socioeconomic integration, but it would not be perfect. This is not possible when people make choices.

Mr. Hennigan. Probably less racial integration but more socioeconomic segregation.

Dr. Jencks. In terms of race, yes. I am not clear in my mind as far as socioeconomic integration is concerned.

One of the factors that complicates the picture is that the perception of a good school in the poor people's eyes is the school rich people want. Even if a school has attributes in terms of curriculum which they don't like, if a lot of rich people think it is a good school, the poor will think it is not all that bad.

There are extremes at which this would not apply. But there is a large intermediate area in which, if a school has good press, and if there are a lot of upper class people there, it will be attractive to other people simply for these reasons. This would tend to reduce socioeconomic segregation.

Mr. Hennigan. You addressed this earlier that parents would define the governments according to skills and that the school populated with the type of pupil not compatible with that or whose parents didn't prefer that, that there would be disincentive to continue that school. So you would have equilibrium. I am not looking for answers, I am going around the point with you.

Dr. **Jencks**. You are right. My guess is that the degree of socioeconomic segregation you would get under this system would be not so dramatic as to be a major social and political issue.

My guess on that question is based on the simple observation that the degree of socioeconomic segregation in the existing system is not a social and political issue. Only racial segregation is really a big political problem. There is far more racial segregation than socioeconomic. By any index you care to devise you have a very segregated system in racial terms and a much less segregated system in economic terms. It is a happenstance maybe; neighborhoods with white populations get stuck next to each other in a lot of ways.

Mr. **Hennigan**. This is a question of how you look at districts or schools.

Dr. **Jencks**. I am talking about schools now. Even if you look at schools the level of economic segregation is much less than the level of racial segregation. That may be less true in the South where we are moving toward the situation where racial segregation is falling to the level of socioeconomic situation. There hasn't been as much improvement in the socioeconomic situation as there has been in the racial situation. There has been some movement in the racial situation in the past few years.

If you think that, in principle, it is absolutely bad to have such segregation the question of whether or not it is a big political issue, or whether or not there is a lot of pressure to get rid of it, is not necessarily anything to worry about.

Mr. **Hennigan**. It is the question of whether the State should perhaps be neutral but you will be allowing differences to exist which will express themselves in resource demands and time. Then you are back to Skelly-Wright and *Serrano* applications and so forth.

Dr. **Jencks**. My feeling about the subject is that you can't, I don't believe you can make a system work in which the State tries to coerce a socioeconomic balance independent of neighborhoods. I think you can make a system work over the long term only if people identify with a particular community. I don't believe, over the long run, you can have segregated neighborhoods of the kind we now have and have children bused all over the place to compensate for the visciousness of their parents.

If their parents are as wicked as that, they are not likely to put up with a system that will make their children somehow virtuous. I could be wrong. We are in the midst of a big experiment to see whether this premise is erroneous. The voucher system, in effect, assumes that.

CHOICE VS. COMPULSORY INTEGRATION

If one were talking about an alternative in which you have compulsory integration, neighborhoods as well as schools, I would be ready to think that may be a viable alternative and that it would have a lot of advantages that a voucher system doesn't have. We are talking of linking integration and community control and balanced communities—there is a lot to be said against the free choice approach. But this isn't an alternative I see anyway to reach legally. I don't think you can bus children all over town any more than you can bus their parents into houses and say who will live where. So I am starting with the assumption that we will have segregation and it will be hard to get rid of it on a compulsory basis. The best you can do is try to help people get away from it.

The system we are talking about is one in which the voluntarism is only on one side. That is, if some of the poor children want to go to school in the rich neighborhood they have the chance to go there, even if the people in the rich neighborhood might not want them.

Mr. HENNIGAN. A statistical chance.

Dr. JENCKS. Right, but his chance of going there is as good as anyone else's. It is the pure case, at least in racial terms. It equalizes the parent's power to choose a school, but it leaves out one kind of school which a parent might choose, namely, a school which another child is not allowed to attend.

Mr. STRICKMAN. If a neighborhood priority accounts for 50 percent, isn't it possible that most of the applicants will come from that neighborhood, given patterns that we have observed before, and therefore within a year 100 percent will come from the neighborhood and you won't change things much because like freedom of choice in the South, a lot of pressures can be put in to maintain that neighborhood school and with it the segregation and everything that goes with it. If 5 percent are from outside the neighborhood and thus only 3 percent in the suburban school are black, you know the pressures would seem to be there for the school soon to be all white and homogeneous, geographically, economically, and so forth.

LOTTERY FLEXIBILITY FEASIBLE

Dr. JENCKS. It is conceivable that would happen. That is what we have worried about. In setting this up, we would do a dry run by looking at parental preferences and manipulating the rules to deal with that problem if it becomes a very serious one.

I have mixed feelings about not having 100 percent lottery, about not saying that private schools must take the children as they come along.

The reason we didn't do this is that it would have a disastrous effect on the incentive for community groups to start schools. If 10 or 15 parents go out and start a school and don't have a guarantee that they can get their own children into it, it knocks their motive of wanting to create a school for their children.

Now, you might deal with that by making the lottery bigger than 50 percent. The 50 percent is not magic. We have talked a lot about making it bigger. But it seems to me if you want to encourage parents to take initiative, you have to guarantee them access to the thing they worked hard to create.

FLOORS ON PERFORMANCE

Mr. HARRIS. What do you do if you have a school that has high demand but the performance is like many other schools and doesn't meet standards. Its output is abysmal.

Dr. JENCKS. We have an elaborate information system which collects all the test scores and sends them to the parents, so the parents know how the school is doing. If they leave their children in school, at least under the pure system, that is their option. You don't have to send your children to a school where they learn to read unless you want to.

Mr. **Harris.** What about the impure system?

Dr. **Jencks.** Well, you can set floors. The problem with setting floors is, of course, that you cannot say every school has to get children to some level of reading unless you have some alternative schools, so that if you close a school the children can go somewhere else. But we do not have a very inspirational floor. We say no private supplier can do worse relative to his input than the worst public school. That is obviously not much of a requirement, to take the worst public school in the area and say that is the floor. But how do you raise it? Well, it is tough, because obviously you cannot say we will stop funding the worst school in the district, unless there is some alternative.

You have to assume that people will want to take their children out of the worst schools and then expand the better schools.

You can put that constraint on the private schools. You can say no community group can set up a school in which nobody learns anything at all or that is worse than schools in the public sector.

Mr. **Strickman.** Given your broader objections to the relative test and grade level scores as opposed to absolutes, is the testing system that you want to employ predicated on absolute standards rather than on relative standards?

Employ Relative Standards

Dr. **Jencks.** No; it is based almost entirely on relative standards. I don't think you can make other absolute standards work; absolute standards only work if people understand what they mean. That is a long-term process.

Mr. **Strickman.** Are you not perpetuating and compounding the problems of the relative testing phenomenon that you cite in the public schools today?

Dr. **Jencks.** In any given district, the standards are relatively absolute. The reason is that in any district, half the children do not have to be below the average grade level.

If we say we will report the San Jose scores in terms of national scores, everybody can be above or below the grade level.

The problem with the relative standard comes up when the norms for the test are deduced from inside the district. In talking about the absolute standard, I did not mean to suggest I did not think relative standards are also important. They are important.

The gap phenomena is an important factor even when the absolute levels are going up. My reason for being anxious to have absolute as well as relative standards is that it seems to me it sets a target which schools are better able to reach, and that this produces more confidence in the schools.

Mr. **Harris.** Let me come back to my point of a moment ago. You have a union school, for example.

Dr. **Jencks.** That is one of the things we try to encourage: To get a union thinking about starting its own schools.

Mr. **HARRIS**. Not in the cities, I hope, but OK.

But we have the private school, and after 2 years or whatever, it is worse than the worst public school, and in some way you close it down; then there is another one that must be closed down, and finally, you are just falling back on this group of bad schools and nothing has really changed.

Are we not really talking about tinkering around with "innovations," with "alternatives"? Why aren't we really addressing those programs, concepts, premises that we already have, many of which are relatively sound and solid in terms of helping people learn how to read and write and to do arithmetic and to learn languages and develop themselves generally—We have tinkered, really, with desegregation, decentralization, compensatory education, and vouchers is the next extension of that.

When is it that we start addressing those things that we do know seriously? We do not know enough about the whole learning process but we know enough so that we can begin doing something if we address it seriously.

Dr. **JENCKS**. I think of a voucher, not as a solution, but as a mechanism for making solutions. In this respect, it is like Federal aid to education. It does not guarantee that anything is going to happen.

Vouchers appear to be a financing scheme. That is what they are. They are a way of distributing money, which seems to me more likely to encourage nontinkering rather than to start drastic changes.

But it is true, it does not guarantee anything at all. You can have a voucher system and the net result can be a bunch of schools that look like the schools we have, or are marginally different, or are drastically different.

All of those things can happen under a voucher system. It is a first step. You have to face the second step as a separate issue. Maybe nothing will happen.

Mr. **HARRIS**. Then it is a political decision, essentially, to open up the system, hopefully to new people and new ideas, but my guess is, that 60, 70 percent will probably be the same old stuff.

Dr. **JENCKS**. If I got 30 percent new and interesting things, I would think I was a success.

Mr. **HARRIS**. Right.

Why do you opt for that rather than to begin to seriously address some sort of accountability for what is and what we know?

Dr. **JENCKS**. Well——

Mr. **HARRIS**. Is that a political as opposed to an educational decision?

Dr. **JENCKS**. In a sense, I see this as a particular way of creating accountability. There are various ways of going at accountability. This seems to be one of them. This is a device which makes the schools accountable to parents—first, by having an elaborate system of information.

Mr. **HARRIS**. Which you will send us because you did not address that.

Dr. **JENCKS**. There is a fat report, which I think you have, which deals with that. The blue one. And there is more material if you want it. There is another report of 50–60 pages which is just about information systems.

Mr. Smith. Will you send us that and we can put it in the record.*

Dr. Jencks. Yes.

Accountability Information System

Dr. Jencks. Anyway, the accountability depends on an information system—any form of accountability clearly does—and one of the things we have been trying to do is devise a system that measures the right things.

It is a hard thing to do, but we have spent a lot of energy on it. The question then becomes what to do about the school that is inadequate in one sense or another.

The mechanism we have come up with is one which says you give the information to the parents, and they can take their child out of the school.

The other obvious mechanism is to have some political body which withdraws funds, closes the school, penalizes the teachers, reduces the contract, plus a slew of other incentives and coercions that you can introduce.

The reasons that we came to this solution rather than performance contracting or some direct form of accountability within the public system were two: One is that people have diverse standards for what schools ought to be doing. We felt those standards were legitimate.

We felt an accountability system introduced into a public system with rewards and gifts, monetary or political, would focus on reading and math scores, something like that. While that is a perfectly legitimate objective for a school, and one which many parents may want their children to pursue, we were not enthusiastic about saying that those are the only objectives for which a school may be rewarded. Even if parents were not really interested in other things, we would not be interested in placing those constraints.

I would be happy with that if it were in terms of minimum standards above which no rewards would be given, so that you do not have a situation in which you have a bottomless well of cramming people with tests in order to get extra money for extra achievement.

But either way, my feeling was that there is too much disagreement about what the objectives of a school ought to be and what is important to justify having a system of accountability which focuses on single objectives.

One thing that seemed particularly important is how children learn to behave, or socialize, or whatever you want to call it. That is what Catholic schools have been about. Although they talk about religion, they taught people manners and attitudes toward authority which I am not unequivocally enthusiastic about, but which are important to a lot of people. And a lot of parents are concerned about those things, but care about them in different ways.

Mr. Harris. But both of those groups of parents would set minimum requirements, as you said, learning to read, to write, to do research or whatever. Given a more complicated process in terms of socialization, why not focus on that reading and writing and, really, what I would call survival skills.

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*See Appendix 1, p. 11088.

If you cannot read in 1971, in the 11th grade, you can forget it, that is if you make it to the 11th grade.

Dr. JENCKS. I would not be unhappy about setting minimal academic standards for schools in a system of this kind. I would be unhappy if that was the only notion of accountability that we have. It seems to me that without some notion of choice, you have got that problem.

Mr. HARRIS. All right, but people are not going to focus on the broader notions until they have the fundamentals, right?

Dr. JENCKS. Right.

A lot of people are talking about that.

Mr. HARRIS. The reason parents send their children to Andover is in fact so that they will be more concerned about art. Chinese history or something else. But they also know that that child is going to know how to read.

Dr. JENCKS. They know he reads because he had to read before he went there.

Mr. HARRIS. But given that, they can move on to other things.

Dr. JENCKS. Sure.

Mr. HARRIS. Going to a public school in East Harlem, people will be very unconcerned about Chinese history. They will be more concerned about whether they can read and write Spanish and English. Given that——

Dr. JENCKS. That is fine. I assume the parents in that situation will apply those criteria in a voucher system. If a school is not teaching children to read, they will find a school that will. If they find one, they will move their children into it.

Mr. HARRIS. Why move the children to different schools?

Why not move the teachers out and get some people in who can do that?

EFFECTIVE SCHOOL PERSONNEL

Dr. JENCKS. Two problems. One, you don't have the assurance a new teacher can do it. We have had a continuous turnover every 5 years in East Harlem and somehow the scores are the same.

One of the things that works in this system is that schools which—for reasons which we may not understand—are doing a good job can expand; and schools which—for reasons which we do not understand—are doing a bad job can contract. The result would be that fewer people would be in schools which are doing a bad job.

In this sense it is analogous to a private enterprise system, though it could happen in a public system. A well-managed corporation grows and has a larger share of the business, and vice versa for the one doing a bad job.

If you knew why the first school was doing better than the second school, you would not have to move the children around. You could just make the second school do what the first school is doing, and everything would be OK.

But, we don't know what it is. We only know that this school works better than that other school. It may well be that one of the best ways to spread these benefits around is to have more children in the good school. There may not be any other way to give access to it.

Mr. HARRIS. So you are going with the personnel in the school that is effective in whatever ways it is.

Mr. STRICKMAN. If you can reach the conclusion that the classroom teacher is of central importance, what implications does this have for your system? Am I correct in suggesting you believe the classroom teacher is the key?

Dr. JENCKS. Yes, and you would only have to have a formula to define the teachers who are doing best.

We don't have any formula now.

Mr. STRICKMAN. You would identify the good schools as well as the other ones, but the good classroom teacher there now will not be able to teach more children simply because the size of the school expands, so that that school is going to be getting more classroom teachers who will be the same teachers that the local school would have gotten, had the children stayed there.

Dr. JENCKS. If the teacher is unaffected by the school he is in, the whole argument is weakened. If you want to recruit better teachers, you will have to decide who the better ones are. The voucher system won't help that.

My feeling is that the school will have an effect on the performance of the teacher, and on the students. If that is untrue, the whole argument for vouchers is really pretty weak. Then it would not matter about the schools; it would only matter who the teachers are. If you get bad teachers at Andover, you would be as bad off as you are in East Harlem. That doesn't read true to me.

Mr. STRICKMAN. But you have a ratio at Andover of 6-to-1, rather than 40-to-1.

There will be other factors you will not be able to control in any public system that hold in the private system.

Dr. JENCKS. I agree.

But there are schools in New York City that do a better job with poor children than other schools in New York City, I don't have the impression that the differences are in the teachers. It seems that how the teachers end up has to do with what the school is like. That teacher becomes a different teacher because he is in a different school.

Mr. HARRIS. Then I guess one last question, what is that level that is most critical for the effectiveness?

What level of personnel is most critical for making an impact on the effectiveness of a school; the teacher, department head, principal, or maybe even a district superintendent?

PRINCIPAL—MAIN VARIABLE

Dr. JENCKS. We have just been starting to investigate this, but my working assumption is that the principal is the main variable that you can manipulate in some way.

There are differences between teachers, but it is very hard to predict them. That is, the differences are not related to whether or not you have graduate degrees or years of experience, or whatever, and they are not related to salaries. Further, the differences between teachers are very hard to do much about, even in terms of raising the quality of teachers. Some people are better than others, but there is no strategy you can pursue which will have much effect on whether or not you can get good teachers. You have a million and a half teachers, and some are good. There is no way I can see to make more of those people.

Like parents, some parents are better than others. But, licensing people to have children won't solve the problem.

So that although I think there are qualitative differences, I am pessimistic as to what you can do from the outside to affect that process.

With principals, although it is harder to know what to do, there is more leverage. A lot of people want to be principals, and you can pick and choose.

So that is my gut feeling about it. But, as I say, I don't have evidence on this and one of the things we are setting up to do, assuming we can get the money, is to try to quantify those things and say how much of the unique effect of schools is due to the schools, and how much of it is due to the teachers in the schools. That is a research problem nobody seems to have undertaken.

Ask me the same question in a year, and maybe I will give you an answer.

Mr. HARRIS. That is all I have.

Mr. SMITH. Before we recess I will place in the record the prepared statement of Robert Lekachman; who, unfortunately, could not be with us today.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT LEKACHMAN

PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS, STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK AT STONY BROOK

I welcome this opportunity to express my views before a distinguished congressional committee upon one of today's most important and most controversial educational issues. In the New Leader of July 12, 1971, I have written at some length on vouchers. I hope that my article, "Vouchers and Public Education," can be made a portion of this committee's hearing record.

On this occasion, I wish to restate and amplify my central position. I assume that support for educational vouchers from strikingly varied quarters is the consequence both of increasingly negative evaluations of the performance of the public schools, and the positive virtues claimed by voucher proponents of educational variety, diminished administrative bureaucracy, and enlarged freedom of parental choice.

I have no doubt that some public schools do badly, others indifferently, and only a minority really well. The same might be said of the universities, public and private, with which I am acquainted. But nothing in logic proves that a proposed new set of institutional arrangements will be any less defective than the old set, particularly if the same people and the same doctrines are present in both instances. Accordingly in what follows, I assume that the strongest case for vouchers is founded upon their claimed merits rather than the arguable deficiencies of public education.

Vouchers come in both conservative and liberal attire. Starting as I do from an egalitarian position, I can state immediate and unequivocal opposition to the conservative voucher plan espoused by Prof. Milton Friedman. Dr. Friedman, in his 1962 manifesto, "Capitalism and Freedom," advocated transfers to the parents of school-age children of the sums now expended by public school authorities. For each eligible child, parents would receive a voucher which could then be assigned to any school chosen by the parent—public, private, parochial, profit-seeking, or altruistic in concept or organization. Thus, on the demand side of the market, parents could freely shop around for the school nearest their taste.

On the supply side, alert entrepreneurs, ideologues, religious educators, and altruists would rapidly widen the available choices by founding new schools better adapted than the old ones to the tastes of prospective customers. Under the stimulus of all this new competition, public school administrators might respond with new vitality in order to retain an acceptable share of the entire educational market.

National adoption of the Friedman design would almost surely increase segregation by race, income, religious doctrine, and social class. Nothing would prevent schools from charging fees much higher than voucher values. In effect, poor parents would be restricted either to public schools of such generally inferior private enterprises as could operate on the voucher level. Middle and upper income parents would enjoy what amounts to a sibsidy in aid of their children's private education. I concur heartily in Christopher Jencks' warning that "an unregulated voucher system would be the most serious setback for the education of disadvantaged children in the history of the United States."

For me, liberal vouchers present a harder problem of choice because their most ingenious advocates like Mr. Jencks share my own values. We wish to diminish racial and economic segregation. We do not want to turn public schools into semipenal institutions of last resort for the storage of unwanted children. We aspire to the establishment of no religion. I take the central features of Jencks' regulated compensatory voucher plan to be these:

1. Tuition ceilings;
2. Financial rewards for schools that admit and benefit difficult youngsters;
3. Admission of at least 50 percent of the pupils by lottery;
4. Effective supervision by educational voucher authorities (EVA) of publicity, admissions, discipline, and expulsion; and
5. Initial and subsequent accreditation by the EVA's of the schools eligible for voucher payments.

I admire the spirit which animates this plan. I applaud the ingenuity of its safeguards against discrimination affecting the poor, black, and merely obstreperous. Sadly, I utterly disbelieve in its political viability, and I very much fear that versions of the Jencks' plan which survive legislative battle will be far closer to Friedman's unregulated free-market vouchers than Jencks' preferred design.

As Jencks has himself aptly remarked of middle-class parents, "They want to send their children to school with other middle or upper middle-class children, and they see vouchers as an easy and apparently legitimate way to do this." I take it to be a regrettable but dominating feature of the social landscape that most parents who favor vouchers do so for reasons quite different from an aspiration to racial or economic integration. Ambitious parents tend to perceive America as a meritocracy. For the parent, the appropriate implication of the definition is giving his child every possible advantage in the credentials race upon which meritocracy is premised. Accordingly, what parents are likely to seek is not merely or mostly schools that are good in themselves, but the nursery schools which open the doors to those private schools which, in turn, promise entry into those colleges whose graduates have in the past enjoyed preferred entry into situations of power and profit.

Right now voucher education is in its demonstration stage. When it reaches the crucial moment of serious debate as a generalized statewide transformation of public education, legislatures and Governors will encounter overwhelming pressure to remove tuition ceilings, junk lottery provisions, and curtail the supervisory powers of voucher authorities. What is exceedingly probable is eloquently described by Philip Slater in "The Pursuit of Loneliness":

> Poverty programs put very little money into the hands of the poor because middle-class hands are so much more gifted at grasping money—they know better where it is, how to apply for it, how to divert it, how to concentrate it. This is what being middle class means, just as a race means competition. No matter how much we try to change things it somehow ends as merely a more complex, intricate bizarre, and interesting version of what existed before.

There is a related point. If against all the probabilities, some enlightened legislature did mandate an arrangement in the spirit of regulated compensatory vouchers, the bureaucratic structure required to administer it is highly likely to be nearly as obtrusive as the "stifling" administrative hierarchies now regularly denounced by educational reformers. As supervisory authorities parallel to existing school boards, EVA's will be charged with numerous functions. Jencks makes them responsible for informing parents about school quality, a task force whose successful accomplishment demands that EVA's continuously inspect, evaluate, grade, and publicize the schools within their jurisdictions. A second EVA role is supervision of admission. It will be required to administer the 50-percent lottery and police the admissions of the remaining half of the pupils so as to ward off racial and economic discrimination. Even more difficult is a third task, the protection of children unwanted by schools who received them as a result of lottery, against unfair treatment, suspension, or expulsion.

I assume that EVA members will be grateful that they need not raise money or supervise school construction. However, for the rest earnest attention to their responsibilities will involve them very closely into the operations of the schools. In the end, these responsibilities of evaluation, admissions, and discipline appear to resemble quite closely those now exercised by public school authorities.

I amplify my reluctant opposition to regulated compensatory vouchers by attention to a partially parallel political event. I allude to the exemplary instance supplied by President Nixon's Family Assistance Plan. Mr. Nixon and his advisers started with an idea that a great many progressive men and women, among them a probably majority of economists, favor. This is a negative income tax as the central feature of a rationalized system of national income maintenance. Distinguished economists like Robert Lampman and James Tobin have designed plans which transfer comparatively generous benefits to the poor, allow those employed to retain some proportion of their earnings above the guaranteed minimum and surround the program with a minimum assortment of eligibility and surveillance requirements.

As was only to be anticipated of a conservative administration, FAP turns out to feature benefits at exceedingly meager levels. Indeed there is no guarantee that in some of the more humane jurisdictions existing benefit levels will not drop. And even more important, FAP insists upon coercive training and work regulations which in effect demand that FAP beneficiaries barter for exiguous financial aid much of the personal freedom most of us like to think the Constitution guarantees the poor as much as the prosperous. Understandably FAP has splintered the liberal community. Liberal optimists rejoice in Republican acceptance of the principle of universal income maintenance and look toward the better day when a Democrat of appropriate principles as President leads a successful battle to enlarge benefits and diminish coercion. Liberal pessimists, myself distinctly among them, are uncertain of the imminent arrival of that yearned for better day. They are prone to think that the repressive elements of FAP will indefinitely linger and the promised benefit expansion will be indefinitely postponed.

The debate over educational vouchers may well develop into a similar scenario. Liberals will urge plans like the Jencks regulated compensatory voucher. Governors and legislatures, responsive to their constituencies of white, middle-class parents, will enact free market designs. At that point, liberals will be torn between their general fondness for educational experiment and the glaring, inegalitarian deficiencies of the only varieties of vouchers likely to win political favor.

My opposition to liberal vouchers is above all founded upon the political judgment that for the time being the only social experiment most Americans favor have the effect even if not always the intention of curtailing welfare benefits, checking integration efforts, and loosening rather than tightening the fragile bonds between races and classes.

Thus, when I express my support of public education it is not because of any fatuously exaggerated notion of its quality. During a conservative period, those who favor liberal goals are simply better off with public schools than with any politically viable alternative. At the least a well-articulated structure of law and judicial interpretation limits school racial segregation. There is even hope that the Supreme Court will outlaw some of the more blatant forms of Northern racial segregation. For similar reasons, the line separating church and state is likely to proceed less rapidly in public than in voucher schools.

As far as economic segregation is concerned, vouchers would worsen a poor situation. At present, middle-class parents must support public education, even if they opt out of the system on their children's behalf. Were parents relieved of some portion of their school taxes, the exodus by the middle class out of the public schools would accelerate and the public schools would become reservations for our urban Indians.

Our contemporary trauma over the design of public education relates to the general conflict in American history between a noble egalitarian tradition which requires that every infant be given an equal chance, and an equally longstanding, generally more potent preference for market solutions to social and educational as well as economic problems. For a spell during the 1960's egalitarianism displayed unwonted vigor. Two of its monuments are the legal services program and title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act.

These are the 1970's. People of my views tend to console themselves with reflections upon the volatility of American political opinion. Nevertheless, unless and until public sentiment swings again in the direction of racial and economic equality, liberals are realistically engaged in a holding operation designed to retain as much as possible of New Frontier and Great Society gains. Under such dour conditions, preservation and improvement of public education deserves high liberal priority. The time for voucher experiment is a liberal administration. Right now any voucher plan rugged enough to survive public debate is far more likely to please Milton Friedman, Edward Banfield, and William Buckley, Jr., than Christopher Jencks and myself.

Mr. SMITH. The committee is in recess, to reconvene at 9 a.m., on Friday, in room 1318, of the New Senate Office Building.

(Whereupon, at 12:59 p.m., the Select Committee was recessed, to reconvene at 9 a.m., on December 3, 1971, in room 1318, of the New Senate Office Building.)

EDUCATION INFORMATION

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1971

U.S. Senate
Select Committee on
Equal Educational Opportunity
Washington, D.C.

The Select Committee met at 9:04 a.m., pursuant to call, in room 1318, of the New Senate Office Building, the Honorable Walter F. Mondale, chairman of the committee, presiding.

Present: Senator Mondale.

Staff members present: William C. Smith, staff director and general counsel; Donald S. Harris and Bert Carp, professional staff; William Henningan, minority staff director; and Leonard Strickman, minority counsel.

Senator Mondale. This morning we have with us Dr. Norman Boyan, Dean of the Graduate School of Education, University of California at Santa Barbara. We are pleased to have you with us here this morning.

STATEMENT OF DR. NORMAN J. BOYAN, DEAN, GRADUATE SCHOOL OF EDUCATION, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT SANTA BARBARA

Dr. Boyan. Good morning, Senator Mondale.

Senator Mondale. You may proceed as you wish.

Dr. Boyan. Mr. Chairman, I will not read from the statement which I have prepared and already submitted.

Senator Mondale. All right, we will place that in the record* as though read and you may summarize.

Dr. Boyan. Thank you.

In addressing myself to the questions of dissemination and diffusion, I have indicated that the first prior consideration is that of insuring an arrangement for producing and converting a sufficient amount of knowledge so there is something really worth delivering.

National Institute of Education

I have taken the opportunity, therefore, to urge speedy and positive action on the proposed National Institute for Education, which I know is under consideration by the Congress.

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*See prepared statement, pp. 11026–30.

(11023)

In my judgment, the investments in the National Institute of Education will be a very important part of producing the necessary research base and converting the research knowledge into materials which are directly usable by the schools.

So I see the whole issue of production and conversion as underlying and providing the foundation for the dissemination and diffusion operation.

MATERIAL DELIVERY SYSTEM

There still remains, however, the fundamental question of delivering materials to the schools and to other users and clients of the schools in a sensible and useful way.

For this reason, I suggest the establishment of two sets of complementary institutions. One set would be State based and State oriented. I call this institution the Educational Intelligence Unit. I use the term "intelligence" deliberately to convey the notion of pro-active scanning, synthesis, analysis, packing the stuff down and delivering it to the school systems and professional operators within the State. Each State does have a communications system that is already available for commanding the attention of people in the State and especially the professional staffs.

The other unit which I have proposed I call an Educational Information Center. I am suggesting this institution be established on a regional basis rather than on a State basis.

My bias up to this point has been in the direction of the professional user. I recognize the fact there are many clients of the schools who feel somewhat alienated from, or disenchanted with, the establishment and who need some kind of a channel to get information for their use as they think about alternatives and choices they want to make; but, which they feel that the school system, both at the State and local level, is not necessarily providing them.

The Educational Information Centers, as I have suggested, would be established on a regional basis. One way of improving accessibility to this center might be the use of a toll-free regional telephone number—the same arrangement used for many commercial firms in getting hotel reservations, car rentals, and the like.

I also see the Educational Information Center gaining access through television and radio to large numbers of people in the region, not through the production of very expensive television programs, but using small 5-minute slots comparable to the weather and market condition reports I have heard as I have driven through rural States. These materials and this information are not all that expensive to produce, but they do keep a steady stream of information going to the people.

NATIONAL EDUCATIONAL CENSUS

Finally, I have suggested that there also be established a regular National Educational Census. I will take the opportunity to read from my statement about the census because of its compact treatment there.

The power of the survey of educational opportunity which was conducted some years ago under the direction of Prof. James Coleman has prompted me to suggest the idea of a National Educational Census.

The original and secondary analyses of the data collected for the Coleman survey have had a significant impact on educational policy at all levels.

Time does not permit me to go through a full rehearsal of the results of the survey, or debates over how good it was, and the arguments on methodology. As you know, it was done in a very short period of time; and at the same time, it was done with a great deal of care.

One of the very unique dimensions of the survey was involvement of thousands of pupils and teachers in comparable tests of achievement, which enabled the study to generate highly sophisticated analyses of the relationships between and among crucial variables—such as race, socioeconomic status—with measures of achievement on a national basis.

In addition, the study spawned a host of secondary analyses that cast further light on the critical issue of equality of educational opportunity in the United States.

I, personally, see it as no accident that since the publication of the report, the Federal presence in education has directed itself, even if unsurely, to the eradication of the relationship between race, ethnic background, and socioeconomic status on the one hand and educational achievement and aspiration on the other hand.

It is my considered judgment that a National Educational Census should be created to institutionalize on a broader and systematic basis the power of the survey on the equality of educational opportunity.

The census itself need not focus on a single issue, as did the Coleman Report. However, if it is authentically instituted, it would yield continuing and systematic data on the issue of equality of educational opportunity, which looms so large in our lives, which represents so powerful a national goal, and which is so noble an objective.

The strategic element in the census would be collection and publication of achievement data, in a way comparable to the collection and publication of income data and earnings in the traditional census. The more strategic element would be that the achievement data would be comparable across the Nation.

In brief, the National Educational Census should address itself to yielding data that would enable meticulous inspection and inferencing about the relationship between the pertinent demographic, fiscal, and operational characteristics of schools and school districts and pupil achievement.

There are some critical dimensions of a forceful National Educational Census that will inevitably strain the fabric of Federal-State-local relations in education, but must be faced directly if the national stake in equality of educational opportunity and equally strategic objectives is to be served; e.g., mandatory collection of achievement data.

Equally crucial is that full funding for conducting the census be borne by the Federal Government. It would be unconscionable to expect local and State educational agencies to carry any of the expenses and time burdens necessary to do the work of the census.

Several critical ingredients for conducting an educational census, which focuses on pupil achievement, already exist. These include the experience of the Bureau of the Census itself; the emerging National

Assessment Program, federally funded and proceeding under the auspices of the Educational Commission of the States; the experience of the survey on Equal Educational Opportunity; and the experience of the directors of Project Talent, a massive, long-term, longitudinal effort that approximates a census in its own right.

It may be argued that the Nation cannot afford on absolute terms a regular and continuous educational census. Or it may be argued that the priority should be given in matters of resource allocation to immediately pressing problems.

These are reasonable positions, but they remain unpersuasive if one really believes that investments in monitoring the performance of one of the Nation's largest and most pervasive social institutions are critically pertinent for decisionmaking on the institutional investments per se.

I might just go back over the funding issue which would be related to establishing the Educational Intelligence Units at the State level and the Educational Information Centers on a regional level.

FEDERAL FUNDING FOR EDUCATIONAL INFORMATION

I see these institutions as requiring Federal funding; the States just do not have the fiscal capability to establish these units. The Educational Intelligence Units at the State level should be set up on a pilot basis to test their efficacy. Most States do not have this capability now.

I learned recently that in three States there are prototypes of such operations now funded in part by the Federal Government. These are Oregon, Utah, and South Carolina. There are five additional States which are moving in this direction: Massachusetts, Texas, Florida, Iowa, and Kansas.

As far as I know, there is nothing comparable to an Educational Information Center at the regional level. At one time there was thought that the regional educational laboratories would perform such a function.

I was in the U.S. Office of Education for 2 years working with the laboratories; and, I, along with other people, had the responsibility for directing the laboratories more to educational development work rather than to diffusion work.

There were just not enough resources to do both jobs. In our judgment, it was more important to get some materials produced and then in the next round, to look at diffusion and dissemination.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NORMAN J. BOYAN

EDUCATIONAL DIFFUSION AND DISSEMINATION

Mr. Chairman and members of the Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity. I wish to thank you for your invitation to testify.

My remarks fall into two broad and related categories. First, I will address myself to the diffusion and dissemination of the results of educational research and experimentation. Second, I will turn my attention to the connection of information systems in education to a variety of actual and potential users.

Three central issues dominate the domains of diffusion and dissemination of research results. The first is the Nation's capability to produce basic knowledge pertinent to the improvement of educational practice. The second is capability to convert raw knowledge into products, processes, and environments which are immediately usable. The third is capability to deliver the products, processes, materials, and organizational forms to the sites which need or want them.

The national investment in educational research and development is abysmally low and shameful. The level of funding approximates one-half of 1 percent of annual expenditures in education, when it should be approximately 5 percent. Unless and until investments in knowledge production through research and knowledge conversion through development receive dramatic increases in funding, efforts to improve diffusion and dissemination will continue to rest on weak and shaky foundations. For this reason, I feel compelled to take advantage of this opportunity to urge your positive and speedy support for the proposed National Institute of Education. If you are really concerned with improving the Nation's capability for diffusing and disseminating the results of excellent research and experimentation, then you must be equally concerned with the Nation's capability to produce high-quality knowledge in quantity. First things must come first.

On the issue of conversion capability, it is now clear that there is no one optimal link between knowledge production and knowledge utilization. A number of studies over the last several years indicate that research results and raw knowledge bring their influence to bear on practice through a variety of routes. Recent experience and observation in education, however, have demonstrated that deliberate stress on rigorous development work represents one of the most powerful means available for linking the production and utilization of knowledge. The single-minded purpose of educational development is the production of tested alternatives to current educational practice. The serious and conscientious development corporation addresses itself frontally to the task of producing materials, processes, and organizational forms which meet predetermined specifications, which are readily exportable, and which are adoptable with a minimum of personnel retraining. Educational development work is, by definition, user oriented. The work of educational development corporations, including many of the federally-supported Regional Educational Laboratories and some of the university-based Research and Development Centers, has demonstrated the power and promise of deliberately linked research and development efforts to affect directly practice in the schools and other educational institutions. A substantial number of the laboratory programs have focussed on disadvantaged target groups.

The very process of development work includes dimensions of diffusion and dissemination because of the number of schools, teachers, and pupils who are involved in ever-expanding cycles of field testing and product revision. At the same time, it must be recognized that the purpose of development work itself is the production of tested alternatives rather than the stimulation of diffusion and dissemination. Rigorous development work is expensive. The allocation of resources to diffusion and dissemination inevitably compromises the number of tested alternatives which a development corporation can produce. I am particularly conscious and sensitive to this condition because of my previous association with the Regional Educational Laboratories, the Research and Development Centers, and a number of comparable organizations. Suffice it to say here that although the products coming out of the laboratories and their counterparts are finding their way into selected school systems across the Nation, two additional conditions must now be met. The first is increased funding of educational development work so that a larger number and variety of tested alternatives may be generated. The second is the establishment of a set of new and complementary institutions whose single purpose is to speed the delivery of the outputs of development work to schools and school systems which choose to adopt them.

The need for these new institutional units does not stem from the absence in education of a large variety of sources of information already available to the practitioner. There already exist many scholarly and trade journals, digests, abstract series, encyclopedias, yearbooks, ERIC clearinghouses, ERIC depositories, and official statistical reports, to say almost nothing about the hundreds of conferences and meetings which beckon both the researcher and practitioner. Still, there remains the need for a systematic link between the producers and potential users of the outputs of educational development.

The institutional device I recommend came to mind during my review of the plan for the proposed National Institute of Education. The NIE plan correctly emphasizes the need for and the benefits anticipated from improving the production of knowledge and deliberately related educational development. Performers of research and development, rather than users, occupy center stage.

These observations are not fundamental criticisms of the plan for the Institute per se, but they support the view that Federal investments in the Institute alone will not yield the benefits to practitioners that would come from parallel investments in a complementary set of institutions which focus specifically on the requirements of users.

It is pertinent to note here that the diffusion of tested alternatives in education is terribly confounded and complicated both by the governmental structure of education in the United States and by the wide variety of potential units of adoption: 2 million teachers, hundreds of thousands of schools, and approximately 20,000 school districts. Any proposal for enhancing diffusion and dissemination of worthy products must contend with and capitalize on these contextual conditions, as well as recognize all of the existing sources of information which already exist.

My estimate of prevailing and desired circumstances leads me to propose the establishment of a set of State-bound and State-oriented Educational Intelligence Units. I believe that if the Federal Government promoted the establishment and appropriately funded such units, there would follow more systematic and continuous adoption of tested alternatives to existing educational practice. This proposition is empirically testable, and should be tested in a small subset of pilot operations before funds are committeed broadside.

Most States do not now support units which are specifically designed to conduct proactive scanning and monitoring of nationwide research and development production pertinent to educational programs within their boundaries. Most States do not now possess the capability for systematic analysis of the results of research and development in behalf of their own professional staffs and school districts. Most States are not now equipped to stimulate the diffusion and dissemination of high value and thoroughly tested alternatives. Yet most States already possess the basic machinery for commanding the attention of school people in their jurisdiction. It makes eminently good practical and political sense to augment strategically the States' capability to reach directly the various potential units of adoption of any new alternative to existing educational practice.

The Educational Intelligence Units would constitute the heart of a statewide delivery system for systematically bringing the fruits of research and development, by whomever performed, wherever done, and under whatever sponsorship, to the attention of the appropriate potential units of adoption. Ideally, the Intelligence Unit would also assess the degree of "testedness" of the alternative to educational practice as a prelude to stimulation of diffusion and to dissemination via print and nonprint media. The Intelligence Unit should be obliged to assess worth as well as to encourage consideration. Both obligations require a degree of leadership and expertise which it is legitimate to expect at the State level.

There need be no requirement that the functions themselves be performed by staff members of a State Education Department. Options could readily include contracting with other agencies to perform the work or establishment of a separate nonprofit corporation. Where States are small or sparsely populated, interstate consortiums could be established to perform the scanning, assessing, diffusing, and disseminating functions. Large States might wish to establish decentralized subregions.

The funding for the Intelligence Units would come from the Federal Government, either completely, on some reasonable matching basis, or on a straight-out equalization formula to guarantee operation in States where need is high but resources are low.

Up to this point, I have focused exclusively on improving diffusion and dissemination where the professional practitioner and user is the target of concern. I fully recognize my bias, but I also recognize that the clients of educational institutions deserve freer access to sources of information on new developments. There will be those who would argue that improving the capability of the States alone to diffuse and disseminate offers little to clients and other citizens who already feel disenfranchised or alienated by the establishment. I am sympathetic to this view. In addition, I have also observed and learned that external pressures represent a powerful impetus to change in any societal institution.

For these reasons, I wish to propose Federal investment in still another set of institutions: specifically, regionally-based Educational Information Centers.

These centers would desirably consist of an interlocking set of nonprofit, quasi-governmental corporations strategically located across the country. They would differ from the single-purpose, single-focus centers in the ERIC network in that they would be multifocused; that is, they would be ready to respond to questions pertinent to a wide range of educational demands. They would differ from the Regional Educational Laboratories in that the centers would not perform actual development work and would have information on hand about the products and services of all of the laboratories and of other research and development activities. They would differ from the regional offices of the U.S. Office of Education in that they would not be responsible for program management or supervision. They would differ from State education agencies in that they would not be involved in direct program regulation and management of local education agencies. They would differ from ERIC depositories in that clients would need no particular associational membership to secure access to services. At the same time, the centers would possess all the present capabilities of ERIC depositories.

The fundamental purpose of the educational information centers would be to respond directly to inquiries from any and all client groups, professional and otherwise, who wish information about recent developments and advances wherever in the Nation the developments and advances have occurred. The interlocking characteristic of the centers would be critical, to permit them to secure access to the storehouses of information located at any one of them, in response to an inquiry from a client in their own region.

The reactive dimension of the work of the centers would be enhanced by direct accessibility via a regional toll-free telephone number, similar to the arrangement for making hotel reservations or car rentals that is now available from certain commercial companies. In addition, the centers would also adopt a proactive posture, with particular attention to the scanning of tested alternatives that are available from a wide array of educational development corporations and scanning of innovative ideas that have not yet achieved a full degree of testedness. The centers would also be proactive in bringing available alternatives and ideas to the attention of people in their regions by way of print and nonprint media, including radio and TV. Their services in this respect would not be unlike weather reports, crop condition reports, and market reports commonly broadcast over a wide regional base in rural areas of the Nation.

The centers would perform, in short, some of the functions that a number of individuals originally expected from the regional educational laboratories, before the laboratories were channeled primarily into development work; some of the functions originally expected from the research coordinating units supported by Federal vocational education research funds, and some of the functions commonly provided by school study councils.

It can be predicted in advance that many members of the education fraternity will not be particularly enamored with the idea of the educational information centers because the centers, by design, fall outside the traditional governmental structure of education. The fraternity members might well see the centers as potential sources of aggravating perturbation. This issue and possible contention need to be faced squarely by the Congress should it choose to move consciously in the direction of providing information to clients by routes outside the formal governmental structure and related professional associations.

Let me conclude my remarks with an urgent recommendation for prompt establishment of a continuing national educational census. We need such a census for essentially the same reason as we need the traditional decennial census: to tell us who we are, what is our status, and how we have progressed. The decennial census itself tells us some things already about our educational status, and these are useful things. The various statistics about education collected and published by the U.S. Office of Education also tells us some useful things. However, we need to know more; the information needs to be collected in and for the national interest; and the data need to be rendered in ways which usefully serve the national interest.

Let me illustrate the point with reference to the monumental study of equality of educational opportunity conducted in the mid-1960's, under the direction of Professor James Coleman. The original and secondary analyses of the data collected for the study have had significant impact on educational policy at all levels. Neither time nor space permit a full rehearsal of the conclusions of the study, the ensuing debates over methodology and inferences, or the details of impact. One of the unique dimensions of the study was the involvement of thousands of pupils, and teachers, in directly comparable tests of achievement. Another was the ability of the study to generate highly sophisticated analyses of the relationships between and among strategic variables (such as race, ethnic background, and socioeconomic status) with measures of achievement on a national base. In addition, the study spawned a host of secondary analyses that cast further light on the critical issue of equality of educational opportunity in the United States. I, personally, see it as no accident that since the publication of the report, the Federal presence in education has directed itself, even if unsurely, to the eradication of the relationship between race, ethnic background, and socioeconomic status on the one hand and educational achievement and aspiration on the other hand.

It is my considered judgment that a national educational census should be created to institutionalize on a broader and systematic basis the power of the survey on the equality of educational opportunity. The census itself need not focus on a single issue, as did the Coleman report. However, if it is authentically instituted, it would yield continuing and systematic data on the issue of equality of educational opportunity, which looms so large in our lives, which represents so powerful a national goal, and which is so noble an objective. The strategic element in the census would be collection and publication of *achievement* data, in a way comparable to the collection and publication of income data and earnings in the traditional census. The more strategic element would be that the achievement data would be comparable across the Nation. In brief, the national educational census should address itself to yielding data that would enable meticulous inspection and inferencing about the relationship between the pertinent demographic, fiscal, and operational characteristics of schools and school districts and pupil achievement. The educational census would serve as valuable a source book for inquiries and policymakers as has the decennial census. In addition, it would provide unparalleled information for Federal policymakers and legislators in making their decisions on where and how to allocate resources for education.

One of the crucial dimensions of a forceful National Educational Census is that the collection of information would be mandatory, not optional. This requirement will inevitably strain the fabric of Federal-State-local relations in education, but must be faced directly if the national stake in equality of educational opportunity and equally strategic objectives is to be served. Equally crucial is that full funding for conducting the census be borne by the Federal Government. It would be unconscionable to expect local and State educational agencies to carry any of the expenses and time burdens necessary to do the work of the census.

Several critical ingredients for conducting an Educational Census, which focuses on pupil achievement, already exist. These include the experience of the Bureau of the Census itself; the emerging National Assessment Program, federally-funded and proceeding under the auspices of the Educational Commission of the States; the experience of the survey on Equal Educational Opportunity; and the experience of the directors of Project Talent, a massive, long-term, longitudinal effort that approximates a census in its own right.

It may be argued that the Nation cannot afford on absolute terms a regular and continuous Educational Census. Or it may be argued that the priority should be given in matters of resource allocation to immediately pressing problems. These are reasonable positions, but they remain unpersuasive if one really believes that investments in monitoring the performance of one of the Nation's largest and most pervasive social institutions are critically pertinent for decisionmaking on the institutional investments *per se.*

Thank you.

Senator MONDALE. Thank you very much, Dr. Boyan.

Your last point interests me a good deal. Do you think that the national effort to collect, analyze, and disseminate educational data—presumably for the purpose of better educating Americans—ought also to include a substantial effort at demonstration and experimentation?

EXPERIMENTAL SCHOOLS PROGRAM

As you know, the President has proposed 20 schools to be established in different settings around the country. They are to try strategies to see what happens, and see if we cannot develop some models which are hopeful.

Your comments seem to emphasize the data collection, analysis and dissemination; do you have any feelings about one against the other?

Dr. **Boyan**. I look at data collection and analysis as flowing from the census as providing a continuous monitoring arrangement to allow us periodically to see where we are, where we come from, and to look at the effects of the various interventions of various experiments which are introduced.

I look at data collection and analysis as not contradictory to the notion of conducting experiments, but necessary to maintain a continuous monitoring system.

As far as the so-called experimental school program—which I think is what you are referring to—I was in Washington at the time that the idea was generated in early 1969. I had some very distinct reservations about the way the program was conceived at that time.

My concern was primarily that not enough investments were going to be made in any one place to make a difference. I remember specifically proposing the notion that approximately $5 million should be allocated per site.

The reason I suggested the alternative of concentrated investment as compared to spreading the funds around was because of my experience with the Regional Educational Laboratory program. Great expectations were generated, promises of lots of funds were made; but the resources never reached the places where the funds should have been allocated.

It took a long time for the laboratories—about 11 of the original 20 are still in existence—to do anything really significant.

Senator **Mondale**. It never was adequately funded was it?

Dr. **Boyan**. In my judgment the program was never adequately funded, and still is not.

Senator **Mondale**. That was supposed to be an experimentation program, too.

Dr. **Boyan**. There were many confused orientations in the founding, establishment, and movement of the program. I found myself—when I came to Washington in 1967—faced by a whole series of expectations of lots of different groups. I read over the testimony and I recall seeing different kinds of aspirations and expectations which people held for the laboratories.

Educational Development

After looking at this material very carefully, and looking at the laboratories that seemed to us to be the most productive, we settled on focusing the work of the laboratories on educational development.

One of the best examples I can think of is the Individually Prescribed Instruction program that came out of the R. & D. Center, University of Pittsburgh and went then to the laboratory at Philadelphia.

About 2 or 3 years after the establishment of the Philadelphia laboratory, the people there had actually made arrangements to get the individualized instruction program into 90 schools across the country. They never would have been able to get the schools interested if they hadn't brought the materials to the point where the materials were almost immediately usable with little training.

As you know, educational development is a very expensive kind of thing. For example, the Physical Science Study Committee headed by Mr. Zacharias spent almost $6 million developing the PSSC physics, which was one course for one grade level at the high school level.

So development is a very expensive operation. At the time I was associated with the laboratory program, I felt we did not have the resources to do both the production and the diffusion work so we concentrated heavily on the production side.

Senator **Mondale**. This committee has been in existence almost 2 years. We end up next spring, and we have been thrashing around trying to answer those old questions, "Why so many children fail?" and, "What we might do to more equalize educational opportunity to children in this country?"

I must say, I have been appalled at the absence of answers in the education field. Data seems to conflict; the suggestions are hard to come by.

Do you think a system such as that which you are recommending here would substantially improve the chance of a better research situation, a better understanding, and development of a better set of strategies that we do not seem to find today?

Dr. **Boyan**. I remember once studying with a professor who said, "Always give a catagorical answer, then hedge." So I will give the categorical answer and say "yes," and then hedge.

Establishment of Priorities

The hedge is related to the establishment of a clear set of purposes and priorities. If, for example, one were to say that we will address the bulk of our investments in research and development over a given period of time to the very single-minded purpose of eradicating the correlation with school achievement of race, socioeconomic status, and ethnic background, I think we could make a material advance along the lines of what you are suggesting.

I think the scattering of purpose and priorities gets in the way of focusing the attention of people on this kind of a problem.

Now, there is one very crucial technical point in the question you are raising; namely, that as long as our assessment procedures are essentially based on an expectation of a normal curve, there will always be half the people below the median.

So we can never get to the point where everybody passes if we assume the continuation of the normal curve distribution. I would like to see the curves for blacks and whites be the same; the curves for the Chicanos and Anglos be the same, and for poor and rich be the same.

I do not know whether we can get there, but I think it is worth giving it a try.

Senator **Mondale**. Would you say we are a long way away from it today?

Dr. **Boyan**. Oh, yes; I think all the data indicates that if you are black and poor, the chances of your performing well, on the average, are low. If you are rich and black as compared to being white and poor, the data will be confounded.

It is just not a question of ethnic background alone or socioeconomic background alone. When you put these factors together, you can make a good prediction of who will be high or low on any achievement scale.

I think we have to look carefully, then, at the way in which we measure the results. It is impossible to get everybody above the median by definition.

There are new developments in the testing and measurement field, which emphasize mastery learning. Essentially, this approach establishes a predetermined criterion of accomplishment toward which you work specifically. You try to bring the people up to this particular criterion.

This approach, incidentally, is partly undergirding the activities of the National Assessment Program. The people involved in this program are moving in quite a different direction from the usual development of testing. They are looking more at meaningful performances rather than conventional school performances.

You probably know that most tests are standardized on the basis of school performance. The National Assessment Program is trying to identify criteria such as being able to read the newspaper, being able to take information and making some sensible inferences from it. The program emphasizes functional intelligence more than school bound intelligence.

This approach, I think, will help considerably to focus efforts on matters much closer to the kind of thing which concerns your committee.

EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

I would argue that we really are not fully appreciative of the efforts that have been accomplished and of some of the work that has already been done in both educational research and educational development programs.

For example, in the Southwest Educational Development Laboratory, located at Austin, Tex., they have done some fascinating work in developing bilingual programs. Their efforts have been rather successful in the Texas area, and they have also shipped a good deal of their stuff to the New York City area where the people display a large variety of Spanish-speaking backgrounds.

Senator **MONDALE**. That is the development of bilingual materials?

Dr. **BOYAN**. Yes; it is a very substantial effort and successful, too.

Another laboratory located in Kansas City has been developing a program focusing on urban teacher education, which is, over the years, something that has shown powerful impact.

So, there are people who are very much concerned about the kind of thing that concerns this committee. One of the major problems is that not enough people know about the alternatives which are actually available to them. This is why I think something like the Educational Intelligence Unit at the State level is extremely important.

Senator **MONDALE**. It sounds to me something like the farm extension service.

Dr. **BOYAN**. There is an ——

Senator **MONDALE**. You try to adapt what is known in the field.

Dr. BOYAN. This is a very important part of both the Educational Intelligence Unit, as I call it, and also the Educational Information Center. From some of the research in mass communication, we have come to recognize a two-step requirement, which suggests that the mass media are valuable for stimulating interest, but that people do not adopt new practices unless they relate to someone whom they trust.

I was talking to people in the U.S. Office of Education yesterday, and they were saying they hoped to see people who can communicate with the Chicano community, and who can communicate with the black and poor communities, who represent bridges between the packed-down knowledge base and the people who are potential users.

So I suspect the counterpart of the agricultural extension agent is commanding a lot of attention right now in the area of education, particularly because of the need to have a trusted party represent a link between the knowledge base and the people who are potential users.

Of course, diffusion and dissemination education are terribly confounded by the governmental structure in the United States and a tremendous number of potential units of adoption. There are more than 2 million teachers; there are hundreds of thousands of schools and roughly 20,000 school districts. The strategy for securing adoption of change and improvements at each level might have to be significantly different.

I expect anyone who is looking for any simple answers and an immediate panacea is whistling in the dark.

I think we need complementary series of institutions and efforts directed differently, but pertinently, to each one of these potential units of adoption.

Senator MONDALE. Thank you very much, Dr. Boyan. We thank you for your contribution today.

Dr. BOYAN. Thank you for the opportunity.

Senator MONDALE. Dr. Kleindorfer, you can proceed as you wish.

STATEMENT OF DR. GEORGE B. KLEINDORFER, LECTURER IN EDUCATION, SCHOOL OF EDUCATION, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY

Dr. KLEINDORFER. Good morning, sir, sorry to keep you waiting.

Senator MONDALE. Proceed as you wish, Dr. Kleindorfer.

Dr. KLEINDORFER. I will summarize my remarks in this paper.

Senator MONDALE. We will put the whole statement in the record.*

MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS

Dr. KLEINDORFER. I have been thinking about so-called management information systems and there are several issues connected with them that I think have deluded people in educational studies.

First, it seems to me that in designing an educational information system, one has to pay very close attention to the kinds of decisions that are going to be made based on the information system. Then, it seems to me that after having considered the kinds of decisions that users are likely to make, one has to consider the procedures by which the users make the decisions.

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*See prepared statement, pp. 11042–46.

Having considered these procedures—that is, models of the decisionmaking processes—one comes to a point where one can see rather specifically and definitely what information, what data needs to be gathered.

Many times in educational research, I see the approach to this thing just going in the opposite direction. There is a Baconian way that people go about doing this. They feel there is a value just having data, period. So they gather reams of the stuff without any notion or clear thought about what they are going to do with it. So it seems to me that one has to consider very carefully the central link in that three-link chain I just put forward—decisions, models, data—and that data is not data without reference to some model or some scheme as to how that data is going to be related to decisions.

There is no reason for paying for data if one isn't going to relate it to decisions somehow. So, then one has to turn to what models are available for resource decisionmaking in education if models are to play such a role in this scheme of things.

Resource Flow Models

There is a set of models which I think have been very much disregarded in educational planning. They have been used extensively abroad but I haven't seen much use of them in this country. I will call them resource flow models.

They are models that can well be used at State or Federal level in which one predicts enrollments under various conditions and, having predicted enrollments, one looks at the likely need for teachers, for equipment, for facilities.

In other words, these models deal with the physical aspects of what is needed to support the educational system. They don't deal in any direct way with the learning process, that is, one specifies to these models what the per-pupil need for physical space, equipment and so on is going to be and the immediate connection of these resources to learning is not treated in the model.

Now with cases coming forward like *Serrano* versus *Priest*, in California, we will likely see a larger State role in education. But it seems this type of model will be much needed in order that a State, if nothing else, be able to plan its budget as to how much it is going to disburse to the schools of the State.

I think many times that educators, by the nature of their business, become very caught up with just the idea of relating resources that come to the school with so-called achievement of the child. In looking around at the State and Federal level, I have seen no one really adequately dealing with models that describe the aggregate need for resources. It is almost as if people just assume that these resources will just keep coming and the only thing they are really concerned about is what effect the resources will have when they get to the schoolhouse door.

It would seem to me that these resource flow models I have been describing would be a valuable adjunct to information system design, and that someone should be doing research to build information systems based on these models.

I have seen several State education departments, and when one goes to these departments and asks for data about, say, teacher turnover, or student flow rates one finds nothing available. One has to guess on a great deal of the stuff. We had to go around and ask people, "What do you feel about it?"

Senator MONDALE. "How do you feel?" Is that what——

Dr. KLEINDORFER. That is exactly what we had to do. It is not a fault of any given individual.

I think many times it is the fault of schools of education, psychology, and sociology, because of a certain type of research that people learn in those institutions which has nothing to do with decisionmaking or the costs of information as related to decisionmaking.

They take the standard base of statistical courses in which one assumes the data will be available and one just runs it through a number of analyses. This is the standard operation.

I think it would be better to see students working on the sort of thing you see in operations research, in economics, or applied economics—of trying to look at where the resources are coming from and where they are being budgeted to and what will be the need for facilities if one makes assumptions about the physical needs of an individual student.

When one goes to a State department of education, one often finds that they are very proud of the fact that they have masses of data on a lot of things. They may have reels and reels of computer tape which it would take several man-years to run through to get anything off. Outside of the fact that it has no value, if you can't use it, even if you were to get to it, I don't think you could find anything valuable from it anyway. If you don't think beforehand about how it can be related to some set of decisions, about how to store it in relation to those decisions and how to process it and organize the information system so that it can be related to decisions, it always turns out that you will find a mass of data on some points and no data on other vital points.

People seem to feel that if you approach a problem with explicit prior models, then somehow you are polluting your thinking. It is just the opposite kind of thinking that we need. We need some clearly laid out models that can be used as a reference for organizing and putting this data together.

PRODUCTION FUNCTION MODELS

Now, I would like to turn for a few moments from resource flow models and to the so-called production function models. These are models which try to take the resources that come to the school and relate them to the achievement of the child.

Recently I sat in several meetings where we have talked about fashioning different formulas for State disbursal of education funds. This is a situation where people are very concerned about delivering the resources to where the need is. They want to design a distribution formula for the State in question that will somehow recognize educational need, so we get into this whole production function kind of argumentation.

This is what the Coleman Report was basically about—how much of the achievement of a child can we really relate to the resources that go to the school.

On the one hand, I meet educators who feel this sort of engineering approach to schooling will eventually, if carried on forever, lead us somewhere. That we will be able to analyze through test results, that we will be able to take into account the school resources, peer group influences, home background, and innate endowments to come up with some magical formula that will allow us to disburse these funds almost as if we were disbursing sandwiches from an electric machine or something of that nature. I am not so sanguine about it for many reasons.

There is no underlying theory of learning. If you go to talk to psychologists about it and you say, "What psychology supports this approach?" I have yet to find an intelligent answer from them.

Economists find that this production function approach to schools is questionable in its own terms. Henry Levin produced a paper that I think just cuts this thing in two.

Senator **Mondale**. What does Henry say in this paper?

Dr. **Kleindorfer**. Oh, well, in his usual scholarly way, Henry has gone through several hundred contributions to the field and sliced them up, one and all.

Senator **Mondale**. No doubt.

Dr. **Kleindorfer**. That is right.

But he shows that the economic assumptions which go into this kind of methodology don't hold water for education. The production function notion comes primarily from microeconomics. The idea is that the five classical assumptions of economics allow one to represent in production function fashion the way that a firm converts resources into outputs. Well, he shows that every one of those assumptions is completely contradicted in the present educational system, and then he argues that even if we assume production functions somehow represent people, that these people's idiosyncratic production functions would be such that if we look at an average production function for a school, or for a community, or for a State, that by making decisions based on that average production function, we could be doing something disfunctional for the individuals involved.

I don't know how to put this, Senator, but the thing that displeases me about production functions is that they represent such a cold-blooded mechanistic view of things. With *Serrano* versus *Priest*, there will be demands on the part of States to institute these large information systems to gather test score information and to start making aggregate decisions based on it according to this production function methodology.

DEHUMANIZATION OF LARGE INFORMATION SYSTEMS

I think there are very large questions about what the hell we are assuming humans are when we do these things. Sometimes I begin to feel that what we look for is the next downtrodden group of people, in this case, children. We find some way to manipulate them, to handle them, rather than relying on the human beings involved immediately with them and/or the community around them and their parents. We have this centralist tendency to use this very faulty and unquestioned kind of methodology in hopes that if we gather enough information and institute a complete testocracy, we will be able to trace the malingerer down who through his perfidiousness has thrown the wrench into the system.

It disappoints me for another reason. What will happen to us if we institute these large systems for watching people? We will lose the villian. The villian—you know—a hundred years ago we had Uriah Heep and Scrooge and we loved them. Now, we are instituting such large systems of monitoring people that we will just lose the good, honest villian, and it frightens me.

I just have very grave questions about it and I think the research supports me. It wasn't just a few years ago that we had the Coleman Report around which people argued whether schools had any effect whatsoever on children outside of their family background. Of course, we have shown the obvious since, and that is that the schools *are* geared to children's family education and background and therefore, to talk about any separate effect of the schools is methodological nonsense in the present discriminatory situation.

I would like to put before you, in my humble opinion, that what we should be making an effort to do is to put together information systems that count the countable, that is, that count the number of people coming along and count the number of buildings we have and count the number of teachers we have and what they are paid and maybe count money, but that we leave counting learning alone. Now the counting I am talking about and backing, can be taken care of by these resource flow models that are more or less demographic and economic in nature. Then we should leave the measurement and appreciation of learning to the community and the parents and people somehow. I don't know how to formulate these things any better than that, but that is what I feel about it.

Senator **Mondale**. Well, that is essentially the system today, is it not, the so-called judgments that you talk about?

Dr. **Kleindorfer**. Yes, to some extent.

Senator **Mondale**. But in fact, the system is pretty much a matter of judgment of teachers, and principals, and superintendents, and the school board, and the PTA, and the parents, and this and that. That is really how it is done in most communities.

Dr. **Kleindorfer**. Yes.

Senator **Mondale**. Yes, I think I would agree there is enormous inequality in American life. The chances of a Mexican American—or Negro or Indian—compared to a rich white child, there is just no fairness in that at all.

Dr. **Kleindorfer**. Yes.

Senator **Mondale**. So what is the Kleindorfer plan for eliminating inequality in education?

Inequality of Resources

Dr. **Kleindorfer**. Well, if we go to look at the poor in this country and we look at their schools, we find that, in fact, their schools are damn poor; and, when we look at the rich, we find, in fact, their schools are damn rich.

I don't see that we have to look at test scores, or that we have to institute some sort of system of testing children to determine that.

But it seems to me that these inequalities in resources we see are very countable and we have counted them and we keep counting and we don't do a damn thing about it.

Senator **Mondale**. There are lots of reasons, but one of the reasons is the argument we keep hearing everywhere—really what Coleman was saying—I saw a rough draft of an educational study which says there is no relationship between money spent and cognitive achievement.

Funding and Cognitive Achievement

Dr. **Kleindorfer**. Well, let me just try to tell you how injurious that argument is and where it comes from.

In the Coleman study student achievement was regressed against socioeconomic status and wealth, and then it was asked what additional variation in the child's achievement scores could be explained by the school. It was found that very little could be explained this way. Only a few school variables had any significant effect. So the general conclusion began to noise itself around, and it is still around today, that schools don't do anything independently of the family background of the child, so why be concerned about them so much.

Senator **Mondale**. There are a lot of people who believe that.

Dr. **Kleindorfer**. Yes, and let me show you why that is a vicious argument.

Senator **Mondale**. The President of the United States said that.

Dr. **Kleindorfer**. Yes; he said that.

We showed in the State of Michigan right now, that the values of some 200 different school resource variables are directly related to the wealth and education of the parents of the children in the school. The school situation is directly correlated to the home.

Senator **Mondale**. Is that what the study* did?

Dr. **Kleindorfer**. Yes.

Senator **Mondale**. I have read that. It was a study for the Urban Coalition.

Dr. **Kleindorfer**. Yes. You have a triangle of variables—family background, the school and the student's achievement.

Now, the Coleman argument says—so-called, I am not laying this on James Coleman—the people who read the report come up with this argument, that we find that the socioeconomic status and education and wealth of the parent explain the students' achievement and therefore the school doesn't mean anything. but if you go along the bottom of the triangle, then you see that the resources and condition of the school is directly correlated to the home, and that the school is really a surrogate of the wealth and education of the family.

When you come and tell me that the school makes no difference independently of the family background you are just rubbing salt into the wound.

You have set up the schools. You have set up this discriminatory situation where the school is directly geared to the home. It is no great wonder that the achievement of the child doesn't show any effect

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***See Part 16C—Inequality in School Finance; Appendix I. Schools and Inequality.**

independent of the home, because the school is just a surrogate of the home, and to come forward with that argument is rubbing salt in the wound. You have set up the system, then you turn around and use that same system you set up to say, "Look, it isn't working independently of the home."

This also raises another problem with the production function type of analysis. How can you make judgments and decisions about the effect of the school independently of the home if the school is directly geared to the home? There is no methodological way to separate the two. Why? Because in fact they are not separate. That is the situation we are in.

EQUALIZE SCHOOL FUNDING

So I think that the Kleindorfer program—if I may revert to that—would be to eliminate that linkage between the resources that go into the school and the wealth and education of the family and to give the poor child as good a school as the rich child.

I don't immediately see what that has to do with instituting a great big testocracy that is going to work miracles.

Senator **MONDALE.** I have always said that I thought money must make a difference, but I can't prove it.

Dr. **KLEINDORFER.** Right.

Senator **MONDALE.** The study I mentioned earlier did find what they said was evidence that money spent made a big difference in educational attainment.

Dr. **KLEINDORFER.** Who said that?

Senator **MONDALE.** This study. In other words, they could not prove that if you spent a lot of money in black ghetto schools that the children tested better in cognitive terms but more went on to college, fewer dropped out, made more money and so on.

Dr. **KLEINDORFER.** Right.

Senator **MONDALE.** I am told that is no longer in the draft either; that is a preliminary erroneous conclusion.

Dr. **KLEINDORFER.** I understand.

Senator **MONDALE.** In terms of general economics in this country today—if you say "What can we do to help poor folks?" Then you can get Walter Heller and two or three others in a room, and they will say, "In our opinion this is the policy that we ought to pursue," for this reason, and so on.

That kind of general economist was able to talk Kennedy into the big tax cut and sold Keynes to the politicians.

Dr. **KLEINDORFER.** Right.

Senator **MONDALE.** Now, for some tragic reason, there doesn't seem to be a similar educational economist or policy person coming along who can help us in the Congress in determining and developing resources for educational opportunity.

Dr. **KLEINDORFER.** Yes.

Senator **MONDALE.** Now, that is the problem. I have the same feeling you do, that accumulating pounds of data is not going to make a difference.

Dr. **KLEINDORFER.** That's right.

Senator **MONDALE.** As a matter of fact, it will tire the politicians out. Of course, we have tons of data from all over the Federal Government here right now, none of which comes to the points that are any good to us, by and large.

How do we organize this thing so that we can start making some sense in education, and start making some sound policy recommendations?

Dr. **Kleindorfer.** Well, that is a big question to answer.

Senator **Mondale.** Don't you think that is where we have to go?

System To Check Input

Dr. **Kleindorfer.** Yes, that's right. I think that—in the question of data and information systems—we can start by counting some things that we agree are countable.

I think we can start to count and set up an information system that will keep track of the actual stuff that students are getting.

Senator **Mondale.** The input.

Dr. **Kleindorfer.** That's right. I think we can do that and that needs doing. I think it will show a lot of inequalities in the schools as they presently exist. I think we need to set up a system that starts doing that. Then maybe in time, if we start equalizing these resources and make this system of disbursal fair, maybe then we will see some of the desirable human effects of this.

But, Senator, I feel there is just a hell of a lot of human life we are just not going to be able to count. I cannot tell you that the solution to the problem is just to dump in so many dollars and that we will get such and such a cognitive level or motivation or lessening of crime or what not. Human beings aren't that simple.

Senator **Mondale.** Well, I agree with you there. I believe most people would. But, why can't we develop a better system than we have to establish some sound reasons for a good public strategy for education—then start moving with it?

This is why the development of the National Institute for Education and other proposals have been made: to try to get a better understanding of what we are doing and what we should do.

Limits of Technological Approach

Dr. **Kleindorfer.** I think many times, Senator, the reason, one of the reasons we don't, is because of the technological bent of our approach. We somehow think in this missile age we can missilize everything.

To give an example, yesterday I was at Johns Hopkins and a man was there named Burns, recently elected as a councilman of East Baltimore. He knocked that Johns Hopkins school faculty all over the place, the so-called experts with their technical approach that just doesn't take into account the self determination of the people of the community, he says.

They made up their mind in that community of East Baltimore to kick them out and not to have anything more to do with them. They saw more and more money going down the drain and they took the handle themselves. They put their own clinic up and they got some doctors and started putting together their own school.

They are putting in that school a drug program, they are bringing the city councilmen there, they are putting a restaurant in so the families can come, they put their hand to their own tiller. Somehow that needs doing here in this country. Not some data bank that will keep track of the "outputs" we get from this fellow and that fellow.

I don't know how you mobilize it, but it seems to me that science and methodology only go so far. This is one of the biggest problems of our age, I think.

How far are we going to computerize things and count things? It starts falling apart at the edges. The educational system is one of the biggest sufferers. Something new is called for and it seems to me that what is called for is human beings, not so much analysis.

COMMUNITY CONTROL

Analysis—here is how Mr. Burns put it. He said you experts can help us with certain things. You can bring us the equipment and you can build us the buildings and set things up the way we want them. He said, "then I think we can do something with it." But the other way around just doesn't seem to work. I would suggest that is part of the reason we are seeing the educational system not work so well, too.

Senator MONDALE. That is an argument for community control.

Dr. KLEINDORFER. I think so, yes. I realize the problems connected with that.

Senator MONDALE. Do you believe in these court orders for school integration which involve busing?

Dr. KLEINDORFER. Yes, I do. I do agree with them.

Senator MONDALE. Doesn't that overrule community control?

Dr. KLEINDORFER. Well, I think it could well make the community much better and perhaps much more vibrant and bring people together to do a lot of things that will help.

I realize there are problems connected with it, but I don't see another way out.

Senator MONDALE. Right now I must go to an executive session on the school integration bill.

Thank you very much.

Dr. KLEINDORFER. Thank you.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEORGE B. KLEINDORFER

SOME THOUGHTS ON EDUCATIONAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS

INTRODUCTION

At the present time a great deal of money is being spent and largely wasted in many inept efforts at gathering educational information and in the construction of so-called educational information systems. This wastage occurs for several reasons among which are:

1. Misconceptions as to the proper nature of an information system;
2. Erroneous ideas about educational research; and,
3. Attempts to measure that which cannot or should not be measured.

Ida Hoos (4)* has recently pointed out many of the myths that surround the use of information systems in public planning. She has ably set forth and questioned the validity of four assumptions underlying the general acceptance of the information system as a management tool:

1. That more information leads to better plans and decisions;

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*References at end of statement.

2. That more and faster-moving information necessarily enhances "efficiency" of operation;
3. That greater "efficiency" is identical with better public service; and,
4. That information systems are best conceived, designed, and controlled by "information experts," whose talents are movable and ubiquitous.

It is reasonable to ask then what, if any place, does an information system have in education, and what principles should be followed in designing one.

I have divided my brief remarks on this topic into three parts. In the first, I list some of the factors I think are important in designing a good educational information system. In the second, I have set down a few criticisms of present states of affairs in regard to educational information systems. Lastly, I have listed a few recommendations that I would encourage the committee to consider.

Most of my remarks about information systems here are meant to apply to agencies at Federal and State levels.

SOME THOUGHTS ON WHAT EDUCATIONAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS SHOULD BE

An information system should explicitly be built around a pattern determined by the decisions which are to be made by the users of the system. The approach that seems most sensible to me is that set out by Gorry and Morton (2), The information system designer should consider three links:

1. Users' decisions;
2. Models or procedures describing the processes by which the decisions will be made; and,
3. Information or data as defined by the models or procedures.

This is a very simple idea which says that the reason for paying for information should be to support and aid decisionmaking. The method and manner in which information is defined, gathered, processed, and stored should be determined with this purpose in mind. It is surprising how much this rule is ignored in educational practice.

The information system designer should start by considering all the decisions which the users of the information system will be required to make. The designer should not be concerned with anything else. If the users do not or will not have the power, or jurisdiction to actually or potentially make decisions in a given area then—if for no other reason—simple cost considerations rule out gathering information in that area.

Having considered the decisions the information system users will or might have to make, the designer next considers the decisionmaking process. How and by what steps are the decisions made? What is or should be the logic or rationale behind each type of decision? In some cases it will be found that an extensive framework or even a mathematical model may be set forth describing the elements of the decisionmaking process. In other cases, decisions will have to be made almost by instinct or tacit knowledge without an overt decisionmaking model. These are the two relative poles: The structured versus the unstructured decision. It is a difficult philosophical matter to define what a structured decision is. This is especially true in the field of education. The idea is a relative one and depends among other things on the development of people's notions about education. The decision which is structured today may be unstructured tomorrow. For our discussion we may say that a structured decision is one which can be reduced to a set of logical steps. Such a definition encompasses all of the systematic methods of decisionmaking including those derived from operations research and systems analysis as well as the many more heuristic decisionmaking methods. But, this definition only removes the problem to another level.

It may be cogently argued that despite the efforts of educators, psychologists, sociologists, etc., that the most important and valuable aspects of education will not be reduced to logical or rational procedures. This thought seems to me to be particularly important in considering the subject of educational information systems. To the degree that each individual is autonomous, self-developing, and free the logic and rationale of education should almost be newly determined for each student each day. In a very real sense it may be nonsensical or even harmful to set up an information system about certain matters in education. I say "nonsensical" because a framework or model around which to gather information may be absent, or may just be blossoming. I say "harmful" because the setting up of such a system may result in rigidification of what should be free.

Since I am placing so much emphasis on models as the central link between decisions and data it may be well to consider this subject less abstractly if for nothing else than to clarify by example some of the points I have been raising.

There is quite an extensive literature in existence dealing with various kinds of educational resource flow models (5), (1), (8). These models are used to forecast enrollments, numbers of teachers, the need for facilities, and other kinds of educational resource needs. These models are often computerized and can be quite mathematical in nature. There are several interesting aspects of such models which should be extensively discussed in reference to educational information systems.

First of all, these models most often do not deal explicitly with the nature of the learning which is supposed to take place in schools. Instead, they are used to calculate and forecast the more physical aspects, if I may say so, incident to the educational process—numbers of students, number of teachers, total costs based on assumed per pupil and/or per teacher costs, total facilities costs based on assumed pupil-place costs, et cetera. Thus, the user of such a model must supply to it his own, or historical information about the physical needs associated with the educational process, this information being translated into various cost categories and figures. The potential effect of these expenditures on the students' learning is left out. Some might say that this deletion of the treatment of learning is a shortcoming in these resource flow models. Others, myself included, see it as a strong point for reasons which I will try to make clearer below. There are models, the so-called educational production function models, which treat explicitly the nexus between physical resources and some of their effects on students. These, too, I will discuss below.

One of the virtues of these resource flow models is that they define very precisely and in an integrated systematic fashion what information must be at hand in order to use them. This precise definition allows one to avoid duplication in information gathering. It allows one to assess what information must be known very accurately, and what needs to be known only approximately. Such models would provide an excellent base or reference for part of Federal or State educational information systems. They are being used in Europe and Asia. They are not being used in this country. Part of the reason, I think, is that educational researchers have been so enamored with the production function—Coleman Report-kind of argumentation that they have ignored the relatively less controversial but ultimately very valuable resource flow models we are discussing. People seem to have just assumed that resources will continue to come along somehow, and have instead devoted most of their systematic attention to the effect of these resources on the test scores of children. No one, so far as I know, has researched how resource flow models could be used to construct valuable parts of a model-based educational information system. It seems to me, however, that this task will have to be undertaken. Court cases like *Serrano* v. *Priest* in California are forcing many State governments to examine their role in supporting education. If these States are to take a more active part they will have to consider the information problem and the models we have been discussing if for no other reason than to be able to plan their budgets. These States will have to be able to gage the present and future effects of the resource allocation patterns and decisions that they will be forced to make. How can this be done without a systematic information system connecting and treating numbers of students, teachers, and facilities and other resources? Let us now turn from resource flow models to educational production function models.

Do the educational production function models provide a solid enough base upon which to build an information system? I would argue that they do not. First, without trying to do injustice to educational production functions let me describe what one is. An educational production function is an equation containing dependent variables (called outputs) and independent variables (called inputs). The output variables are usually test scores of one type or another. The input variables may comprise school resource variables, family inputs, peer group influences, and variables representing innate endowments of the student. The idea of this production function representation is to connect educational resources and student background to educational achievement as measured by test scores.

Leaving aside for others the vulgarity of this kind of treatment of learning and education, let us instead mention only a few of the weaknesses in it when one considers it as a possible framework around which to gather educational information.

Henry Levin (6) has shown that the economic theory from which the production function idea is derived does not carry over to education and that decisionmaking using such a model may well be harmful in the terms of this model itself.

How are we to measure all of these variables without imposing a complete testocracy on the schools?

The models themselves are gross and approximate and based on no underlying theory of the educational process (7).

No method presently exists for separating the effects of the family and the school on students' achievement. It is essential to be able to do this in order to use production functions for making decisions about schools. This is primarily what the controversy surrounding the Coleman Report was about. In fact, the obvious has been proven: the educational system caters to the children of the wealthy (3). Any effort to show that schools affect children independently of family wealth and education fails precisely because at present the quality of school services provided a child *is* directly geared to family wealth and education. I will be the first to retract this objection to the use of production functions when the present discriminatory situation is abrogated.

It seems to me then that a State educational information system should not deal with the processes that educational production functions have tried to deal with. Such an information system would fail in every link that we said than an information system should possess:

1. There is no adequate model on which to define, reference or base data collection;
2. Important "data" is missing in the sense that many of the "variables" can't be sensibly measured; and,
3. Decisions based on such an attempted information system may be dysfunctional in their own terms.

For all these reasons we should work to allow the community immediately connected with and surrounding the school to make the decisions which some want to make in Orwellian fashion by means of production functions.

SOME THOUGHTS ON THE PRESENT STATE OF EDUCATIONAL INFORMATION COLLECTION

There is a great deal of waste in the way that educational information is presently gathered and treated.

A typical State Education Information Agency gathers and stores reams of stuff that will never be related to decisions. Often information is collected so unsystematically that a surfeit exists in some areas while in other crucial areas nothing is gathered. Federal agencies exhibit the same behavior.

To give just one example, I was recently asked to examine a set of three questionnaires that had been sent out to a large sample of schools (over a thousand) all around the United States by a certain group in the Office of Education. The question to be determined was what could all that data be used for. This is certainly not a very bright question to ask after all the expense and trouble caused by the gathering of the data. I examined the questionnaires myself as did others and we all came to the same conclusion. While some interesting questions were asked in these three forms there existed no possible way to relate the information together with anything else let alone study any kind of possible policy implications. This failure resulted from the clumsy way questions were asked as well as from questions not asked or missing. Had the questionnaires been framed with definite decisions and policy matters in mind, had the means whereby the information was to be related to the policies or decisions been carefully thought through beforehand, this failure would not have occurred. As it was, the whole effort was a fishing expedition which came back emptyhanded. How is it that supposedly trained and educated professionals can make mistakes like these?

I think that at least part of the reason lies in the false preconceptions put forward about research in many schools of education as well as in sociology and allied academic disciplines. The Baconian idea of research seems still to be strong. According to it one must collect information without any kind of prejudice or pollution caused by the adoption of prior models. The chief kind of preparation for research in these academic areas seems to be the standard kinds of statistical courses. These courses do not deal except in the most undirect way with decisionmaking. Rather, one estimates or hypothesizes about parameters or quantities without relation to the cost of data or the nexus of the parameters to decisions.

SOME RECOMMENDATIONS

1. I would like to see this committee endorse the use of Federal funds to encourage State education departments and Federal agencies to study and design model-based information systems. The emphasis in this effort should be toward systems based on resource flow models and away from the input-output type of production function model. Unless encouragement and support for this effort comes from outside these agencies, then for many reasons—such as bureaucratic inertia, lack of trained personnel, etc.—it will be a long time before this kind of information system will be brought into use.

2. I would like to see this committee encourage decisionmaking, control and information gathering at the local and community level in the areas of educational assessment, and the evaluation of student achievement.

3. I would like to see this committee encourage the study of the moral, philosophical and value theoretic questions involved in the use of educational information. How does the gathering of educational information relate to our country's ideals of freedom and individual self-development?

4. I would like to see this committee encourage the study of different kinds and modes of quantitative research than those now in fashion in most schools of education, psychology and sociology. The customary diet of statistics should be changed to include more of the treatment of the modern decision analysis methods of operations research.

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Senator MONDALE. The committee is in recess, subject to the call of the Chair.

(Whereupon, at 10:10 a.m., the Select Committee was recessed, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.)

APPENDIXES

Appendix 1

MATERIAL SUBMITTED BY THE WITNESSES

FROM DR. FRANCIS KEPPEL

[The New York Times, Nov. 28, 1971]

PRINCETON IS URGED TO GIVE 3-YEAR B.A.

PRINCETON, N.J., Nov. 27.—The chairman of a committee studying education at Princeton University has recommended that the school shorten its normal undergraduate program to 3 years.

Dr. Marvin Bressler, a 48-year-old professor of sociology at Princeton and chairman of the university's Commission on the Future of the College, made the proposal this week in an 86-page report distributed to university officials and faculty members.

According to the committee's proposal, Princeton's current 12-week semester sequence would be supplemented by trimesters arranged in an 11—6—11-week sequence. Each academic year would be 28 weeks long and their 3-year total of 84 weeks would be equal to seven current semesters.

It was said that such a move would make Princeton the only major American university routinely offering a baccalaureate degree in 3 years.

Dr. Bressler contended that "almost all Princeton freshmen, while still in secondary school, receive instruction which in the recent past would have been regarded as at least the equivalent of one semester of college work."

The commission, composed of 10 Princeton faculty members, six students and three senior administrators, was formed in October of 1970 and is scheduled to make its final recommendations next fall.

GENERAL LEARNING CORP.,
New York, N.Y., December 29, 1971.

Mr. LEONARD P. STRICKMAN,
Minority Counsel, U.S. Senate Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. STRICKMAN: Thank you for your letter of December 21, in which you asked two questions related to:

1. Safeguarding the privacy of children and their families while obtaining effective information for research and teaching purposes; and,
2. Minimizing the danger of the effect on teaching and teachers of the use of standardized tests.

With regard to the first question, I find myself in agreement with the Russell Sage Foundation guidelines, a copy of which follows this letter. This seems to me a matter on which our society must take a "hard" line; where the results involve the identification of individuals, written consent of parents, or the student who is of age (defined by State law which usually means 16 years minimum) should be required. This may, admittedly, make life difficult for researchers, but the principle of safeguarding privacy is surely a higher priority than inconvenience or even restrictions to research investigations. Where no identification is possible, of course, such requirements would not be necessary.

With regard to the second question, I hope the select committee will take note of the distinction between the use of tests as measures designed to help the teacher diagnose the situation of the individual learner, and measures designed to assess the performance of the school as a whole—not the individual teacher or pupil. With regard to the former use of tests, the best protection against measuring teachers on the basis of "high" test scores is simply to keep salary schedules separate from pupil results. I realize that there are students of the educational scene who take the opposite position, that is, that teacher performance should be measured by pupil performance on standardized tests, and that economic rewards should be used as an incentive. The long-run dangers of such a policy seem to me to outweigh any short-term benefits. Teaching is an art, not a science, and the instruments we use are not sensitive enough to factor out the differences in any individual case of the effects of home, community, and teacher on what a pupil has learned. And the teacher's responsibilities in practice also involve influencing the pupils' ethical and social values, whether or not such influence is required by law. We lack measures of these "noncognitive" results that could be used in setting policy. Information gathering which involves testing all pupils of a given category must therefore be kept separate from assessment of teacher performance, and Federal policy should be designed with this explicit restriction.

Information gathering for the purpose of assessing the performance of a school, a school system, a State, or the Nation in order to measure trends and spot weaknesses, is a very different matter. Here it is possible to get the information needed by testing a small sample of students. No single student need be tested in all subjects, and no teacher is likely to have more than an occasional pupil (unidentified in advance) in his classes. "Teaching to the test" is far less likely and being measured by results on salary schedules becomes impossible. As far as I know, for example, none of these dangers have arisen in connection with the national assessment program to which I referred in my testimony on December 1. For this aspect of information gathering, therefore, the select committee may wish to require that data be collected only by sampling methods, with standards set by Federal regulations on techniques of data collection and reporting.

Sincerely yours,

FRANCIS KEPPEL.

GUIDELINES

for the collection maintenance & dissemination of pupil records

RUSSELL SAGE FOUNDATION

PREFACE

As the modern world becomes more finely organized, the search for a satisfactory human dimension to life grows in intensity. This quest is not confined to the poor, to the young, or to minority groups: it is characteristic of all men—for all of us seek personal dignity and fulfillment.

We have come to accept our society as increasingly technological and bureaucratic. What is harder toaccept is that such a society, while essential to the life to which we are accustomed, in many ways threatens the quality of the lives we hope to live.

Privacy is one of the rubrics under which the persistent tensions between the natural drives for individual fulfillment and the intruding needs of society are categorized. The claim to privacy is a claim for personal freedom, the freedom of each to choose for himself the extent of his sharing with, or withholding from others. This human claim involves bodily privacy—or the right to life and physical integrity; property privacy—or, as it is usually put, the right to private property; and spiritual privacy—or the right to integrity of personality.

In no one of these aspects is the claim to personal privacy an absolute one. Privacy always yields to those needs of a community which are believed by that community to be paramount. Thus, bodily privacy yields to the draft, property privacy to eminent domain, and spiritual privacy to a free press or to a public trial by jury.

Every one of us will assess differently the tolerable limits of intrusion upon our privacy. And even a single individual will assess those limits differently at different times and in varying settings. Nor are community needs static. They, too, differ in importance, or in urgency, at differing times and under differing circumstances.

Thus, the conflict between the need for personal privacy and the claims of the community is always a contest among many powerful and constantly varying forces. The modern version of this enduring struggle between the individual and his environment is not simply a matter of urban and suburban crowding, of exploitation and prejudice, of a polluted environment, and a defiled landscape. More subtle, but by no means less important, is the increasingly intrusive capacity of modern technology, the reality of instant communication and the availability of computerized memories.

Modern science has introduced a new dimension into the issues of privacy. There was a time when among the strongest allies of privacy were the inefficiency of man, the fallibility of his memory, and the healing compassion that accompanied both the passing of time and the warmth of human recollection. These allies are now being put to rout. Modern science has given us the capacity to record faithfully, to maintain permanently, to retrieve promptly, and to communicate both widely and instantly, in authentic sound or pictures or in simple written records, any act or event or data of our choice. Technology can now transform what participants believed were private experiences into public events.

In considering the challenge of these developments, it is well to remind ourselves that not every laying on of hands is assault; nor is every technical trespass actionable; nor every taking of private property forbidden. So too not every affront to individual dignity is objectionable.

The range of tolerable invasions of privacy is ample. They include those that are purely technical, or insubstantial, or wholly inadvertent. They also encompass those invasions deemed desirable in order to further a paramount public purpose. The criteria for separating the permissible from the impermissible invasions of privacy are numerous and complex. They must be chosen with special attention to the particular setting in which the issue arises.

One of those settings is the nation's schools. And the schools have a special command upon our concerns. The promise of the human resource represented by the pupils in our schools is compelling in its importance; the plastic nature of the growing young personality underlines the delicacy of the issue; and the commitment of our society to the development of every child's full potential establishes the paramount social objective within which the human dimension must be preserved.

The following Report of a conference convened by Russell Sage Foundation is unique in presenting, with full sensitivity to the competing values involved, the first guidelines for the collection, maintenance and dissemination of data in the dossiers of school pupils. It is an exceptionally fine effort. With clarity and discernment it has brought a keen collective intelligence to bear on the often baffling problem of accommodating the competing claims of pupils, parents, the school and the community. Its usefulness will be readily apparent to both parents and administrators. Its ultimate contribution will be to the pupils and the communities it is designed to serve.

Oscar M. Ruebhausen
Chairman, Board of Trustees,
Russell Sage Foundation

December 22, 1969

INTRODUCTION

Virtually all school systems now maintain extensive pupil records containing, in addition to a pupil's attendance and achievement record, standardized test scores, personality data, information on family background and current status, health data, teacher and counselor observations, anecdotal records, and so on. Despite this fact, very few systems have clearly defined and systematically implemented policies regarding uses of information about pupils, the conditions under which such information is collected, and who may have access to it. We do know, however, that important decisions affecting individual pupils are made, at least in part, on the basis of these school records.

In the absence of explicit administrative policies, legislation, legal precedents, or even a universally adopted code of professional ethics, teachers, counselors, principals, and other school personnel are frequently left to their own devices to make judgments about the collection, maintenance and disposition of pupil records. Although little public attention has been focused on this problem, there have been cases of serious conflict between parents (or children) and the school, and the issues are judged to be important enough to warrant careful analysis.

The working conference on the ethical and legal aspects of school record-keeping was convened by Russell Sage Foundation to clarify these issues, assess the seriousness of the problem and to prepare a set of guidelines for the formulation of school policies regarding pupil records. A number of specific questions served initially to provide a framework for the discussion. Among these were the following:

☐ Should schools and school personnel be required to obtain parental and/or pupil permission before collecting certain kinds of information about pupils or their familes? If so, what kinds of information?

☐ Should the school be required to obtain parental and/or pupil permission before releasing certain information about pupils to parties outside the school? To which kinds of information and which outside parties should this apply?

☐ Should school personnel, especially counselors, be protected legally from subpoena by a third party of information collected in the course of a professional relationship with a client (i.e., a pupil)?

☐ What rights should pupils and/or their parents have regarding access to information about the pupil possessed by the school? Do school personnel have any obligation (right?) to withhold such information (for example, an intelligence test score) when, in their professional judgment, its release to the child or parent would be harmful to his client?

☐ What rights, if any, do pupils, as distinct from their parents, have with respect to information about them? Should a child, for example, have the right to deny his parents access to information about him, such as an intelligence test score?

The conferees included representatives of both educational and legal institutions, as well as experts in a number of related areas. As one would expect with such a diverse group, complete agreement was not reached on every issue. The recommendations that follow, therefore, summarize the overall sense of the meeting and should not be construed as representing the opinion of any participant as an individual.

There was agreement, however, on one point: namely, the seriousness of the problem and the need for the development of a set of guidelines which might serve as a basis for the adoption of specific procedures in each school system. It was noted, for example, that legislation aimed at strengthening safeguards on privacy is currently before, or recently has been enacted by, several state legislatures. All of the conferees expressed a sense of urgency about the necessity for thoughtful consideration of the ethical, legal and practical issues involved before overly restrictive, incomplete, or in other ways inadequate legislation becomes a reality; or before specific incidents create a repressive climate of public opinion.

Three background papers were prepared and distributed prior to the conference (see Bibliography). These papers provide much of the legal, philosophical and factual underpinning for the following set of recommendations. The principles and concrete recommendations themselves are the product of a conscientious attempt by the conferees to adjudicate among the various potentially conflicting interests of parents, children, schools, and other interested parties, such as colleges, employers, law enforcement agencies, and researchers. In every case issues of practicality were weighed against matters of principle and legal precedent.

Implementation of the following recommendations will require significant modifications of current practice in most school systems. These modifications will, in most cases, create a degree of administrative hardship and, more important, expense. The conferees were acutely aware of the financial and administrative problems that already plague most systems, especially those in our largest cities. Nevertheless, they felt that this report should confront the issues as forthrightly as possible. Concrete suggestions for implementation, including sample consent and release forms, are contained in Part III of the report.

In initiating this project, Russell Sage Foundation anticipated that the Conference Report would serve to focus attention on an important problem, not only in the management of our schools, but in American society in general. With respect to safeguarding individual rights to privacy, we believe that school systems have an important opportunity to lead rather than follow other institutions in the society in establishing realistic, yet ethically and legally sound policies. We hope this document will serve as a first step toward such a goal.

David A. Goslin
Conference Chairman

PROPOSED PRINCIPLES FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF SCHOOL RECORDS

preamble

Schools typically maintain extensive and intimate information about pupils and their families for legitimate educational purposes including instruction, guidance and research. Necessarily, the collection and maintenance of any information about a pupil or his family constitutes a potential intrusion on privacy. At the same time, society, by its approval of our educational institutions, legitimizes such intrusions, at least in those cases where the information collected can be demonstrated to be necessary for the effective performance of designated educational functions.

There are clear indications, however, that current practices of schools and school personnel relating to the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of information about pupils threaten a desirable balance between the individual's right to privacy and the school's stated need to know. Specifically, we may point to the following examples of potential abuse:

> Information about both pupils and their parents is often collected by schools without the informed consent of either children or their parents. Where consent is obtained for the collection of information for one purpose, the same information is often used subsequently for other purposes. For example, information collected by a counselor for use in guiding students is sometimes released, without consent of students or parents, to a college or employer for use in selecting students.
>
> Pupils and parents typically have little or, at best, incomplete knowledge of what information about them is contained in school records and what use is made of this information by the school. For example, teacher or counselor evaluations of a pupil's character and personality traits may be incorporated into the pupil's permanent record, without parental knowledge, and used subsequently as a basis for a college recommendation.
>
> Parental and pupil access to school records typically

is limited by schools to the pupil's attendance and achievement record (including standardized achievement test scores). For example, intelligence test scores, personality data, and teacher and counselor reports, are usually withheld from both parents and pupils.

☐ The secrecy with which school records usually are maintained makes difficult any systematic assessments of the accuracy of information contained therein. Formal procedures permitting parental or pupil challenges of allegedly erroneous information do not exist. An unverified allegation of misconduct may therefore, for example, become part of a pupil's permanent record.

☐ Procedures governing the periodic destruction of outdated or no longer useful information do not exist in most systems. Moreover, the cumulative nature of most record-keeping systems makes a fresh start difficult or impossible for most pupils.

☐ Within many school systems few provisions are made to protect school records from examination by unauthorized school personnel. Thus, for example, a teacher may usually obtain access to a pupil's record file, whether or not the pupil is a student of his, and without demonstrating a legitimate need for the information.

☐ Access to pupil records by nonschool personnel and representatives of outside agencies is, for the most part, handled on an ad hoc basis. Formal policies governing access by law enforcement officials, the courts, potential employers, colleges, researchers, and others do not exist in most school systems. For example, in many school systems a police official may obtain access to a pupil's record file.

☐ Sensitive and intimate information collected in the course of teacher-pupil or counselor-pupil contacts is not protected from subpoena by formal authority in most states.[1]

It is our opinion that these deficiencies in record-keeping policies, taken together, constitute a serious threat to individual privacy in the United States. These deficiencies also interfere with the effective functioning of our educational institutions in that school administrators, if they are to continue to obtain information necessary for the effective performance of their duties, must maintain the good will of their clients who voluntarily supply such information. We therefore hope that school authorities will review their current record-keeping policies in light of the following proposed guidelines, and, where appropriate, revise them in such a way as to strike a balance between the need for educationally relevant information about children and the protection of individual rights to privacy.

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[1] Among the states having statutes establishing communications between pupils and counselors as privileged are Michigan, Indiana, and Wisconsin. The question of the desirability of recommending laws extending testimonial privilege to counselors and other school personnel in all states was discussed at the conference, but no clear-cut decision was reached. This issue deserves further discussion and deliberation.

collection of data

1.0 We begin, and urge school authorities to begin, from the fundamental principle that no information should be collected from students without the prior informed consent of the child and his parents.

1.1 Such consent may be given either individually or through the parents' legally elected or appointed representatives (for example the Board of Education) depending on the nature of the information to be collected.

1.2 With respect to conditions under which **individual** as opposed to **representational** consent should be required, we acknowledge, first, that it will not always be possible to obtain the separate consent of every parent for every data gathering process, and that the approval of such processes by appropriately elected representatives (whether a legislature, a school board or other body) will in some situations adequately satisfy the principle of consent. We do not believe that it would be appropriate to endorse rigid formulae for the identification of situations in which representational consent will be sufficient; it is enough for present purposes to emphasize two contrasting benchmarks:

1.2.1 On one hand, we have concluded that **representational consent** will, for example, ordinarily be sufficient in situations involving aptitude and achievement testing (whether standardized or informal) and reporting of skill and knowledge outcomes in the subject-matter areas now within the customary curricula of the public schools.

1.2.2 On the other hand, we believe that programs of personality testing and assessment, for example, should proceed only with the informed **individual consent** of each child and/or his parents. (See 1.5 and 4.6.) The test or assessment itself should not be shown to the child or his parents, although representative questions not included in the scoring or evaluation may be shown. Moreover, individual consent should be an absolute requirement before information, other than that required for pupil identification, concerning a pupil's family is obtained (for example, ethnic origin, religious beliefs, income and occupational data, husband-wife relations, and the like), or before any information not directly relevant for educational purposes is solicited from the pupil or his parents.

1.2.3 Classification of information-gathering procedures falling somewhere between these two extremes; for example, habit/skills tests or vocational interest inventories, should be undertaken by each school system, with parents being notified of the result of all such decisions.

1.3 No statement of consent, whether individual or representational, should be binding unless it is freely given after:

1.3.1 The parents (and students where appropriate by the principles described in 1.5 and 4.6 below) have been fully informed, preferably in writing, as to the methods by which the information will be collected; the uses to which it will be put; the methods by which it will be recorded and maintained; the time period for which it will be retained; and the persons to whom it will be available, and under what conditions, or

1.3.2 The reasons for the impossibility or undesirability of such explanations have been presented.

1.4 In all situations where **individual consent** is to be obtained, it should be in writing.

1.5 Where **individual consent** is required, the student's consent should also be obtained where he is reasonably competent to understand the nature and consequences of his decision. (See also, 4.6.)

1.6 In situations in which **representational consent** is sufficient, students and their parents should be informed in advance, by school officials, perhaps annually or biannually, of the purposes and character of the data collections. Moreover, they should be guaranteed reasonable opportunities by the representational agency (for example, the School Board) to contest the necessity or desirability of particular data collection processes, or proposed use of such data. We emphasize, however, that the decision of the representational agency is, subject to higher authority or judicial review, binding on all students and parents, whether or not they might individually have consented to the collection. (See also, 1.3.)

1.7 We recognize that certain special problems are presented by data-gathering in individual situations. Illustrative here are interviews or diagnostic tests by the school counselor, social worker, nurse, psychologist, school principal, etc. While the foregoing recommendations on informed consent should be applied in these situations where possible, there are special problems to be resolved. In most of this class of situations, the requirement of informed consent cannot be met, perhaps because of the age of the student, or the unforeseeable course of the interview process. Moreover, in many schools there is an element of duress in that the student feels obliged to participate in the situation. The principles advanced by the conferees for these situations are as follows:

1.7.1 The professional should inform the student as fully as possible, consonant with his professional responsibility and the capacity of the student to understand the implications of the situation, about the data that are likely to be obtained; and

1.7.2 should stress the voluntary character of the student's participation.

1.7.3 Where reasonable doubt exists about the capacity of the student to understand the implications of the situation, either because of the student's age or other circumstances, parental permission should be sought first. Moreover, when a student clearly in need of intervention declines to participate, the professional should seek parental consent.

1.7.4 In either case, if parental consent is not given, further steps to provide assistance (including resort to the compulsory machinery of the school; for example, visits with the principal, sanctions, and the like) should be

collection of data

initiated only if the counselor or guidance officer (a) is entirely convinced, giving full attention to the privacy interests involved, that intervention is imperative; (b) both the student and his parents have been fully informed, so far as that is possible; **and** (c) appropriate school authorities (see 3.3 below) have consented.

1.7.5 It should be noted that the difficulties in meeting the criterion of informed consent in this type of situation place unusual stress on the proper management of recording of information and control over dissemination. (See 3.0–3.4 below.)

1.8 Where the data are to be collected for nonschool purposes, either by school personnel or outsiders, as in the case where it is proposed that the student population be used as subjects in medical or social science research studies, then the above recommendations also should be fully applied, with the further provision that prior informed consent must be obtained from the responsible school authorities.

1.8.1 In cases where data are to be collected under conditions of anonymity, this fact should not relieve the collecting agency of the obligation to obtain the appropriate form of consent. In addition, we urge school authorities to establish procedures for regulating the collection of such data; including (a) timely notification to students and their parents that their participation in any aspect of any such data collection is entirely voluntary and (b) careful reviews of the instruments and procedures to be used for any such data collection to determine whether the methods and/or inquiries constitute a significant potential invasion of privacy, **even though the data are to be collected under conditions of anonymity**. School authorities may, for example, conclude that the topics to be investigated are so intimate or likely to be so embarrassing to the students involved that an invasion of privacy will occur even under conditions of anonymity. In any such situation, prior informed **individual consent** should be required.

collection of data

classification and maintenance of data

2.0 The total set of student personnel data extant in a school at a given time ranges from tentative uncorroborated reports on alleged student behavior to highly stable information. To illustrate: on one end of the continuum a memo may contain a report or allegation that a particular student molested a child, disrupted a class, or wept for several hours yesterday; at the other extreme records will show that a student has completed grade five, that he received a specified score on a nationally standardized test, and that he has a particular attendance record. These differing kinds of data require differing arrangements for security and access.

2.1 **Category "A" data:** Includes official administrative records that constitute the minimum personal data necessary for operation of the educational system. Specifically we take this to mean identifying data (including, names and address of parents or guardian), birth date, academic work completed, level of achievement (grades, standardized achievement test scores), and attendance data.

2.1.1 These records should be maintained in perpetuity, subject to the conditions set forth in 3.0–3.3 below.

2.1.2 Conditions of access to these data are given in 4.0–4.9 below.

2.2 **Category "B" data:** Includes verified information of clear importance, but not absolutely necessary to the school, over time, in helping the child or in protecting others. Specifically, scores on standardized intelligence and aptitude tests, interest inventory results, health data, family background information, systematically gathered teacher or counselor ratings and observations, and verified reports of serious or recurrent behavior patterns are included in this category.

2.2.1 Great care must be exercised by the school to ensure the accuracy of Category "B" data. In particular, reported behavior patterns and specific incidents must be unambiguously described and clearly verified before they become part of any continuing record. (See 2.3.1.)

School systems should give serious consideration to the elimination of unnecessary Category "B" data at periodic intervals; for example, at points of transition from elementary to junior high school and from junior high to high school. In any case, these records should be destroyed, or else retained only under conditions of anonymity, (for research purposes) when the student leaves school. Exceptions may be made where, under rigorous standards and impartial judgment, good cause for their retention can be shown. (See 3.4 below.) 2.2.2

Conditions of access to these data are set forth in 4.0–4.9 below. Parents should be periodically informed of the content of these records and their right of access to these data. 2.2.3

Category "C" data: Includes potentially useful information but not yet verified or clearly needed beyond the immediate present; for example, legal or clinical findings including certain personality test results, and unevaluated reports of teachers, counselors and others which may be needed in ongoing investigations and disciplinary or counseling actions. 2.3

Such data should be reviewed at least once a year and destroyed as soon as their usefulness is ended; or transferred to Category "B." Transfer to Category "B" may be made only if two conditions are met; namely, (1) the continuing usefulness of the information is clearly demonstrated and (2) its validity has been verified, in which case parents must be notified and the nature of the information explained. Formal procedures for validating information and protecting the interests of students and parents at this stage are set forth in 3.3 below. 2.3.1

If, for any reason, temporary unevaluated data are held for more than a year, the existence of these data must be 2.3.2

discussed with the parent and the reason for their maintenance explained fully. Parents then should have an opportunity to challenge the decision to maintain such data through procedures outlined in 3.3 below.

2.4 **Confidential, personal files of professionals in the school** (school psychologist, social workers, counselors): We recognize that, in some instances, professionals working in the school may maintain personal and confidential files containing notes, transcripts of interviews, clinical diagnoses, and other memory aids for their own use in counseling pupils. Any and all data that are considered to be the personal property of the professional should be guarded by the rules given above in addition to those dictated by professional ethics, subject to the terms of the employment contract between the school and the professional and any special agreements made between the professional and individual parents and/or students.

administration of security

3.0 It is recommended that schools designate a professional person to be responsible for record maintenance and access, and to educate the staff about maintenance and access policies. All school personnel having access to records should receive periodic training in security, with emphasis upon privacy rights of students and parents.

3.1 Records should be kept under lock and key at all times, under the supervision of the designated professional.

3.2 The conferees recognize that computerized data banks pose special problems of maintenance, security, and access not fully dealt with by these **Guidelines.** These problems should be fully explored and procedures developed for dealing with them, with the understanding that use of external data banks for record-keeping should be in accordance with all procedures outlined in these **Guidelines.**

3.3 Formal procedures should be established whereby a student or his parents might challenge the validity of any of the information contained in Categories "A" or "B." (See 4.7.2 below.)

3.3.1 It is recommended that the school create a quasi-judicial review panel composed of qualified professional personnel to determine the validity of Category "C" data, and to provide for parental challenges of such data on occasions where their transfer to Category "B" is held to be desirable. Panel members should not be limited to school employees.

3.3.2 With respect to both challenges and verifications, parents and students should be given rights to counsel, to present evidence and to cross-examine witnesses. Further, parents should receive written notice of these proceedings and should be given reasonable time to prepare for them.

3.3.3 Provision should be made for an annual review of all data retained in Categories "B" and "C." The principle that good cause must be shown for the retention of any of these data should be followed. Parents should have an opportunity to challenge the decision to maintain such data through procedures outlined above.

3.4 Current practice of maintaining Category "B" data, with accompanying identifying information, after the student leaves school, often makes possible the use of these data for retrospective research studies. Significant value may accrue to society as well as individuals from the results of such studies. Therefore it may be that, in some cases, the maintenance of such records after the child leaves school is justified. However, the difficulty of maintaining such data under secure conditions, the inability to foresee the value of future research, the difficulty in defining and obtaining informed consent when the data are collected initially, and the ultimate threat to individual privacy all militate against such policies. We therefore urge school systems to review their policies regarding long-term maintenance of such data and to establish procedures pertaining to consent, security, and access fully consonant with the general principles outlined above should they decide to retain identifiable information.

4.0 *dissemination of information regarding pupils*

As indicated in previous sections, all information regarding pupils and their families should be collected and maintained under such safeguards of privacy as may be obtained through informed consent, verification of accuracy, limited access, selective discard, and appropriate use. As long as the data are retained within the school, it can implement these principles with some flexibility of procedures. The school, however, is often asked to transmit student information to other agencies, institutions, and even individuals. Such requests come from schools, colleges, employers, courts, police, social agencies, and sundry others. Since conveyance of records removes the data from control of the school, much more stringent precautions are required to protect the rights of the student against infringement of privacy, misinterpretation of data, and inappropriate use.

4.1 The school may, without consent of parents or students, release a student's permanent record file, including Categories "A" and "B" defined above, to:

4.1.1 other school officials, including teachers, within the district who have a legitimate educational interest. All school personnel desiring access to pupil records, however, should be required to sign a written form (see Sample Form C which would be kept permanently on file, indicating specifically the "legitimate educational interest" that they have in seeking this information. Such a file would be available to parents and to the school official responsible for record maintenance (see 3.0) as a means of auditing the operation of the system.

4.1.2 the state superintendent and his officers or subordinates, so long as the intended use of the data is consistent with the superintendent's statutory powers and responsibilities. (See also, 4.9.)

4.1.3 to officials of other primary or secondary school systems in which the student intends to enroll, under the condition that the student's parents be notified of the transfer, receive a copy of the record if desired, and have an opportunity to challenge the record's content via a specified judicial-like procedure. (See 3.3 above. See also 4.7 below and Sample Form D.)

4.2 The school or any school personnel **may not** divulge, in any form, to any persons other than those listed in 4.1.1–4.1.3 above, any information contained in school records except:

4.2.1 with written consent from the student's parents specifying records to be released, and to whom, and with a copy of the records to be released to the student's parents and/or students if desired by the parents, or

4.2.2 in compliance with judicial order, or orders of administrative agencies where those agencies have the power of subpoena. Parents and/or students should be notified of all such orders and the school's compliance.

4.3 Where parental and/or student permission is required for the release of school records, procedures for obtaining this permission should take into account the distinctions made in 2.1–2.3 above regarding differences in the kinds of data contained in a student's record file, as follows:

4.3.1 Routine, nonspecific (with respect to information to be released), consent applies **only** to Category "A" data. (See 2.1 above.)

4.3.2 Additional, separate, and specific (with respect to information to be released) permission should be required for the release of any data in Category "B." (See 2.2 above.)

4.3.3 Under no conditions, except as in 4.2.2 should the school release information in Category "C." (See 2.3 above.)

4.3.4 Under no conditions, except as in 4.2.2, should the school release information gathered by any nonschool agency, but included in the school record, with the exception of birth date. This would include, for example, the report of a caseworker concerning conditions in the pupil's home, etc.

4.4 Each matter of request for consent must be handled separately; for example, blanket permissions for release of data within an extended period of time may not be solicited since they, by definition, do not provide an opportunity for informed consent.

4.5 The school **may** comply with parental requests for the release of information to other persons or agencies, subject to the qualifications set forth in 4.6 regarding safeguards of the student's rights when he reaches legal age.

4.6 With respect to the problem of a student's age and his legal rights, the following **exceptions** should be made to the principle of parental consent:

4.6.1 When a student reaches the age of eighteen and no longer is attending high school, or is married (whether age eighteen or not), his or her consent alone must be obtained.

4.6.2 This includes the right to deny parental access to his records.[1]

4.7 Either a child, or his parents or guardian, or their legal representative, may have access to the official administrative record (Category "A" above). Parents may have access to Category "B" data. Students may have access to Category "B" data with parental permission.

4.7.1 This rule is subject to the qualifications regarding age and consent specified in 4.6 above.

4.7.2 This right of access includes the right to challenge the validity of information contained in the record through procedures to be developed by the school and involving a formal review process incorporating due process principles. (See 3.3 above.)

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[1] The conferees recognize that twenty-one remains the age of effective consent for many purposes in most states. Our recommendations are premised on the social and educational interests of students and parents and not on any particular view of the various local laws. We urge school authorities to seek counsel to determine whether significant legal difficulties might arise from these recommendations under applicable state law.

4.8 The school may provide anonymous data from its records for outside research purposes without consent under conditions where the likelihood of identifying any individual because of his unique characteristics is negligible.

4.9 School districts often face instances in which governmental agencies, local, state, and federal, mandate the release of information on individuals. The principle of informed consent should apply in all cases except those involving school responsibilities under existing child abuse or neglect statutes, and the conferees recommend that governmental agencies, in mandating the provision of information, abide by the recommendations herein contained to assure the rights of privacy. Where identification of individuals is nevertheless legally required, with or without consent, we recommend that written protest be made by the local educational agency to the requesting agency, that parents be informed of the specific information which has been provided, and that legislative redress be sought. For Category "C" information the principles enumerated in 4.2.2 and 4.3.3 shall apply.

IMPLEMENTATION

comments

It will be apparent to experienced school administrators that many of the preceding recommendations, if closely adhered to, will result in increased administrative as well as financial burdens on schools. The conferees felt, however, that their task was to outline as clearly as possible the basis and intent of the various principles without attempting to take into account the special circumstances of individual schools or school systems. It is impossible to anticipate all of the possible practical difficulties that might be created by these recommendations in different settings. Each school system, therefore, must consider the recommendations in light of practical realities it faces. For some systems, already hard-pressed to meet their primary obligations, implementation of some of the recommendations simply may be out of the question in the immediate future. On the other hand, many of the principles presented above will impose little, if any, additional expense or administrative hardship.

It should be noted, for example, that most of the recommendations contained in Section IV, pertaining to dissemination of information about pupils, do not require any specific positive actions or new administrative procedures on the part of school systems or school personnel. Rather, they provide a set of explicit guidelines for the use of school personnel in dealing with requests for information that are now handled on an **ad hoc** basis in many systems. If anything, many of the recommendations contained in this section will **reduce** the workload of school personnel, since they place the burden of proof on the individual requesting the information and not on the school.

On the other hand, consent procedures, the administration of security, and the periodic updating of pupil records, if thoroughly carried out, are likely to require considerable effort on the part of school personnel. In addition to ethical and legal obligations on school officials, we believe that such effort and probable additional expense will pay significant dividends in terms of increased confidence in schools on the part of parents and children. In light of current pressures to make schools more responsive to their constituents such an outcome would appear to be highly desirable. Of equal significance is the goal of establishing procedures that will increase the opportunities available to every child in the system and ensure that these opportunities are distributed equally among children of all abilities, races, cultural backgrounds, and family circumstances; for example, by increasing the availability of a second chance to children who begin their schooling with handicaps of one sort or another.

The following sections are included to assist in interpreting and implementing the preceding guidelines. In each section, hypothetical cases are provided as examples of concrete actions that might be taken by school personnel in accordance with the recommendations. These cases are not intended to be exhaustive of the range of possible events or school system responses to such occurrences. Nor do they, in all cases, lead to simple solutions. "Hard cases make bad law"; goes the lawyers' adage. But hard cases may play an important role in testing the practicality and utility of policy recommendations.

Finally, as we have noted, implementation of these principles will require the development of far more detailed and specific procedures, rules, and organizational arrangements than it is possible or desirable to outline in this document. While recognizing that the development of such rules and procedures is a matter for local determination, the conferees urge school systems to give serious attention to the process by which these rules and procedures will be established.

In keeping with the increasing demands for participation by students, parents, and community leaders in the governance and rule making in the school, we urge that the very drawing up of such a code for the definition, operation, maintenance, and disposition of sensitive school records should be subject to student participation within the school and to various kinds of consultative referenda or clearance with key parent-teacher associations, community action groups, and professional associations within the community. The issuance, by administrative fiat, of a set of rules by the school system, carries with it the danger of ensuring misunderstanding by the various populations whose trust and goodwill must be linked with the system if it is to operate with maximum effect.

comments

(1) The superintendent of schools, upon the recommendation of staff specialists in measurement and evaluation, proposes a system-wide testing program involving the periodic administration of standardized aptitude and achievement tests to all pupils at a given grade level.

> **Response:** Such examinations may be administered without obtaining the separate consent of each parent and child. It is sufficient if the school board or other agency responsible for the conduct of school affairs and representative of the community has approved the program. (See generally 1.2.) It is, nonetheless, recommended that parents receive periodic notice in writing of such programs, together with a brief description of their purposes. (See Sample Form A.) Moreover, interested parents and others in the community should be given reasonable opportunities to challenge such programs before the approving agency. (See 1.6.)

(2) The superintendent of schools, upon the recommendation of staff specialists in guidance and counseling, proposes to conduct a program of personality testing and assessment.

> **Response:** Such programs should be conducted only with the prior written consent of parents and/or children. (See generally 1.2. On the form and source of consent, see 1.3–1.5. See also, Sample Form B.) **Special Note:** Sections 1.2.1–1.2.3 were deliberately intended to be vague concerning certain kinds of information gathering procedures, including the administration of standardized intelligence tests. Some school systems may wish to place such tests in the same category as personality tests, thereby necessitating the solicitation of written consent of parents and/or children prior to their use in the school.

(3) A teacher wishes to administer a standardized test designed to diagnose individual difficulties in reading achievement to her pupils.

Response: The teacher should seek the approval of appropriate school authorities before administering the test. In addition, it is recommended that the school board or other agency responsible for the conduct of school affairs, acting on the recommendation of staff specialists in measurement and evaluation, or outside consultants, issue a roster of approved instruments for use in such situations by individual teachers. In accordance with 1.6, however, the teacher should inform parents periodically of the use and purpose of such tests. (See Sample Form A.)

(4) The school psychologist or an individual counselor wishes to administer a standardized personality inventory to a pupil who is experiencing difficulties in getting along with his classmates.

Response: Prior written consent of the child's parents must be obtained before such tests may be administered. (Sample Form B may be used. See generally 1.7. Should consent be withheld, see 1.7.4 for possible remedial actions and precautions.)

(5) An educational research institute seeks permission from local school authorities to administer a questionnaire to high school students.

Response: The requirements of 1.2, relating to the necessity of consent must be satisfied. Moreover, the consent of responsible school authorities must first be obtained. (See generally, 1.8.) These requirements should not be waived or varied even if the information is to be collected under conditions of anonymity (1.8.1). Compare 4.8 for situations in which anonymous data are requested from existing school records.

(6) A well-known psychologist requests permission from school authorities to conduct a program of research involving the collection over time of data from individual pupils within the school. Although the general procedures and goals of the research are clear, the exploratory nature of the research makes specification in advance of all data to be collected impossible. The psychologist seeks blanket permission to proceed with the research without obtaining new parental consent every time he wishes to collect new information.

Response: Initial individual consent must be obtained from parents. Consent must also be obtained from students if they are reasonably competent to understand the nature and consequences of their decision. (See 1.2.2, 1.4, 1.5 and 1.7.) In securing this consent, the procedures and goals of the research must be specified as clearly as possible (1.3). Parents (and pupils where appropriate) must be informed that additional information may be solicited in the future without their subsequent individual consent. Moreover, each time additional data are sought by the researcher, pupils must be reminded that they are under no obligation to continue participating in the research. Finally, parents must be notified periodically of the types of data being collected, be given an opportunity to withdraw from the program, and to request that all data be destroyed.

(7) A teacher asks the school psychologist for advice about a pupil who is receiving failing marks despite very high scores on intelligence tests. The teacher reports, "This pupil can do the work, but he seems to doze in class all the time. There's something wrong with him." Should the psychologist make any record of this observation? If so, in what category does it belong? What further steps are indicated?

Response: Such observations fall into Category C (2.3) and should not be entered onto the student's permanent record until fully investigated, verified, and determined to be of continuing usefulness to the school. In this case, since the information is likely to serve as an aid in interpreting information already contained in the pupil's record, namely his grades, the psychologist should investigate further, keeping in mind the consent constraints imposed by 1.2 and 1.7, and notify the child's parents of the outcome of the investigation should it result in an entry in Category B of the pupil's record. (See 2.3.1.)

(8) A student reveals to his counselor that he is having a great deal of trouble concentrating on his schoolwork because his father gets drunk every night and quarrels violently with his mother. He is worried that his mother may be in physical danger and solicits the aid of the counselor.

Response: The counselor should first try to reach the family, in this case the mother, by helping the child see the possible value of such contact. Failing in this effort, the counselor should inform the child of appropriate community agencies for assistance. Disposition of the counselor's personal record of the child's remarks is covered by 2.4, except insofar as the counselor has evidence of parental behavior towards the child which would require a report to the authorities under local child abuse or neglect statutes. (See 4.9.)

(9) The parent (or guardian) of a sixteen year old student, is concerned about his child's school performance. He asks to review the child's entire school record.

Response: The parent should be permitted to examine those portions of the child's record described in Categories A and B (2.1 and 2.2, above). He should not be permitted to review those materials described under Category C (2.3, above). It is recommended that competent professional assistance should be available to explain to him the meaning and implications of the materials he is permitted to examine. (See 4.7.)

(10) The parent (or guardian) of a married student, aged sixteen, seeks to review the student's school records.

Response: The parent or guardian of a student who is married, or who is eighteen and no longer attends high school, should be permitted to examine the student's records only with the written consent of the student (See 4.6.)

(11) A prospective employer telephones the local high school and asks for information about the marks, behavior, etc., of a recent graduate of the high school.

Response: No person, other than those listed in 4.1, should be permitted access to a student's school records without the prior written consent of the student and/or his parents. For the form and appropriate source of consent, see 4.3, 4.6, and Sample Form E. Oral comments by members of the school staff should be subject to these same limitations. Even if an appropriate form of consent has been obtained, it is recommended that information not be provided by telephone. Information should be given from school records only after the recipient has been properly identified and only if the records' custodian is reasonably confident that the recipient will understand the meaning of the information that is provided.

(12) A social worker employed by the local city government seeks to examine the school records of a child whose family is a client.

Response: No person other than those listed in 4.1, even one employed by local, state or federal authorities, may examine a child's records without the prior written consent of the child and/or parent. If such consent is denied, the petitioner must seek an appropriate court or administrative order.

(13) An unmarried seventeen year old high school student seeks to examine his school records. His parents have not submitted an appropriate form of consent.

Response: A student, even if unmarried or less than eighteen years of age, should be permitted to examine those portions of his records described under Category A. (See 2.1, above.) He should be permitted to examine Category B materials (see 2.2, above) only with the prior written consent of his parent or guardian. (See generally 4.1 and 4.7.)

(14) A college professor seeks permission from local school authorities to use student records (including identifying data) for research on the relation between high school grades and participation in extracurricular activities.

Response: Neither the possible importance of the study nor the difficulty of obtaining appropriate forms of consent should permit school authorities to waive the requirement of prior written consent from each of the individuals whose records are sought to be used. (See generally 3.4.)

(15) A federal security agent asks the school principal for information about the patriotism, loyalty, and emotional and mental stability of a student who was graduated from high school ten years ago.

Response: The principal may not provide any information without the written consent of the individual about whom information is sought. If such consent is denied, school records may be examined only by an appropriate court or administrative order. (See 4.2 and 4.6.) Moreover, it is recommended that schools destroy such information when a pupil leaves school, or retain it only under conditions of anonymity for research purposes. (See 2.2.2 and 3.4.)

cases

sample form
A

ROUTINE INFORMATION LETTER TO BE SENT HOME AT THE BEGINNING OF EACH SCHOOL YEAR OR AT TIME STUDENT ENROLLS DURING YEAR

Dear Parent,

In accordance with the recommendations of the Superintendent of Schools and the Director of Measurement and Evaluation, the Board of Education has approved a city-wide testing program designed to provide information concerning the proficiency of all children in the district on standardized tests of academic achievement and aptitude.

The results of these tests provide a continuing record of each child's academic progress in comparison with national norms. They are also an invaluable aid to your child's teacher and counselor in diagnosing individual strengths and weaknesses in order to provide more effective individualized instruction. During the coming school year the following tests will be administered to your child as part of this program:

	Name of Test	Purpose
Example	Iowa Tests of Educational Development, Grade 10	Measurement of achievement in mathematics, English, basic science
	Terman-McNemar Test of Mental Ability	Measurement of verbal and mathematical aptitude

Your child's scores on these tests will be checked carefully and maintained in the school record as long as your child attends school in this system. Should your child transfer to another school system, you will be notified of the transfer of his or her permanent record to the new school system. **No individual or agency outside of the school system will be permitted to inspect your child's school record without your written permission.**

Should you wish to examine your child's record file at any time you may arrange to do so by making an appointment with the principal's office. [In addition, a routine report and interpretation of your child's scores on the above-mentioned tests will be included as part of the second term grade report.]

Sincerely,

Superintendent of Schools

sample form
B

REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO COLLECT PERSONAL DATA

SPECIAL REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO COLLECT PERSONAL INFORMATION

In order to provide your child with more effective guidance and counseling services, your permission is requested for the collection of the following kinds of personal information from your child.

Type of Information or Test	Description and Purpose	Permission Granted	Permission Denied
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory		☐	☐
Kuder Preference Record	Example	☐	☐
Wrenn Study Inventory		☐	☐
Family Background Information		☐	☐

Because of the sensitive nature of this information, all test scores and related information will be treated with complete confidentiality. Only parents and authorized school personnel will be permitted access to this information without parental consent.

Please check the appropriate box signifying your approval or disapproval of this request, sign the form in the space provided below, and return in the enclosed envelope.

Parent's signature ____________ Date ____________

sample form
C

RECORD OF INSPECTION OF PUPIL RECORDS

Date: ____________

Records Examined: ____________

(Name of pupil or pupils)

Records Examined By: ____________

Purpose: ____________

sample form
D

NOTIFICATION OF TRANSFER OF PERMANENT PUPIL RECORD TO ANOTHER SCHOOL SYSTEM

Dear Parent,

You are hereby notified of the pending transfer of (name of pupil)'s permanent school record to (name of school district) in (location).

Should you wish to receive a copy of the record to be transferred please return the bottom portion of this form with your signature by (date).

Sincerely,

Principal

I wish to receive a copy of the school record of ____________________
(Please print name of pupil.)

who is my (son) (daughter) (legal ward).

Parent's signature ____________ Date ____________

Address to which transcript should be sent:

____

____

____

11081

sample form
E

REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO RELEASE PERMANENT SCHOOL RECORD TO THIRD PARTY

Dear Parent,

We have received a request from

____
(name of requesting individual, agency, etc.)
for a copy of (access to) (name of pupil)'s school record.

Please indicate in the space below whether you are willing for us to comply with this request.

(Name of requesting party) may have a copy of (access to) the following parts of (name of pupil)'s record:

- ☐ Official Administrative Record (name, address, birthdate, grade level completed, grades, class standing, attendance record)
- ☐ Standardized Achievement Test Scores
- ☐ Intelligence and Aptitude Test Scores
- ☐ Personality and Interest Test Scores
- ☐ Teacher and Counselor Observations and Ratings
- ☐ Record of Extracurricular Activities
- ☐ Family Background Data

____________________ ____________
Parent's signature Date

APPENDIX

list of participants

- David J. Armor, Assistant Professor of Sociology, Department of Social Relations, Harvard University
- Merle Borrowman, Professor of Education, University of Wisconsin
- Orville G. Brim, Jr., President, Russell Sage Foundation
- Roger Craig, Senator of State of Michigan
- Annette Engel, Director of Counseling Services, Roosevelt School District, Phoenix, Arizona
- Leo Goldman, University Coordinator of Counselor Education, Division of Teacher Education, The City University of New York
- David A. Goslin, Sociologist, Russell Sage Foundation (Chairman)
- Franklyn A. Graff, Assistant Superintendent, Westport Schools, Westport, Conn.
- John L. Hayman, Jr., Executive Director, Research and Evaluation, The School District of Philadelphia, Philadelphia, Pa.
- John L. Holland, Professor of Education and Social Relations, and Director, Research and Development Center, Johns Hopkins University
- Martin R. Katz, Senior Research Psychologist, Developmental Research, Educational Testing Service
- John D. Krumboltz, Professor of Education and Psychology, School of Education, Stanford University
- Roger T. Lennon, Director, Test Department, Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc.
- Charles Lister, Associate Professor of Law, Yale University Law School (background paper)
- Thomas E. Long, Assistant Professor, Department of Vocational Education, Graduate Studies and Research Division, College of Education, The Pennsylvania State University
- Paul E. Meehl, Regents' Professor of Psychology and Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Minnesota
- Ted Rubin, Judge, Denver Juvenile Court
- Charles Schinitsky, Attorney-in-Charge, Family Court Branch, The Legal Aid Society, Brooklyn, N.Y.
- Michael Scriven, Professor of Philosophy, University of California at Berkeley (background paper)
- Alan F. Westin, Director, Center for Research and Education in American Liberties, Teachers College, Columbia University

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> A collection of original papers describing record-keeping practices in each of the major institutions in American society.

index to recommendations classified by type of information contained in pupil records

Category A [(2.1) (3.3) (4.1) (4.2) (4.3) (4.4) (4.7)]

Identifying information
Attendance record
Grade Level completed
Record of achievement (grades, standardized achievement test scores, class standing) [(1.2) (1.6)]

Category B [(2.2) (3.3) (3.4) (4.1) (4.2) (4.3) (4.4) (4.7)]

Health record
IQ and aptitude test scores [(1.2) (1.6)]
Personality and interest test scores [(1.2)]
Record of extracurricular activities
Family background data [(1.2)]
(Teacher and counselor observations—see Category C)

Category C [(2.3) (2.4) (3.3) (4.3) (4.9)]

Teacher and counselor comments concerning academic performance, work habits, strengths and weaknesses, conduct, motivation, special problems, and the like.(a) [(1.7) (2.4)]
Reports from outside agencies; including delinquency reports, psychiatric evaluations, etc.(b) [(1.7) (2.4)]
Reports of parent-teacher, parent-counselor conferences.(b) [(1.7)]
Work samples.(b)

(a) May be transferred to Category B on the basis of determination of validity, with parental notification and right of appeal.
(b) May not be transferred to Category B except under extraordinary circumstances.

FROM DR. CHRISTOPHER JENCKS

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF PUBLIC POLICY,
Cambridge, Mass., February 23, 1972.

Hon. WALTER F. MONDALE,
Chairman, Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MONDALE: Enclosed is a rough draft of the report on information systems relating to accountability.

Sincerely,

CHRISTOPHER JENCKS.

THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF A VOUCHER SYSTEM'S INFORMATION AGENCY

This report was prepared under
Grant CG 8542 for the
U.S. OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
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by
THE CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF PUBLIC SAFETY
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I. INTRODUCTION

Various models of voucher systems promise to diversify public education. This paper considers one such model—the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) Voucher Plan. We describe the outlines of this plan and ask, "How can the OEO model work, and work well?"

This question entails at least two concerns: the administrative concern of how to communicate information and actually run the voucher system and a community development concern of how to help parents and professionals exercise more control over their lives. We propose the creation of two new organizations designed to address these concerns: an *Information Agency* (IA) would focus on communications and information functions—collecting information about the voucher system, and responding to community feedback (especially complaints). A second agency, the *Neighborhood Information Centers* (NIC) would continue these functions at a neighborhood level and deal directly with parents and professionals who need to learn how to exercise the choices and responsibilities afforded by the OEO voucher plan. Both these new organizations would report to the superordinate agency, the central *Education Voucher Agencies* (EVA). The proposed structure is presented in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Educational Voucher Agency (EVA), Information Agency (IA), and Neighborhood Information Centers (NIC'S).


EVA Board
I.A.
1. Collecting, Verifying, Packaging Information
2. Handling Complaints
3. Supporting NIC'S
NIC
NIC
NIC
1. Dispensing Information
2. Supporting Parents
3. Supporting Professionals
School
School
School
School
School

We hope that these two new structures, the IA and NICS, will facilitate getting and distributing accurate voucher information, help professionals respond to neighborhoods, and help parents exercise choice. The reader should assess our proposal against these hopes, modifying or rejecting our ideas where they seem inappropriate to specific contexts, for the central value of our proposal lies in its capacity to respond to situational community needs.

II. THE OEO VOUCHER MODEL: KEY CONCEPTS

Under OEO's system of education vouchers, the local school board of a demonstration area establishes a publicly accountable agency to administer its voucher program. This agency, called the Education Voucher Agency (EVA), issues certificates worth the cost of educating a child for a year to all the parents of elementary children who live in the demonstration area (vouchers). Parents take these vouchers to any eligible school in which they choose to enroll their child. Schools return their vouchers to the public agency. The agency then sends each school a check equal in value to the collected vouchers.

Presently children are assigned to public institutions on the basis of residence. The voucher system, by contrast, allows parents to select the schools they deem most desirable. In addition, the change in financing scheme encourages schools to pursue the "desirable" more aggressively: principals might feel freer to introduce new programs; teachers might find more congenial school climates. The conventional roles of parent, child, administrator, and teacher would be transformed.

Today, for the most part, only relatively affluent parents are free to exercise effective control over their children's education. They can move to districts with better schools, or send their children to private institutions. But low-income parents can seldom exercise these options. They usually have no choice but to send their children to neighborhood schools.

With vouchers, poor parents can likewise participate in choosing schools for their children, thus gaining "consumer power." Regardless of income, a parent who thinks a school is doing a poor job can withdraw his child and enroll him elsewhere.

Vouchers should also allow parents to take new kinds of collective action in behalf of their children. Parents who "pool" their vouchers should be able to press effectively for changes in existing schools, or to start new schools financed with the money their vouchers represent. Since a school's budget would be directly proportional to the number of children enrolled, voucher schools should be responsive to parent demands.

In addition, principals and teachers working under the voucher system might have more control over their own schools. Principals free from the necessity of pleasing an entire community, might pursue rather more specialized programs and policies, choosing methods and personnel appropriate to their philosophy. Teachers, like parents, should be able to choose among schools or create new ones.

In short, vouchers should give rise to new schools, new roles, and new power for parents, principals and teachers. In contrast with existing school systems, voucher schools, whether "public" or "private", should be responsive, diverse, and flexible.

The OEO voucher system is regulatory and compensatory. Its administrating agency regulates but does not operate schools. The terms "public" and "private" have somewhat different meanings than they usually have. And the systems information and parent-counseling programs are extremely important. Each of these concepts will be briefly discussed in this section.

1. REGULATION AND COMPENSATION

The system proposed by OEO is quite different from other voucher systems now being advocated. It regulates the educational marketplace more than most conservatives would like, and contains extensive safeguards for the interests of disadvantaged children. Such restrictions may be considered undesirable by some people, yet many others believe that a voucher system which did not include these or equally effective safeguards would be worse than no voucher system at all.

OEO's "regulated compensator" system has been designed to give all parents more control than they now have over the kind of education their children receive; to prevent racial, economic and ability segregation; to protect parents from false advertising; and to help close the gap between the advantaged and disadvantaged. The system:

Provides for the participation by all interested groups in the community in the planning and operation of the demonstration;

Seeks to prevent an increase in school segregation by race, income, ability, and "desirable" behavior patterns;

Gives disadvantaged children a chance of being admitted to the school of their choice;

Provides an incentive for schools to enroll disadvantaged pupils and makes more money available for their education than for the education of the advantaged;

Provides free transportation to ensure every family equal access to all participating schools;

Provides an information and guidance program for parents to help them choose among schools;

Forbids schools from making untrue advertising claims;

Ensures the constitutional separation of church and state; and

Provides for the auditing of every participating school's financial records.

The OEO system has five basic ground rules. Only schools that abide by them are eligible to cash vouchers.

1. No school in the program may discriminate against pupils on the basis of race. All schools must demonstrate that the proportion of minority pupils enrolled is at least as large as the proportion of minority applicants.

2. Any student can apply to any school. Schools must accept all applicants unless there are more applicants than spaces available. When more students apply than can be accepted, schools can select up to half of their students in any way they wish—so long as they do not discriminate racially. Some may want to give preference to brothers and sisters of children already enrolled,

to children of a particular neighborhood, or to children with certain talents or interests. For the remaining positions (at least half) the choice must be made randomly, by a lottery among the applicants to the school.

Rules No. 1 and No. 2: If low-income parents are to feel that they have control over the kinds of education their children receive, the market must be regulated in such a way that poor children have a fair chance of being admitted to the school of their choice. Mandatory signing by schools of non-discrimination pledges, the minority applicant quota and "lottery" rules just described and the provision of free transportation, ensure that poor and minority children have a fair chance of being admitted to schools of their choice. The lottery is the only apparent way to prevent popular schools from selecting the children with the fewest educational problems and leaving the difficult cases for under-applied schools.

3. Schools must accept vouchers as payment in full for all their educational services. No school may require parents to make additional out-of-pocket payments.

Rule No. 3: If schools could charge parents more than the value of the voucher for a year's education, schools would soon be stratified by price with the poorest students forced to attend the schools with the fewest resources. Economic and, consequently, racial segregation would probably increase.

4. Parochial schools will be permitted to participate in the program only if their participation does not violate that state's constitution or the U.S. Constitution. They will also have to comply with all the rules that apply to the other schools in the program.

Rule No. 4: No school may use money to support religious instruction. Parochial schools may participate, however, providing they raise money for religious activity from others sources and keep separate accounting systems, and providing this support is consistent with the state and the U.S. Constitution.

5. All schools must make information available to parents concerning the school's basic philosophy of education, the number of teachers, teacher qualifications, facilities, financial status and pupil progress. In short, schools must provide sufficient information to enable parents to make wise decisions when they select schools.

Rule No. 5: Participating schools must agree to make a wide variety of information about their facilities, teachers, programs and students available to the EVA and to the public. In addition they have to maintain accounts of money received and disbursed in a form that will allow both parents and the EVA to determine whether a school operated by a board of education is getting the resources to which it is entitled on the basis of its vouchers, whether a school operated by a church is being used to subsidize other church activities, and whether a school operated by a profit-making corporation is siphoning off excessive amounts to the parent corporation.

These regulations seek to allocate educational resources so that poor children receive their full share of bright, sensitive, and talented teachers, and to alter enrollment patterns to create more heterogeneous classrooms. In addition, the *compensatory* or supplementary voucher will ensure that more money is allocated to schools that enroll poor children than to other schools.

A sliding scale based on OEO poverty guidelines will be used to compute the value of compensatory vouchers. Vouchers given to families who earn less than the OEO poverty income will be worth 30% more than basic vouchers. Vouchers given to families who earn twice the OEO poverty income will be worth 10% more than basic vouchers. The vouchers of other special groups, for example the handicapped and Spanish speaking, may also be augmented. Thus schools focusing on special groups may earn more money.

2. REGULATION VERSUS OPERATION

Local school boards operate the schools over which they exercise authority and are held directly responsible for everything that happens in their classrooms. The EVA will resemble a local school board in that it will be locally controlled and will receive federal, state and local funds for financing the education of all local children. But it will differ from a traditional board in that it will not *operate* any schools of its own.

If the EVA were held directly responsible for every action that took place in every school cashing vouchers, the system would be no different than the present system. Recognizing this, the voucher system seeks to establish the principle that what happens in a school is largely the business of the children, teachers and parents connected with that school, as well as others who would like to be connected with it—not of taxpayers, politicians or parents who prefer to send their children elsewhere.

The EVA is responsible instead, for *regulating* schools. It should formulate and enforce policy; guarantee all parents a fair chance of getting their children into schools of their choice; provide parents with information and counseling services; and encourage innovation and diversity. It should *not* purchase supplies, hire or assign teachers, maintain buildings, determine curriculum methods, or tell parents that certain schools are better than others.

If vouchers are to give parents a meaningful range of choices, EVAs will have to encourage educational diversity, principal and teacher autonomy, classroom innovation, and the dissemination and cross-fertilization of ideas. If it is exceedingly difficult for teachers to choose among schools, for principals to re-design classrooms, or for new schools to be established, people will assume that these things are not being encouraged, and that "choice" is a meaningless concept. In sum, EVAs will have to perform many important policing functions. But they will also have to distinguish between regulation and operation in order to foster rather than inhibit educational diversity.

3. PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE: A REDEFINITION

Since the nineteenth century schools have been classified as "public" if they were owned and operated by a governmental body, and as "private" if they were owned and operated by private organizations. These definitions conceal as much as they reveal, for they classify schools entirely in terms of *who* runs them, not *how* they are run.

OEO has adopted a different way of classifying schools. Those that exclude applicants in a discriminatory way, charge tuition, or withhold information about themselves are considered "private", even if they are managed by the public. Schools that are open to everyone on a non-discriminatory basis, charge no tuition, and provide full information about themselves to anyone interested are in contrast considered "public", even if managed by private groups.

Following this definition, OEO's voucher model makes financial and nonfinancial resources available to interested individuals and groups for the establishment of new "*public*" schools.

This priority ensures that parental *preference* rather than parental *residence* is the basis for assigning students to schools. Thus, all children will be eligible to apply to a diverse range of schools.

OEO is recommending a three-stage process for the establishment of new public schools. Individuals or groups would: 1) express interest; 2) draft proposals; and 3) obtain pledges of "intent to enroll". Financial and nonfinancial support would be made available by the EVA and OEO at each stage. This three-stage process and the question of EVA qualifications for new schools, are further discussed in OEO's program guidelines.

4. INFORMATION AND PARENT-COUNSELING

The process of matching pupils to schools begins with an application stage. In the application stage, voucher schools seek applicants, and applicants appraise schools. The danger at this stage is that many families, either because of a lack of interest, or because of selective recruitment by schools, may fail to obtain the information they need to make reasonable choices. The more sophisticated will probably find out about the "best" schools and apply to them even if they are not near their homes. But many families may end up "choosing" the schools nearest them unless there is some machinery for informing them about other available schools. EVAs information and counseling components focus on this critical problem. If selective recruitment is to be avoided, each EVA will need to:

1. Ensure that every family is informed of the range of alternatives open to it before applications close for any school.
2. Ensure that "objective" information is collected about each school which will answer parents' questions as well as they can be answered.
3. Ensure that this information is available to parents both in a clear, comprehensible printed form and through face-to-face contact with counselors who can explain the printed information to those who do not understand it.

4. Ensure that misleading advertising claims are controlled and that the "objective" information provided to parents is correct.

5. Investigate claims of fraud, discrimination, and deception, and take appropriate remedial action where these claims are verified.

These functions will be complicated in any event, but overwhelming unless educational voucher agencies have machinery which facilitates communication between schools and parents. To this end, we propose establishing an Information Agency, described in the next section.

III. THE FUNCTIONS OF AN INFORMATION AGENCY AND HOW THEY MIGHT BE PERFORMED

To exercise intelligent choice, parents must understand the workings of the voucher system, know that there are alternative schools open to them, and know what the alternatives are like. The EVA should therefore establish an Information Agency to apprise the public of the details of the system, collect and disseminate information on schools, and help parents understand and use that information. The Information Agency should:

1. Explain the voucher program to parents;
2. Recommend to EVA board members that certain kinds of school information be collected;
3. Collect school information;
4. Verify school information, police school advertising, handle complaints, and recommend the application of sanctions when schools deliberately release false information;
5. Package school information;
6. Distribute school information to parents (making additions and corrections when necessary);
7. Help parents to understand and use school information and know more about alternatives that are open to them once their children are enrolled; and,
8. Evaluate the claims of participating schools.

1. EXPLAINING THE PROGRAM TO PARENTS

Parents should have and understand a great deal of general program information before they start applying to schools. By the time the school selection process begins, parents should be knowledgeable about: 1) the history of the district's involvement with vouchers; 2) the goals and rationales of the voucher program; 3) the nature and structure of the agencies in the community responsible for overseeing the system (the EVA, the Information Agency, etc.) and 4) the regulations designed by OEO and the EVA.

At the earliest possible time Information Agency staff should write for distribution to parents a number of general information documents. These might include:

A Summary of ———'s Involvement with the Voucher System
The OEO Regulated Voucher System
———'s EVA
A Summary of Voucher Regulations Established by ———'s EVA
The Process of Matching Pupils to Schools—A Summary
The Lottery Process
Voluntary and Involuntary Transfers
Vouchers and Transportation

Each of these documents should be easy to understand and concise (Parents on the mailing lists of educational information institutions frequently complain about receiving too much information, or about receiving information that is too difficult to understand). This *general program information*, could be distributed in many ways. By:

Mailing flyers to everyone in the community;
Advertising the program on commercial and public radio and TV;
Organizing a speaker's bureau and providing speakers to interested community groups;
Holding day or evening meetings or classes in schools;
Opening up school and neighborhood information distribution centers;
Sending out-reach workers door-to-door, and using leaflets, posters, and sound trucks to publicize the program;
Establishing a central "question and answer service" which parents with questions could call.

2. HELPING THE EVA DECIDE WHAT KINDS OF SCHOOL INFORMATION SHOULD BE COLLECTED

Public school systems tend to distribute information on the performance of pupils, but not on the performance of schools.* Proponents of the voucher system believe that effective parental choice requires accurate, responsive, and understandable information about participating schools. What kinds of school information should an EVA collect in order to make intelligent parent choice possible? An Information Agency should distribute to the public the kinds of school information the public wants: information that will help parents and nonparents alike judge the quality of their educational institutions.

A. The Information Questionnaire

We assume that the IA will send a comprehensive school questionnaire to each participating school and that schools will be qualified to accept vouchers only if they return to the IA a complete and accurate questionnaire form.

Where such a regulation is adopted the EVA might use the following process to generate a questionnaire that will yield information of the sort parents need. First, information agency staff should survey parents in the community to ascertain the kinds of school information parents want, or, if a survey is too costly or time-consuming, make "educated guesses" about the kinds of information they think parents are likely to want. Second, the agency should translate survey results or "guesses" into a questionnaire. Third, members of the EVA board should approve the draft of the school questionnaire. Fourth, the questionnaire should be distributed for discussion, testing and revision to school principals, parents, and private interest groups. Finally, the information agency should be prepared to honor reasonable requests for additional information made by individual parents, parent groups, or private interests.

B. What Information Do Parents Want?

(See notes in Appendix #1)

Parents will probably want several kinds of school information: information that will facilitate between-school comparisons, judgments about whether individual schools are living up to their unique claims, and qualitative school information.

C. Comparing Schools

The school questionnaire should be comprehensive enough to yield most of the comparative school information that parents will want. The questionnaire should yield information on school facilities, philosophy, staff, students, curriculum, policies, and finances. Each of these headings might be a separate subdivision of the questionnaire. Obviously, most questions in the questionnaire should be structured so as to yield comparable data.

Questions of the following sort might be included in the school questionnaire: What is the physical plant of the school like? Does it have play-areas? What is the school trying to do? How many of what kinds of teachers are on the staff? What experience and qualifications do they have? What are their salaries? What is the school's basic curriculum? How is reading taught? How are pupils grouped? What tests does the school use to measure pupil progress? How do children in the schools do on these tests? When and how are reports made to parents? What is the school's policy on parent-teacher conferences?

Other items might address the following:

1. *Information on the goals and means of participating schools.* Some parents might prefer brief descriptions of the goals and means of participating schools.

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*Pupils are tested for intelligence and achievement, graded on academic effort and standing, and rated on a bewildering variety of personal and character attributes . . . (But) schools are not given report cards—they are not tested, they receive no grades . . . Public education agencies maintain a virtual monopoly over information on schooling. In addition, the . . . information (they distribute) is cast in terms that suit the interests of the educational professions. They provide little informaion to clients or constituents, and none of it would challange either the existing management of the enterprise or its definition of educational quality. (David Cohen; "Social Accounting in Education: Reflections on Supply and Demand;" p. 155 from "Proceedings of the 1970 Invitational Conference on Testing Problems—The Promise and Perils of Educational Information Systems;" Copyright 1971 by Educational Testing Service.)

Questions having to do with "means" will be especially important since many participating schools will probably profess very similar goals, for example teaching children basic skills such as reading and arithmetic, and developing their personalities. If the goals of participating schools turn out to be very similar, parents will be able to differentiate schools on the basis of means but not on the basis of goals.

2. *Information on schools written by the schools themselves.* Participating schools should be asked to briefly describe themselves in any way they wish (unstructured questions). The IA should explicitly state, however, that school claims will be monitored or evaluated during the course of the program.

3. *Student achievement information.* As appendix #1 indicates, most parents seem to want additional information on pupil achievement. The EVA might wish to collect this kind of information for another reason as well—to provide an incentive for schools to raise pupil achievement test scores.*

Achievement test scores are subject to serious abuse, and considerable effort should be made to ensure that the test score data released by an EVA is not misleading. The overall level of student achievement is not always a reliable indicator of performance for specific kinds of students (e.g. minority students). If schools are to be compared in terms of test scores, then their relative effectiveness with groups from specific socio-economic and ethnic backgrounds should be compared, not just their overall scores.

OEO and an EVA might wish to implement an annual testing program to provide information about students' performance on standardized tests *before* they entered the schools as well as *after* attending them, so that differences in initial ability could be taken into account. If such a program were implemented parents could be given pupil achievement information for a school from the past as well as from the present, and comparability problems would be reduced.

4. *Financial information.* The availability of school-by-school financial data will enable any interested person to determine how a particular school is spending its voucher monies. A school run by a private company may have to report its profit rate; a school run by a local board of education will probably have to report how much of its income is being diverted to children in other schools; a church school will probably have to report how much of its income is being paid to a religious order for the services of teaching sisters. Before drafting financial questions for inclusion in the school questionnaire, IA staff should discuss the matter in detail with state and federal program officers.

Questions about goals, means, finances, and student achievement would facilitate gross comparisons of schools on equivalent measures. Parents who wanted to consider only non-profit schools, or schools that stressed discipline, or schools without grades, or schools which used a particular reading method, could find such schools easily if the relevant information were presented concisely and comprehensibly.

D. Information About Individual School Success

Some parents might want to choose schools on the basis of their successful achievement of objectives. The IA might therefore ask schools to specify what they were trying to accomplish and to suggest their own measures of success. For example, if a school claimed to motivate children in a particular way, its staff might design a classroom checklish and ask IA "verifiers" to administer it. If a school claimed to develop "responsible citizenship", it might suggest that the IA count the number of its alumni arrested in the previous year. If a school claimed special success in preparing children for college, the IA might ask the school to provide evidence to substantiate the claim.

Schools confident of their ability to live up to their claims might find it to their advantage to have the IA evaluate them. A positive evaluation might bring a school many more applicants if it were noted in the IA's school booklet. The booklet could say for example, "This claim was substantiated by the IA in the following way. . . ."

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*Coleman said : The publication of carefully designed measures of academic performance, which pay attention both to the total distribution of achievement and to the increment in achievement rather than the absolute level, could have, it appears, a very strong impact in changing the direction of pressures upon the school policy-makers, towards academic performance. (James Coleman, "Incentives in American Education,") (Paper prepared for the Brookings' Seminar on Incentives in Public Policy, Feb. 20, 1969, Eric No. Ed 030-191) p. 5.

If some schools requested a "claims evaluation" and statements similar to the one above were included in the IA's booklet, other schools would have an incentive to follow suit.

Making information on the validity of school claims available to parents would broaden considerably the program's information base and make it easier for parents to choose schools intelligently. But collecting this kind of information might be difficult, time-consuming, and counter-productive unless a school considered a "claims evaluation" to be in its own interests. For at least in some cases, such an evaluation would require principals, teachers and IA personnel to spend hours together discussing goals and designing appropriate performance measures. In this light, evaluating the claims of participating schools should probably be postponed until the second year of the program—unless schools specifically request the IA to evaluate their claims earlier. (This subject will be discussed again in the "evauation" section.)

E. Qualitative School Information

Parents will probably also want qualitative school information, such as other people's perceptions of school atmospheres and teacher attitudes. Not all parents wil be able to visit many schools; some who do will feel unsure about their appraisals; and some parents will feel comfortable choosing schools only if they know the opinions that other people hold.

Despite the probable importance to parents of qualitative school information, we do not think that IA staff should actively gather information of this kind. Were they to do so, accusations of "using unreliable measures" and subjectivity would probably be made, and the outcry, especially from schools judged negatively, might be considerable.

On the other hand, it seems reasonable to expect that parent groups as well as a number of local community agencies will subjectively evaluate the schools participating in a district's program. Parent groups and organizations such as the American Legion, and the Urban League will probably be interested in things like school curriculum and teacher attitudes, and in persuading parents to use their vouchers "wisely". The IA should probably encourage parent and interest-group participation in school evaluations of this kind, since these groups will most likely engage in these activities whether or not they are encouraged to do so.

F. Information Not To Be Divulged

The EVA might determine that some pieces of information, though commonly sought, should not be divulged by a public agency. Indeed, the state may restrict the kinds of information the agency can collect and disseminate. For example there may be prohibitions against distributing information on the race or religion of teachers and/or students. Before the IA makes school information public it should discuss the issue with appropriate local and state government agencies.

See Sample Questionnaire in Appendix #2.

3. COLLECTING SCHOOL INFORMATION

The easiest way to ensure that schools provide information to the IA is to make the provision of information a requirement for cashing vouchers. With such a requirement, school information could be collected relatively easily in the following way.

First, in order to minimize the work of school teachers and administrators, the IA should make full use of data already in the district's central office and information collected earlier by feasibility-study-contractors. Questionnaires might be partially completed in this fashion.

Next, the IA could call a meeting of school principals and/or administrative officers responsible for completing their school's information forms. During this meeting school personnel would be introduced and assigned to IA "Liaisons", the school questionnaire would be handed out, discussed, and if necessary revised; and a schedule for completing it would be negotiated.

Following this meeting, school personnel would complete the information forms. During the "questionnaire completion stage" contact between school staff and IA Liaisons should be relatively continuous so that questions could be answered quickly and other necessary assistance provided promptly.

Individuals responsible for completing their school's information forms would have a somewhat more complicated job if their schools had been restructured to contain "schools within schools",—i.e. an "open classroom school" or a "highly structured school", within the same public school building. In such an event it might be appropriate to complete separate questionnaires for each of the school's sub-divisions.

During the later phases of the information collection process, IA Liaisons would spend a day or so in each of their schools, clarifying and helping to complete certain questionnaire items, discussing the program and the subject of claims-evaluation with teachers and para-professionals; and helping to revise material written by school staff—for example school descriptions and claims. After the completed questionnaires were returned to the IA the formal process of information verification would begin.

4. VERIFYING INFORMATION

The IA should have the power and personnel to:

Verify the data it collects;
Police school advertising;
Investigate complaints alleging a school released false information; and
Apply sanctions in cases of deliberate fraud.

Verifying data. Most of the questionnaire information reaching the IA will probably be correct. School personnel will know in advance that their data will be widely publicized and scrutinized; that complaints alleging false data will be investigated; and that sanctions will be applied in cases of deliberate fraud. Moreover, some incorrect school information will probably be discovered by IA Liaisons. Discussions between them and school principals should make incorrect information even less of a problem. School questionnaires submitted to the IA should, in any case, be read carefully and spot-checked occasionally before the information they contain is released.

Policing advertising. The data collected by the IA will hopefully be correct and responsive to parents' needs. But some schools will probably want to supplement EVA information by advertising privately. If parents are to make rational choices between schools, information contained in advertisements will have to be as correct as information distributed by the IA.

The "correctness" of advertisements may often be difficult to determine. If, for example, an advertisement claimed that a school had three play-areas with children's equipment, the IA could certify that the school did or did not actually have play-areas and equipment. But suppose the equipment was still crated, or in terrible condition, or mostly in one play-area. How far should the IA go in verifying the *implicit* as opposed to the explicit claims of advertisements?

Advertising claims (and claims made by schools in the information questionnaire) may not be about facilities but about atmosphere ("We have a friendly school") or about achievement ("Our students learn to play the piano"). Who should determine that a school's atmosphere is or is not friendly? That children have or have not learned to play the piano?

We have a few answers to these difficult questions. Nonetheless we think that there may be a realtively large amount of "misleading advertising" in a demonstration program. The IA should. of course, forbid schools from making advertising claims contrary to IA data. It should also establish definitions for the terms frequently used in school advertisements. Beyond these measures, however, each IA will have to determine itself how best to perform its "truth in advertising" function—deciding whether or not to police implicit advertising claims, and if so, how. Again, the IA's collection and publication of school information, along with the possibility of complaint, investigation, and publicized inconsistency, should assure that most explicit advertising claims will be consistent with information agency data.

Taking complaints and recommending sanctions. Parents or private interest groups may claim that information released by a school is incorrect. The Information Agency should investigate such allegations promptly, for its reputation and legitimacy will hinge partly on the extent to which the community trusts and relies on its information and personnel.

If the Information Agency finds that a school has made a false report, it should note this and change its records. If it finds deliberate fraud. it should recommend to EVA board members that sanctions be applied. The EVA might then authorize the information agency to require the school to publicize a retraction or to send a letter to the parents of each child in the school stating what the correct inforamtion is. Other appropriate sanctions should be publicized by the IA before the data-collection process begins.

5. PACKAGING SCHOOL INFORMATION

Before parents begin choosing schools, the information agency should publish for distribution to parents a booklet explaining the voucher system and containing the information on participating schools that it collected. In order to publish such a booklet the agency will have to employ people with editorial and publication skills.

The booklet should be distributed to all parents holding vouchers, and should also be made available to non-parents and private interest groups. The school information should be presented in easily comprehensible formats, and some space should be allotted for schools to describe themselves. The IA should choose formats on the basis of interests expressed by parents. For example, if it found many parents interested in how students were disciplined, the booklet would include a format comparing the disciplinary approaches of participating schools. A model booklet is appended to this report.

6. DISTRIBUTING INFORMATION TO PARENTS

There is a distinction between simply making information available to parents and assuming the larger responsibility of distributing it to them. The Information Agency should perform the latter function. It should mail the booklet described above to every parent holding a voucher; publish and mail at reasonable intervals a newsletter containing additions and corrections to the booklet; and require every school to maintain an open "Information Distribution Center" for Information Agency literature.

But mailings and "Information Distribution Centers" will not necessarily suffice to inform all parents about the program, the schools participating in it, or choices that are open to them. Some parents—recent arrivals to the district, for example—will fail to receive mail. Some parents will disregard mailed information and never visit information distribution centers. Still others who read mailed material will find it too difficult to understand.

The Information Agency should therefore also require every parent of an elementary school child to visit an IA office in order to receive his or her voucher. Once there, IA staff could register the child, explain the program, describe the schools, and answer questions the parent might raise.

Even with such a requirement however, some parents will not pick up their vouchers, or do so later than is advisable, or pick them up but forget about the subsequent process of applying to schools. Different population sub-groups in the district will be differentially willing and able to get, digest and use information, and the IA should keep this in mind when formulating its information-distribution policies.*

If the IA is to contact all parents and compensate for the different capacities of individuals to obtain and manage information, it will probably be necessary for it to do more than mail information, maintain Information Distribution Centers, and require all parents to visit an IA office. It will probably be necessary to establish a network of Neighborhood Information-Agency Centers staffed with outreach workers and parent-counselors.

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*David Wilder studied parent attitudes towards schools in nine different kinds of communities in New Jersey. He found that parent knowledge about schools was strongly related to the parent's income and educational level, *unless* the schools took positive steps to provide the low-income parent with school information. Wilder also found that the absence of school-structured information dissemination activities had virtually no impact on the knowledge of middle-class parents. With or without school-structured activities to provide parents with information, members of the middle-class had roughly the same knowledge about their schools. Discussing the relation of parent education to parent knowledge, Wilder said:

"Thus education makes a difference in mother's knowledge *when the school does not intervene* to provide sufficient opportunities for parents to obtain information; but when such opportunities are offered the gap in knowledge between college and non-college mothers is reduced. Apparently, the familiar class differences in knowledge found in other studies of parental information about the schools as well as in most public opinion studies can be partly explained by the fact that the more educated segment of the population is provided with greater opportunity for access to sources of knowledge." (David Wilder, *et al.* Actual and Perceived Consensus on Educational Goals between School and Community; Columbia University, Bureau of Applied Social Research, 1968, p. 197).

This finding suggests that the EVAs information-distribution activities should be geared principally to low-income parents.

IV. HELPING PARENTS TO UNDERSTAND AND USE SCHOOL INFORMATION: THE NIC'S

We have thus far described a number of IA functions that should be performed centrally, by the employees of an IA's central office. We suggested that central IA staff help EVA Board Members determine what kinds of school information local parents want, design a comprehensive school questionnaire to generate the information, and collect, verify, and package it for distribution to the public. We turn now to a discussion of a second "agency" an EVA ought to create: several decentralized Neighborhood Information Centers that would interconnect IA staff, school staffs, and parents, facilitate the flow of program information, and increase parent and school participation in the demonstration.

The NIC's established by the IA should be easily accessible and centrally located in store-fronts or community organizations. Space in some cases might be donated by local groups. More often the IA would have to absorb rental costs. Each NIC might have a waiting room, a meeting room, and several small offices suitable for private conferences.

A typical center might have five paid staff members: a secretary-receptionist and four parent workers (An extra staff person would be desirable in a very poor neighborhood). The majority of these workers would be parents without professional training. NIC employees might be social workers, guidance counselors, teenagers, or recent college graduates. A center's staff would act as a team. Responsibilities might rotate among them.

Each center might serve a geographical neighborhood of approximately 1600 families. Thus a program in which there were 6400 families (perhaps 10,000 elementary school children) would have four NICs. (If one hypothesizes that an NIC staff member could visit approximately five families a day or 100 families a month, the combined staff of all the centers could visit all the parents participating in the program in the space of a month).

Education workers would be involved in information dissemination, and parent-counseling activities. They would:

Distribute general program information to parents;

Answer questions relating to the operation of the system;

Solicit suggestions about the kinds of school information parents wanted;

Assist in pre-testing agency literature such as the basic school information booklet;

See to it that all neighborhood children were registered;

Distribute the school booklet, interpret its contents, and explain options to parents;

Coordinate parent-school visits and meetings between parent groups and school or EVA personnel;

Be resources for parents interested in starting new schools or increasing the capacity of schools already in existence;

Help parents apply to schools;

Publicize lottery results and discuss them with parents;

Funnel complaints to the central office, seeing to it that they were acted on promptly; and,

Help parents solve school-related problems.

"Decentralizing" the Information Agency's outreach, information distribution, and parent counseling services so that each NIC could design the details of its own programs would benefit parents, schools, the EVA, and the NICs. More parents could be reached and satisfied; more of the unique needs of a neighborhood would be met; information would flow more smoothly; and NIC staff could function creatively.

A small neighborhood center would be less threatening and more accessable to parents than a large central office located in the heart of a city. In as much as parents would be likely to meet friends and neighbors in such a place, the NIC would provide parents with an incentive to participate in the program.

If NIC staff were familiar with the needs of neighborhood parents, with participating schools, and with the demography and leadership structure of the community, neighborhood satisfaction with the information agency would probably be greater and the centers would be more likely to be viewed as accountable to the community. At a time when so many parents complain about the unresponsiveness of their institutions, this kind of accountability is practically mandatory in a program seeking to make schools more responsive to parent needs and desires.

While we would recommend that information agency staff hire NIC personnel, we would also urge the IA to involve community residents to the maximum extent possible in this staff selection process.

To begin this process the agency would establish "neighborhood districts" within the demonstration area. Once done, the agency would identify groups in the districts viewed by residents as representing their interests (PTA's, tenants unions, block organizations, etc.). The agency might then organize "temporary neighborhood center advisory groups". These groups would be asked to recommend locations for the center and to submit to the IA the names of individuals qualified to be center employees. (Simultaneously, the information agency would advertise available positions centrally.) A screening committee composed of Information Agency staff and advisory group members might then review applications and interview applicants. Individuals disliked by either group would not be considered for the positions. This process would not however culminate in the hiring of center personnel. Potential center employees would then be intensively trained by the IA. The final selection of employees would not be made until after the training.

Once the IA had hired center staff it would institute a formal or informal system by which individuals could be "recalled" if they proved unsatisfactory to the IA or to neighborhood residents.

After the staff had been hired and the center opened, a formal "Neighborhood Center Advisory Group" might be established. Center employees would report to this group, and the group would help the center publicize the program, tailor its efforts, find volunteer workers, etc.

Giving each NIC the authority to design the details of its own program would facilitate the formation of neighborhood parent groups concerned with the schools, and so benefit schools as well as parents. Parents in some cases will not get their children into the schools they wanted. These schools may be their neighborhood schools. If the voucher system is to succeed, other attractive alternatives will have to be available to these parents. A neighborhood center could help parents in such a situation persuade the principal of an overapplied neighborhood school to increase his school's capacity, or help them to get together with other neighborhood parents and start a new school. A neighborhood center could also bring parents together with the staff of an underapplied school and help the two groups reach an agreement.

A loosely confederated system of NICs would be as good for the EVA as it would be for parents and schools. If the centers were viewed as responsive and accountable, the EVA would also be regarded as responsive and accountable. If center employees felt that their creative capacities were not being stifled by a distant and hostile bureaucracy, and the centers functioned smoothly, a positive atmosphere might infect the entire system, bringing credit and praise to the EVA board.

The NICs could be linked to each other and to the IA in numerous ways. The individuals who would later comprise the staffs of the centers could be recruited at the same time and trained as a group. This would promote a common understanding of the program and foster a spirit of cooperation between the staffs of the different centers.

One person responsible to the EVA could flexibly supervise all the centers. He could oversee NIC purchasing and budgets; coordinate center activities; maintain a connection between the centers and the IA; and ensure that the centers were performing their duties in accordance with the desires of the EVA board.

1. DISTRIBUTING GENERAL PROGRAM INFORMATION

As mentioned earlier, the Information Agency could publicize the voucher system and distribute general program information to parents in many ways. While arranging for radio, TV and newspaper advertisements should probably be left to the central office, neighborhood centers would be the appropriate place to locate activities such as leafletting, soundtruck advertising, community meetings and door-to-door contacts.

NIC staff, left to their own devices, could design creative information distribution program relatively easily. For example, they could secure small donations from the community and use them to bring parents together. If a local supermarket donated coffee and donuts, center staff could dispense refreshments to NIC visitors. If a community business donated an appliance, the center could raffle it off and use the proceeds to organize a neighborhood party.

2. ANSWERING QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM

People who hear about the voucher system for the first time generally have many concerns and questions. A system of NIC's has been recommended partly because a concerted outreach program is the only way for the EVA to reach some of the parents who have concerns and questions.*

Questions about vouchers are often difficult to answer. Moreover, short answers frequently fail to satisfy confused questioners. Given the complexity of the system and the difficulties associated with explaining it well, extended dialogues between diads or small groups seem to us necessary. A locally oriented neighborhood center would lend itself both to door-to-door question-and-answer sessions, and to small group discussions of the voucher program.

Parents should comprise a substantial proportion of NIC staff. For it seems reasonable to expect parents to be more capable than non-parents of understanding and responding to parent-concerns.**

3. SOLICITING SUGGESTIONS ABOUT THE KINDS OF INFORMATION PARENTS WANT AND PRE-TESTING AGENCY LITERATURE

The information distributed to parents by the NIC's must be responsive and easy to comprehend if it is to help parents to select schools. The feasibility study contractor's "attitude survey" will indicate the kinds of school information parents are likely to want in 1971–1972, but parent desires for school information parents may change during the course of the program. Since the staffs of the NIC's will be in close contact with parents throughout the demonstration, and, in addition, be constantly using the school information booklet, the IA could ask the NIC's to solicit "information suggestions" from parents and to funnel them back to the central office. Information suggestions could be solicited either informally on a day to day basis or formally once a year by the NIC's.

Since NIC personnel will know better than central personnel how easily comprehended agency literature actually is, the central office could distribute documents for pre-testing to the neighborhood centers before releasing them to the general public. Regardless of whether the NIC's found agency literature useful or useless, neighborhood feedback would be an invaluable asset to the staff of the central office.

4. REGISTERING NEIGHBORHOOD CHILDREN

No matter how the EVA registers children, some youngsters will show up for school in the fall who did not apply the previous spring. These may be children who have moved into the district during the summer, or children whose parents were somehow missed in the dissemination of voucher information. This problem will vary in magnitude and will presumably diminish as parents become familiar with the system. Still, the problem will never disappear entirely, and may be especially serious among low-income families.

The NIC's could register children themselves (conducting something similar to voter registration drives) or canvas neighborhoods, referring the parents of unregistered children back to the IA's central office. In either case, having neighborhood people active in the registration endeavor would most likely reduce the scope of this problem.

5. EXPLAINING OPTIONS TO PARENTS

We have recommended that the Information Agency staff its NIC's with parent-counselors. NIC counselors would inform parents about the program, the options available, and the differences among schools that the agency's data would indicate.

IA personnel will probably explain school differences more objectively than school personnel since they will have no personal interest in either recruiting children for a particular school, or in discouraging them from applying to it. Nonetheless, even the most objective NIC counselor will have values, opinions and prejudices, and these could influence parent choices to a considerable extent.

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*Carter said, "It is . . . clear that the school should not depend on people seeking information about schools. Those who do are persons already more likely to have information about the schools." (Richard F. Carter *et al; The Structure and Process of School-Community Relations;* Stanford U., 1966, vol. 1, p. 336).

**"The direction of most informal communication (about schools) is horizontal. About 5/7 of all conversations are with persons like oneself. . . . Thus public school parents converse with other public school people. Preschool parents converse with other preschool parents, and so forth . . . people talk more to persons like themselves . . ."—CARTER.

Many parents will undoubtedly ask their counselors "Which school is best?" or "which school should I send my child to?" We do not feel that NIC staff can appropriately offer judgments on the quality of schools or recommend particular schools for particular children. Getting parents to make independent judgments about school quality is after all, a major goal of the voucher system. Allowing counselors to tell parents where or where not to apply would, we think, subvert this important program objective. The technology of schooling, moreover, is such that even educational "experts" cannot always agree that one kind of school is more desirable than another for a given child. In any case, all the schools participating in the program will have met state and local standards, and thus represent equally acceptable choices under the law.

Providing subjective advice about school quality is a field that we think is best left to private interest groups such as newspapers, counseling agencies, consumers' unions, or the Women's Civic League. The EVA should, of course, facilitate parents' access to private interest group advice. It could do this by providing local organizations with free space in the NIC's when parents were registering their children, or by making available lists of organizations and/or individuals willing to suggest schools to parents.

A parent discussing the voucher program with an NIC counselor may not be able to articulate clearly the kind of a school that he would like his child to attend. In such a case the counselor would try to help the parent express his values and make an independent choice. Counselors should be non-threatening, non-judgmental, accepting, and helpful. They should try to help their clients develop independent judgment. They should explain options—the costs and benefits of different alternatives—but leave the final choice up to the client.*

Requiring the counselor to take a "value-free" stance is, of course, easier said than done.**

An NIC counselor might begin to interview by asking a parent to describe the kind of a school that he or she wanted. If the parent had no ready answer, the counselor might ask the parent to describe what he or she felt was important, or what he or she wanted the child to do. Once the parent had done this, the counselor could help the parent put his or her statements together with the agency's school data, so as to arrive at a choice of schools.***

If a parent were able to articulate a desired "school type"—for example a school that stressed reading, or one that had many black male teachers, or one where the child would learn music—the counselor could suggest that the parent visit four or five particular schools consonant with the parent's description. In other words, the counselor could help the parent set priorities on the basis of his own statements.

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*Perry calls this kind of counseling teaching "the skills of choice and management." (Perry, W. G. "On the Relation of Psychotherapy and Counseling." Annals of N.Y. Acad. of Sciences, November 1955, 63, pp. 396–407. As quoted by Sprinthall, Norman A., in *Guidance for Human Growth;* Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., N.Y., 1971, p. 74). Bordin calls it "mutual deliberation." (Bordin, E. S., *Psychological Counseling*, 2d ed., N.Y.: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969, p. 371. As quoted by Sprinthall, p. 74). Tyler calls it "'appraisal with' the client of the array of alternative 'possibility structures'." (Tyler, L., *The Work of the Counselor;* New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969. As quoted by Sprinthall, p. 75.)

**Educators and school guidance counselors sometimes unwittingly force their own values onto their clients.

A study by Cicourel and Kitsuse (1963) indicated that counselors performed the administrative function of selecting educational programs for the students in a secondary school. Not only did the counselors make the decisions for the students (hence the title of the book—The Educational Decision Makers), but most of these decisions were made on the basis of sociocultural stereotypes; e.g., well-to-do children were urged to attend college, poor children were "cooled off," and a lower set of aspirations were often encouraged. (Cicourel, A., and Kitsuse, J. *The Educational Decision-Makers.* Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963. As quoted by Sprinthall, pp. 20–21.)

School personnel in general . . . and unfortunately guidance counselors are not an exception, both represent and attempt to promote one set of values, values that upon examination are highly conventional, conformist, and other-directed. (Sprinthall, p. 40.)

***Describing the counselor's role, Sprinthall said: "The counselor's activity in individual counseling includes respect for both sides of the human condition, ideas and feelings. The counselor can suggest alternatives and clarify consequences . . . In this mode, the counselor should be flexible enough to encourage expression in taciturn clients, present alternatives, and make vague meanings more explicit to the client . . . The stance of the counselor, then, consists of at least two major elements: Genuine interpersonal sensitivity and a flexible response set. The latter implies an active set of responses, a problematic orientation (i.e. questioning, suggesting alternative perceptions, introducing different modes of viewing the presenting situation, etc.)to promote an open-ended exploration and examination by the client of his own "self" in the present reality situation." (Sprinthall, p. 77)

Some parents who have visited participating schools on the recommendation of a counselor will return to their NIC seeking additional help. If a parent said to a counselor that all the schools he visited looked the same, the counselor could simply suggest that the parent select a school randomly from among those that he visited.

6. COORDINATING PARENT-SCHOOL VISITS AND MEETINGS BETWEEN PARENTS AND EVA OR SCHOOL PERSONNEL

In addition to working with parents in the ways mentioned above, NIC employees would greatly facilitate the school selection process if they 1) helped arrange parent-school visits and meetings with school or EVA staff; and 2) referred less knowledgeable parents to more knowledgeable parents.

After a parent had decided on the kind of school he or she wanted, a counselor could show him a schedule of school visits arranged by the NIC. Each NIC could provide a free mini-bus service for neighborhood parents one or two days a week. With such a service parents could visit the schools they were thinking of applying to and discuss their visits with other parents. Similarly, if after a parent-counselor interview, a parent still had no clear idea of where to apply, the counselor could hand the parent a list of the names and telephone numbers of other willing neighborhood parents, saying "it might be helpful to you to call some of these parents and get their ideas."

7. BEING RESOURCES FOR PARENTS INTERESTED IN STARTING NEW SCHOOLS, OR INCREASING THE CAPACITY OF SCHOOLS ALREADY IN EXISTENCE

We assume that the Information Agency will make staff available to parent groups interested in establishing new schools. Nonetheless, many community residents may not believe it possible for them to start a new school, or they may believe it but not know how to proceed, unless: a) neighborhood center outreach workers emphasize the new school possibility; b) encourage parents to pursue their own inclinations; and c) help to arrange meetings between interested parents and appropriate EVA and school employees.

As long as possible before school applications are to be submitted to the EVA, when parents are discussing the school selection process with counselors and counselors are interpreting IA school data, both parents and counselors should pay particular attention to the number of spaces available in the schools being considered. For example, a parent thinking of applying only to very small schools should be made cognizant of the riskiness of such a strategy. (The IA will not be able to specify the total number of spaces available in each school if the EVA adopts a regulation permitting parents to keep their children in the schools they attended the previous year. Where such a regulation is adopted, the IA will only be able to accurately specify the number of spaces available in entry grades (K or 1st). The information agency should nonetheless, attempt to ascertain the number of spaces it thinks will be available in the various grades of every participating school.)

At some point in the school selection process, it will become apparent that certain schools are likely to be overapplied while others are likely to be underapplied. These likelihoods should be discussed in parent-counselor interviews. When this point has been reached it will be especially important for center employees to arrange contacts between parents and appropriate EVA and school personnel. If, for example, a neighborhood school seemed likely to be deluged with more applicants than its structure could accommodate, center staff could bring parents thinking of applying to the school together with the school's principal to find out if the school's capacity could be increased. If the necessary increase in capacity were not possible to effect, center staff could arrange another meeting between the parents and the staff of a school less likely to be overapplied, or between several groups of concerned parents and a principal interested in starting a school. The more the IA and the NIC's study and try to remedy such problems prior to the lottery, the fewer their post-lottery problems are likely to be.

8. HELPING PARENTS APPLY TO SCHOOLS

Parents visiting their NIC's to talk with counselors, register children, or pick up vouchers, should at some point also be given the EVA's "school application form" and instructions for filling it out. Two kinds of instructions (written in both Spanish and English) should probably be stapled to the application: A) instructions for completing the form; and B) strategy suggestions.

A. Instructions for Completing the Form

Obviously these should be as easy to comprehend as possible. Instructional content will of course depend greatly on the kind of lottery system being implemented. Depending on the choice made by the EVA, the voucher system itself, as well as these directions, will be more or less comprehensible to different parents.

In some cases NIC counselors may have to devote considerable effort to explaining the application form to parents. Moreover, some parents will need to be helped to fill out specific questions on the form.

B. Strategy Suggestions

By the time parents begin applying to schools, the EVA will have made many important decisions governing its lottery. These decisions will suggest application strategies to some but not all parents. Some parents will recognize ways of "maximizing satisfaction" while others simply will not.

If all parents are to have a fair chance of getting their children into schools of their choice, application strategies will have to be discussed with parents who otherwise would fail to consider them.

Aside from having determined such things as whether the lottery is to be "decentralized" (i.e. taking place on different nights in the buildings of participating schools) or "centralized, and computerized," the EVA may have decided on a 75% as opposed to a 50% lottery (75% rather than 50% of a school's students are selected randomly). In such a case, NIC counselors might suggest to some parents that they apply to some schools that otherwise might not have been recommended. For a 75% as opposed to a 50% lottery will increase the chances of "less desirable" children being accepted by over-applied schools.

An EVA may or may not have also decided to implement a racial quota system. If a quota system has been instituted, minority-group children may have a better chance of getting into certain schools. With a quota system, NIC counselors might discuss its likely impact on admissions with minority-group as well as non-minority-group parents.

The EVA might instruct parents to choose and list three or five "first-choice" schools, or several "first-choice" schools and several "second-choice" schools, or a series of school choices in descending order of preference. The EVA might or might not decide to consider all "first-choices" before any "second choices." Depending on the particular "choice rules" established by the EVA, and the schools a parent desires, a parent may increase or decrease his chances of getting his child into desired schools by completing the form in different ways (See *Education Vouchers, A Report on Financing Elementary Education by Grants to Parents;* CSPP, Dec. 1970, pp. 183–187). Again, some parents will be aware of these strategy issues while others will not. If the EVA is to equalize acceptance to schools deemed desirable, these issues will have to be discussed in detail with some parents.

9. PUBLICIZING LOTTERY RESULTS AND DISCUSSING THEM WITH PARENTS

Central information-agency staff will probably use radio, TV and newspapers to publicize the lottery's results. The NIC's could supplement these centrally organized publicity efforts by leafletting neighborhoods, using sound-trucks and organizing meetings with parents.

The lottery will undoubtedly generate both large and small problems. The computer may break down or its print-outs may be in error. Some application forms will have been lost, and some parents will have filled out their forms incorrectly. Some parents who are slightly unhappy about the schools that accepted their children will surely be anxious for EVA advice. Others may be angry enough to refuse to enroll their children in the schools that accepted them. Some of these unhappy parents may want to initiate transfer requests immediately. Others may try to organize new schools, requesting friends to withdraw their children from the schools that accepted them.

Regardless of the nature and scope of the EVA's post-lottery problems, the NIC's should be used both to study and to resolve them. In some instances NIC staff will be familiar with particular disgruntled parents, and able to respond quickly and effectively to their concerns on an individual basis. In other instances, groups will have to be dealt with. Center staffs may be able to reassure some parents by bringing them together with other parents, or by arranging meetings between parents and the staffs of their schools.

10. TAKING COMPLAINTS

The information agency will collect basic information about participating schools, handle complaints about the accuracy of the information, and perhaps publicize the finding that certain information received was inaccurate. Collecting school information, handling complaints, and applying sanctions are functions that for reasons of effectiveness and efficiency should be performed by the agency's central office. This is not to say, however, that neighborhood centers should play no part in these programs. For example their involvement in the "complaint program" is, we think, crucial.

Neighborhood center staffs should encourage parents to bring "information complaints" to the central office. Some parents will be reluctant to do this unless they are assisted. In such cases NIC staff should act as conduits for complaints lodged by parents in their neighborhood. Neighborhood center staff should in addition keep track of specific complaints lodged by parents, and, if necessary, see to it that the complaints are acted on promptly. For if they are not, parental anger will be directed first and foremost at the neighborhood centers.

11. HELPING TO SOLVE PROBLEMS

NIC personnel will have to concern themselves with three kinds of problems: late applicants; children who will need special guidance or educational programs; and parents and/or children dissatisfied with their schools.

A. Late Applicants

Late applicants will fall into two categories: those who failed to get their children registered at the required time (because they did not live in the demonstration area at that time) and so did not apply to schools, and those who failed to apply to schools at the normal time because they did not know they were supposed to or did not get around to it. Such students could constitute an appreciable proportion of the total student population in certain urban areas.

In an area of stable population but high turnover, the problem of recently arrived students should be more or less taken care of by recent departures. If a lottery takes place in April of any given year, some of the students admitted to any given school will leave the area before September. Each school, whether it was initially overapplied or underapplied, will therefore have some vacancies in September. After being registered either by the EVA or by an NIC, recent arrivals could be given a list of these vacancies and told by counselors to apply to whatever schools they liked. An admission process identical to that of the previous April could then be followed. Though the time these parents would have to appraise the schools they were thinking of applying to would be brief, this would not be especially important if NIC personnel were conscientious about working with these parents and arranging contacts between them and other parents or appropriate school personnel.

Problems will arise under three circumstances: 1) parents who are planning to leave the area may not bother to apply in April, so that their departure may not create an extra space in desirable schools; 2) parents who remain in the area may not bother to apply until September; 3) more children may move into the area between April and September than move out. Needless to say, such occurrences would place extra burdens on NIC staff who would still have to make sure that these children were enrolled in the district.

To cope with these problems, the IA could estimate the number of students likely to be living in the area the following September and ensure that enough places were available for all such children. This could be done in one of two ways. One possibility would be to enter "dummy applications" for late comers into the same pool as regular applicants, ensuring that there would be some places for these children in the "desirable" as well as the "undesirable' schools. The other possibility would be to let old residents more or less monopolize places in "desirable" schools, except insofar as vacancies were created by late withdrawals. New residents would then have to attend "undesirable" schools in their first year. In subsequent years, they could compete with everyone else for any vacancies created by turnover in "desirable" schools. Such efforts will obviously require close coordination between the IA and its NIC's.

B. Children Who Need Special Help

The word counseling has been used in this paper to describe a process that focuses on parents, not children. Thus the principal task of the NIC counselor has been said to be helping parents choose schools consonant with their values. The NIC counselor elicits educational goals from his clients, and imparts and interprets IA data. He does not offer judgments on the quality of schools, or on the appropriateness of particular schools for particular children. This intervention has two central purposes. One is to help parents choose schools intelligently. The other is to promote and facilitate parental feelings of mastery or efficacy.

Children may also need counseling. In an educational context, one important counseling goal is to place a child in growth-producing settings. This kind of counselor should offer parents judgments about the appropriateness of particular schools for particular children.

If possible, the IA should provide parents with both kinds of counseling. For some parents will have troubled or disturbed children who need help above and beyond that which a "normal" school can offer. These parents may need counseling services both before they begin choosing schools and after their children become enrolled.

If the IA had a "therapeutic" counseling program, NIC counselors could refer certain parents and children to it. While such a program should be located in the IA rather than neighborhood centers, IA counselors could visit parents and children in the NIC instead of the IA if their caseloads permitted.

If a substantial proportion of the NIC's counselors are non-professionals it will sometimes be difficult for them to determine whether or not a child needs special help. If an NIC counselor is unsure, he might discuss this with counselors in the central office then schedule an appointment for the parent in either the IA or the NIC.

C. School Related Problems

In a sense the lottery will signal the beginning rather than the end of the NIC counselor's job. For NIC staff should play a major role in resolving the lottery-related as well as the school-related problems of both parents and children. They should, in other words, be "parent helpers" throughout the program.

It may be appropriate for NIC counselors to begin helping parents solve school-related problems at an early time. When a counselor had completed one or more interviews with a parent and the parent had decided where he was going to apply, the counselor could say to the parent, "Give me a ring if you have any problems."

If the staff of an NIC had divided its parent "case load" so that each counselor was responsible for one or more schools, parents leaving the NIC could be handed a paper saying "if you have any problems with School X give Y a ring at ———." The EVA could also require participating schools to distribute a similar note to their parents. Parents with lottery-related or relatively minor school-related problems could thus use their counselors as responsive listeners, resources, and helpers.

If a parent had a major school-related problem however, a counselor might be advised to refer it to the IA's Complaint Administration instead of handling it himself. Thus he and the NIC would not be drawn into an extended conflict between parents and schools.

We assume that the EVA will have promulgated uniform standards for student transfer, suspension, and expulsion; that participating schools will have accepted them; and that such standards will have been succinctly described in a widely distributed general information document. NIC's could explain this document both to individual parents and to parent groups.

If a parent wished to initiate a transfer request, an NIC could assist him in completing the necessary forms and in selecting another school. Center staff could also keep track of the parent's request, seeing to it that it was acted on promptly.

If the parent of a suspended or expelled child were simply looking for another school, the NIC could also provide the necessary help.

If a child had been suspended or expelled, and the parent considered this a violation of the EVA's uniform standards, the parent could take the complaint to his NIC or to the EVA. If the complaint were lodged at an NIC, center staff could personally contact IA staff, then refer the parent to the IA's complaint administration.

In sum, the NIC staff member has been described as a "jack of all trades:" an outreach worker, an information distributer, and a counselor; a problem solver and a facilitator. He guides parents through what may often be a complicated bureaucratic-administrative network, helping them find professional diagnostic help for children with special problems; bringing parents dissatisfied with the lottery together with the staffs of the schools that accepted their children; discussing problems brought to him by parents with school personnel; providing school saffs with feedback on parental perceptions; helping parents complete transfer papers; helping parents lodge complaints, etc.

In the matter of bringing parents and school personnel together, the counselor can help bring about educational change. But it is likely that he will be productive in this capacity only in so far as he remains objective and dispassionate. When conflicts between parents and schools begin to intrude into his daily life, the counselor should avoid taking sides. He should be instructed that he works *for* the EVA (and *for* the children) *with* parents and *with* schools.

The NIC counselor can be most effective as a "parent-" and "school-helper" if he brings together friendly parties trying to reach an agreement: for example groups of parents trying to start a new school, or a group of parents with children in different schools trying to transfer their children to a particular school. Or, the counselor might help disputing parties: parents dissatisfied with a school, and staff from that school; parents who have lodged a complaint (against a school, an NIC) and the party the complaint is directed at, and so forth.

V. EVALUATION AND EVALUATING CLAIMS MADE BY SCHOOLS

Since voucher demonstrations will be systematically evaluated by "outsiders" selected by OEO, the IA should have a "program evaluation division" to coordinate its evaluation efforts with those of the federal government.

We noted before that an IA might ask schools in the program to suggest ways of measuring their claims. In that section we acknowledged that getting school personnel to set goals and select performance measures would often be difficult and time consuming. We therefore suggested that the IA refrain from evaluating school claims until the demonstration's second year, unless requested to do so by particular schools. The Liaisons, who gathered earlier information, might appropriately participate in these second-year evaluations as "participant observers", viewed as friends and "resources" by school personnel. Clearly their intimate knowledge of school programs would be invaluable.

A claims-evaluation-program would supplement voucher evaluations which focused on achievement test data, and lend support to an argument frequently made by proponents of the system. That argument holds that emphasizing achievement test scores is a reflection of a particular educational philosophy; that achievement tests are only one and not necessarily the best or most important way of evaluating educational quality; and that many parents are concerned with issues other than academic performance.

A claims-evaluation-program involving all the schools in a district might generate many different kinds of school information desired by parents: information on classroom techniques and atmosphere, teacher and pupil attitudes and behaviors, relations between schools and communities, and so forth.

The claims of a school might be evaluated relatively easily if a) the school wanted to be evaluated by the IA; b) its teachers had set goals and suggested appropriate measures for evaluating them; c) intensive Liaison assistance was not required for them to do so; and d) classroom monitoring was unnecessary for goal-or-claim-evaluation. The evaluation would also be relatively easy to implement if a) the school wanted to be evaluated; b) its teachers had set goals but not devised performance measures; and c) the performance measures the teachers eventually selected made classroom monitoring unnecessary.

If, for example, a school's teachers decided that attendance or drop-out figures were a good measure of "how happy a school was," or that the marks of ninth graders who had graduated from the school were indicative of the quality of the school's classes and teachers, the IA could, with little difficulty study school attendance and drop-out figures, as well as the grades of pupils who had earlier gone to the school. Again, however, selecting these measures might require IA and school staff to devote considerable time and energy to the endeavor.

The "claims evaluation process" would be much more complicated to implement if a school did not want to have its claims evaluated; if its teachers had not defined their goals; if its teachers could not suggest performance measures; or if the measures eventually suggested required classroom monitoring.

A Liaison working with teachers unable to articulate educational goals might first hold a series of meetings in the school in which he and the staff discussed educational philosophies, defined educational objectives, and selected appropriate measures. If the measures suggested in meetings of this kind were acceptable to the EVA and made classroom monitoring unnecessary, an evaluation of the school's claims could proceed almost immediately.

If instead, the suggested measures required classroom monitoring—a Liaison might help a group of teachers 1) develop a checklist (behaviorally observable examples of what should go on in a given classroom), 2) use it, 3) discuss the experience with the persons involved. IA "Claims Evaluators" should in no case be sent to a school to conduct a "claims evaluation" until this or a similar process has been completed.

Needless to say, this kind of an evaluation will probably be unproductive unless Liaisons facilitate rather than hamper the work of teachers and are viewed by them as advisors rather than policemen.

If the performance measures selected by teachers were checklists, "Claims Evaluators" could be non-professional parents as well as professional IA staff members. For it would be relatively easy for the IA to instruct parents in the use of checklists designed by teachers. (See Appendix 3).

The way an IA would use this strategy would be to ask a teacher or a group of teachers to specify elements of their classroom approach; formulate checklist items, etc.

The goal descriptions/checklists in the appendix are only meant to be suggestive. For if the process just described is to have any positive effect on educational quality, teachers must set their own goals, participate in designing their own instruments, and believe that the instruments accurately reflect the goals they are trying to achieve.

VI. TRAINING

Each Information Agency should probably have on its staff one or two persons knowledgable about small group training techniques to 1) assess the training needs of IA employees; 2) recommend training approaches and organizations to the EVA Board; and 3) coordinate the implementation of community training programs associated with the voucher demonstration.

The first task of the "training division" should probably be organizing a training program for prospective NIC counselors. Later, the division might train or arrange training for other EVA employees (Liaisons involved in the "claims evaluation process") parents (interested in starting a school) school staffs (anxious to improve relations with a parent group) or mixed groups.

Because of the Voucher System's newness and complexity, many program participants will undoubtedly need and request training advice or training services. Since one of the goals of the voucher program is to facilitate parental involvement in education, the EVA should respond to requests for training that emanate from the community.

As a group, prospective NIC employees should reflect the ethnic, racial, and economic composition of the demonstration area. The group should have men and women, professionals and non-professionals, teenagers and adults.

The majority of the trainees should be intelligent parents who reside in the community, are interested in and knowledgable about the schools, and are sensitive to the needs of majority and minority individuals and groups. (Parents tend to be able to communicate better than non-parents with other parents. Moreover, it is generally easier to teach a community person to counsel than to teach a professional counselor to be sensitive to the needs of the community.)

The training program should have built-in assessment and selection procedures. The final selection of NIC employees should not be made until after the training is completed. The program will most likely indicate that some individuals will be effective NIC employees while others will not.

Individuals may feel uncomfortable with the training and opt out of the program, or persevere but not be acceptable to the IA. All programs with "selection" or "deselection" procedures built into them hurt the feelings of some individuals. This is unfortunate, but inasmuch as the role of the NIC employee is pivotal, we think it better that some feelings get hurt than that poor counselors be selected. In any case, the IA should do everything possible to minimize this problem. All training programs initiated by the IA should begin with a frank discussion of this issue.

Non-professionals and professionals should be trained together, in large and small groups of changing composition. Since center effectiveness will be heavily dependent of the extent to which a few staff members work effectively together, the formation of "natural" groups should be encouraged during the program. Each center's staff should end up being a diverse group of persons capable of doing the job, relating to the community, and working well together.

A Program for Training Prospective NIC Employees

The training should cover five areas: 1) the job of the NIC employee; 2) the voucher system; 3) participating schools and their characteristics; 4) effective outreach strategies; and 5) counseling skills. Program components #4 and #5 should probably be sub-contracted.

Component #1: The Job of the NIC Employee

This component would introduce trainees to the concept of the NIC, and to the many facets of the job they were seeking. Trainees would learn outreach strategies (how to and how not to introduce yourself when going door-to-door; how to and how not to hold a meeting; etc.) information distribution techniques (the use of office machines, how to write leaflets, how to use sound trucks:) and an overview of the counseling role described in this paper.

Component #2: Knowing the Voucher System

During this part of the program, trainees would be expected to become thoroughly familiar with the details of the voucher system. They would read literature on the program, discuss it, and to be tested on comprehension and retention. They would be expected to learn and remember the rationale for the system, OEO and EVA regulations, and the structure and functions of the IA.

Component #3: Participating Schools and Their Characteristics

In this part of the program, trainees would come to know the schools in the district, their staffs, and their characteristics. Trainees might:

Tour participating schools;

Discuss the voucher program and the role of the NIC's with school personnel;

Discuss the schools with school children; and

Familiarize themselves with school characteristics and the IA's school booklet.

Component #4: Outreach Strategies

In this component, trainees would practice outreach strategies and information distribution techniques in the community. Trainees might be asked first to solve "action problems", then to briefly describe what they had done, why they had done it, and who they had done it with. Trainers could discuss the performance of trainees with individuals the trainees had seen. This would greatly facilitate the evaluation of the trainees, and the involvement of the community in the evaluation process.

Trainees might be sent individually, in pairs, or in trios to neighborhoods in the demonstration area. There they might spend hours or one- or two-day periods solving problems prepared for them earlier, such as:

Conduct a mini-survey: find out what ——— neighborhood's major problems are; who the neighborhood's leaders are; and how different groups of neighborhood residents view their schools.

Go to ——— neighborhood and ascertain which regulations are understood and which are not.

Find out what parents with children in ——— school think about the school's new ——— program.

Find the Juan Rodriguez family. Juan's wife is named Louisa. The Rodriguez's have two young children and a teenage daughter. In 1969 they lived at ———. Mr. Rodriguez was a friend of ———. He used to eat at ———.

Spend at least two hours in the home of a family you don't know and find out what the family thinks about the voucher program.

Find two groups of parents (at laundromats, a park, a club, a bowling alley, etc.) and describe their feelings about the EVA.

Get a family that you and your friends don't know to hold a meeting in their home.

Hold a meeting in your own home with at least two adults that you and your friends don't know who come from ——— neighborhood.

Organize an evening meeting at the ——— school. During the meeting describe the voucher program and answer parents questions.

Using the office machines in ——— office, write a leaflet that parents will want to read and distribute it to parents who live in ——— housing project. We will later call several of the families who live there to see if they saw or read your leaflet.

Mrs. Jones has a school-related problem. Help her solve it. She lives at ———. She will be expecting you at 1:00.

At 7:30 you are to address a meeting of the ——— PTA.

Secure donations worth at least $10.00 from one or more businesses in the community. (IF you are selected to be a NIC employee you can keep the donation and use it in your job. If not, you will have to give it to someone of your choosing who is selected.

Find out what happened to the ——— mothers group and the ——— PTA in the last two years.

Component #5: Counseling Skills

A number of programs designed to teach non-professionals counseling skills have recently been developed and tested. They focus on teaching listening and communicating skills. Research indicates that such programs work well.

These training programs tend to be highly specific and structured as opposed to general and unstructured. Clinicians and trainers have come to believe that the less education a group of prospective counselors has, the more explicit the group's training should be. Included in Appendix 4 are descriptions and discussions of three of these approaches.

VII. THE STRUCTURE OF THE INFORMATION AGENCY

The Information Agency we have proposed could probably be cut-back considerably at this end of the demonstration's first year. Initially, however, the agency would have three major "divisions", each of which would have smaller units called "sections" and even smaller units called "components."

Each Division could be administered by an "Assistant Director." The three Assistant Directors would then report to the IA director, who, in turn, would report to the Director of the EVA.

THE DIVISION OF INFORMATION COLLECTION, VERIFICATION, AND PACKAGING

This Division has three sections: one for information collection; one for information verification; and one for information packaging.

THE INFORMATION COLLECTION SECTION

The information collection section has two components. One coordinates IA testing programs and evaluation efforts with the evaluation efforts of OEO; gives OEO evaluators clearance to enter district schools; and approves all IA forms before they are distributed. This component should: (a) ensure the coordination of all program evaluation efforts; and (b) minimize the number and complexity of forms reaching principals, teachers, parents, and EVA employees.

The information collection section has another component in which IA Liaisons are located. They help school personnel to implement financial and non-financial records systems and to complete OEO and IA forms. In addition, they help schools set up "claims evaluation" programs. The actual evaluation of a school's claims is done by IA verifiers.

THE INFORMATION VERIFICATION SECTION

This section has two components: a verification component and a "truth in advertising" component. The verification component has testing staff, verifiers of school information, and verifiers of school claims. The "truth in advertising component" defines (makes comparable) terms frequently used in school advertising and ensures that a school's advertising claims are consistent with data on the school collected by the IA.

THE INFORMATION PACKAGING SECTION

This section has three components: one for administration; one for writing and publication; and one to answer the questions of community residents. The administrative component is responsible for IA purchasing, rentals, supplies and personnel (payroll and records) for EVA and IA advertising; and for the printing and duplication of IA papers. In addition it creates "information distribution centers" in the schools participating in the program.

The writing and publication staff write and publish the information documents that are released by the IA: program explanations; a booklet describing the characteristics of participating schools; a newsletter with additions and corrections to the school booklet, and so forth.

The question and answer component answers the questions of community residents and refers individuals and groups to appropriate EVA, IA, and NIC employees.

THE COMPLAINT ADMINISTRATION

The second division of the IA, the "Complaint Administration" has two sections. One responds to complaints alleging that information released by a school is contrary to fact. The other responds to non-information complaints: a parent's allegation that her child has been expelled from a school without cause; a school's allegation that it did not receive a check equal to the value of the vouchers it collected, etc.

THE NIC SUPPORT DIVISION

This division has four sections: one for administration; one for training; one for guidance and counseling; and one to help community individuals or groups start new schools.

The administrative section coordinates NIC purchasing, rentals and supplies. The training section organizes and coordinates training programs in the district. The counseling section helps parents and children with special problems referred to the IA by the NIC's. The new schools section helps parents or teachers start new schools or increase the capacity of old ones.

SOME OF THE TASKS REFERRED TO IN TEXT LISTED SEQUENTIALLY

DISTRIBUTING GENERAL PROGRAM INFORMATION

Establish "Question and Answer" service.
Organize "Speaker's Bureau."
Write general information documents.
Mail flyers and advertise program on radio, TV, etc.
Organize classes and open "Information Distribution Centers" in schools.

WRITING THE QUESTIONNAIRE

Survey parents or make guesses about the kinds of school information they want.
Translate survey or guesses into questions.
Coordinate financial questions with OEO.

Check on information not to be distributed because of state or local prohibitions.

Get EVA Board approval for questions.

Pre-test questionnaire and mention claims evaluation to school personnel.

Prepare to respond to reasonable requests for additional school information.

COLLECTING SCHOOL INFORMATION

Completion of questionnaires to maximum extent possible by IA Liaisons.

Meeting of school staff and Liaisons in which questions answered and schedule for completing questionnaire negotiated.

Liaison-school-visits in which questionnaires completed and claims evaluation process described in detail.

SETTING UP NIC'S

Establish mini-districts.

Organize temporary NIC advisory groups.

Solicit suggestions for center locations and prospective NIC staff from advisory groups.

Advertise NIC openings centrally.

Screen candidates and make first selection.

Train prospective NIC employees.

Final selection of NIC employees.

Center openings.

Institute "recall system."

Create formal advisory groups.

THE DIVISION OF INFORMATION COLLECTION, VERIFICATION, AND PACKAGING

Establish process to coordinate all OEO and IA evaluation efforts.

Establish procedures by which all forms approved prior to distribution.

Decision on annual testing program.

Develop procedures for allowing OEO and IA program evaluators to enter schools.

Liaisons: collect school information, describe claims evaluation process, help schools institute records and book-keeping systems, and help schools that want to organize a claims evaluation program do so.

Spot-checks of school information by verifiers, and on-going claims evaluations.

Truth in Advertising Section: develop system whereby school advertising claims automatically checked with IA data: decide what to do about implicit advertising claims; define terms frequently used by schools in their ads; recommend to EVA sanctions for schools that advertise falsely.

Administrative unit: write booklet on IA personnel procedures; plan forms for rentals, purchases, etc; advertise IA staff openings; set up "xerox room" and procedures; open information distribution centers in schools.

Question and answer service: set up; coordinate with other IA units; publicize.

Writing and publication staff: write and publish general information documents; pre-test documents in NICs; see that documents distributed to schools and NIC's; institute "feedback system" in which NIC comments on agency literature brought to unit.

THE COMPLAINT ADMINISTRATION

List "legitimate" and "illegitimate" complaints and likely sanctions, and decide how complaints are to be processed.

Get writing and publication staff to write a general information document on this subject and on uniform EVA standards and see that the document is distributed to schools and NIC's.

NIC SUPPORT

Devise procedures by which NIC's can refer parents to trainers, counselors, and new school personnel.

NIC OPERATION

Center staffs decide on how they will coordinate their activities and the use of office machines, mini-buses, sound trucks, etc.

Center staff decides how it will rotate tasks and responsibilities.

Centers relations with advisory group formalized and "permanent" advisory group formed.

Door-to-door outreach effort in which program explained and parents registered.

Schedules specifying when parents can meet with IA, EVA and school employees.

Paper written explaining what counselor will and won't do with and for parents distributed.

Private interest group involvement sought.

Parent counseling: mini-bus schedules; lists of parents willing to give advice; booklet explained; discussion of application strategies; handing out (or mailing) of vouchers.

Lottery.

Helping to solve post-lottery problems.

On-going contacts between parents, schools and NIC employees.


EVA BOARD
EVA DIR.
IA DIR.
ASST. DIR.
ASST. DIR.
ASST. DIR.
DIVISION OF INFORMATION COLLECTION, VERIFICATION, AND PACKAGING
COMPLAINT ADMINISTRATION
NIC SUPPORT DIV.
INF. COLL SECTION
FORM WRITING & CLEARANCE; COOR. WITH OEO EVAL.EFFORTS
LIAISONS WHO GATHER SCHOOL INFO.; HELP SCHOOLS INSTITUTE RECORDS SYSTEMS; AND HELP SCHOOLS INSTITUTE CLAIMS EVAL.PROGRAM.
INF VER. SECTION
TESTERS, SCHOOL INFO. VERIFIERS, CLAIMS VERIFIERS
TRUTH IN ADVERTISING SECTION
INF. PCK'G SECTION
ADMIN.UNIT: PERSONNEL, PURCHASING, RENTALS, PRINTING & DUPLICATING, ADVERTISING, & INFO.DIST. CENTERS IN SCHOOLS
QUESTION & ANSWER SERVICE
WRITING & PUBLICATION STAFF
INFOR. COMPLAINTS
NON-INFOR. COMPLAINTS
ADMIN.
TRAINING
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EDUCATION VOUCHERS: AN EVALUATION—THE WASHINGTON RESEARCH PROJECT

(By Irene Solet, Summer Intern 1971, Wellesley College, Class of 1972, November 1971)

An education voucher would probably look much like most other official pieces of paper which change hands in the process of administering all public services. That voucher would be the key, however, to a proposed new system for financing education by the twin goals of improving the education of children (particularly of disadvantaged children) and increasing parental control (particularly among parents of disadvantaged children) over the kind of education their children get. This system raises serious questions for the civil rights and education communities. Vouchers' utility as a tool to achieve these goals remains the subject of great debate. In addition, the possibility that institution of voucher systems would produce serious negative side effects, especially in the area of racial and economic integration, cannot be dismissed. For these reasons and because the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) now intends to fund demonstration voucher projects, the concept demands the closest scrutiny.

Economist Milton Friedman, original contemporary proponent of the voucher idea, recommends that the Government issue all parents vouchers of equal value for the education of each of their children. In his proposed system, a voucher would be a certificate spent by the parent at any public or private school in which he chose to enroll his child. The school would then redeem the voucher at a Government agency for the cost of educating that child for 1 year. By forcing every school to depend for financial survival on its ability to attract students, institution of a voucher system would improve the quality of education for all students, according to Friedman, Although this idea of competition among schools for students is at the heart of all voucher proposals currently being discussed, the faults of Friedman's model are obvious. By allowing schools to charge tuition in excess of the voucher, such a scheme would permit them to exclude students from low-income families. By allowing schools to set their own admissions criteria, it would permit the systematic exclusion of minority group children.

Friedman's proposal is by no means the only voucher proposal, however. Many others exist, most with problems just as serious as those inherent in his unregulated market model. These various proposals and their defects are discussed fully in a report prepared under an OEO grant by the Center for the Study of Public Policy in Cambridge entitled "Education Vouchers: A Report on Financing Elementary Education by Grants to Parents" (December 1970). Recognizing that "an unregulated voucher system could be the most serious setback for the education of disadvantaged children in the history of the United States," the Cambridge report proposes a system which it asserts would be sufficiently regulated to prevent such a setback but sufficiently free to encourage innovation. This proposal is of key importance because it is the basis for OEO's continuing interest in vouchers. The system, designated as the regulated compensatory model, would operate in the following manner:

> An Education Voucher Agency (EVA) would be established to administer the vouchers. Its governing board might be the existing local board of education or a special newly elected or appointed body. The EVA would receive all Federal, State, and local funds for education in the district. It would distribute this money to schools participating in the system, solely on the basis of how many vouchers each school collected from students in the district. The EVA would also pay transportation costs for all students to attend the school of their choice.
>
> The EVA would issue a voucher to the parents of each school-age child in the district. The value of the basic voucher would be equal to the current level of per pupil expenditure in the public schools. The vouchers of children

from low-income families would be augmented by compensatory payments determined on a sliding scale based on the family's income.

The EVA would have the power to designate schools as "approved voucher schools." All public schools would be approved as voucher schools. Any privately operated school would be approved for participation in the voucher system if it agreed to:

(*a*) Charge no tuition in excess of the voucher (since parents would be prohibited from voluntarily supplementing their children's vouchers, this would assure that more money was spent to educate the poor);

(*b*) Accept all applicants as long as it had vacant places;

(*c*) If applicants outnumbered places, fill at least half of those places by random selection of applicants and the other half by any criteria it established, provided it did not discriminate against racial or ethnic minorities (the percentage of minority-students would have to be at least as great as the percentage of minority applicants);

(*d*) Accept standards set by the EVA governing suspension and expulsion of students;

(*e*) Comply with standards set by the EVA concerning public disclosure of information about facilities, program, staff, students, and other aspects of school operation;

(*f*) Maintain financial records open to the public, and

(*g*) Meet existing State requirements for private schools.

If a school agreed to these conditions, no other restrictions would be placed on its organization, curriculum, staffing, or any other aspect of its operation.

The local board of education would remain responsible for insuring that a place in a public school existed for any student who did not wish to attend or could not find a place in a privately operated school.

Every spring, parents of each child would submit to the EVA a list of school choices in order to preference. Schools would fill their places on the basis of these choices. Oversubscribed schools would do so in compliance with the 50–50 formula already mentioned. Schools would then collect a voucher from the parents of each applicant admitted and redeem these vouchers with the EVA for money to operate the school for that year.

This system, according to the Cambridge report, would stand a good chance of achieving the double objective of improving the quality of education, especially for poor children, and increasing parental control, especially for parents of poor children. This assertion rests on several more specific claims. By fostering competition among existing public schools, existing nonpublic schools, and new alternative schools which supporters expect the plan to promote, this voucher system would encourage and reward educational innovation. By allowing parents to choose which school their children were to attend and thus giving parents power to determine which schools remained financially viable, the system would increase the control of parents over the kind of education their children received. By making the vouchers of poor children more valuable than those of children from middle and upper income families, it would provide an incentive for good system would encourage and reward educational innovation. By allowing parents operated and nonneighborhood public alternatives to students from poor areas. These are the general claims of those who advocate institution of a voucher system similar to this regulated compensatory model.

Planning for voucher experiments based on the Cambridge model began soon after the report was submitted and continues in several cities from among which OEO hopes soon to select up to four sites for institution of demonstration projects. (Two cities withdrew from consideration after local opposition to the plan developed.) Federal funding is expected early in 1972, with the projects scheduled to begin in the fall of that year. Each project will probably run for 5 years and be funded at a level of about $5 million per year.

Voucher proposals raise but do not answer many complex questions. The only way to penetrate the maze of interrelated issues surrounding the voucher idea is to consider them one by one.

AVAILABILITY OF ALTERNATIVES

The entire voucher concept is based on the anticipated availability of educational alternatives. Voucher proponents contend that existence of an "educational market" will stimulate development of a wide variety of different kinds of schools. They expect competition among these schools to encourage educational innovation. They depend on existence of this wide range of alternatives to insure that giving the parent power to choose his child's school means giving the parent power to choose how he wants that child to be educated, not merely at what address.

While most observers agree that a voucher system could not be effective unless these alternatives existed, most also agree that the required range of alternatives does not now exist in most school districts. Also to be considered is the fact that in most communities, no plan would be politically acceptable which did not permit those students already in relatively good schools when the system was instituted to remain there. Under such a plan, unless new alternative schools developed rapidly or existing good schools expanded rapidly, choice for students then in poor quality schools would be illusory. Only places in other poor quality schools would be open to them. Thus the question is not simply would a sufficient number and variety of schools develop under a voucher system to permit real choice for all students, but would those schools develop fast enough?

Responses to this question by voucher proponents rest heavily on faith in the effects of turning the education field into a regulated marketplace. They assert that, given a situation where demand for high-quality schools exceeds supply and where parents have vouchers which they are free to spend at new schools, parents' groups, community groups, private enterprise and others will enter the market as suppliers of high-quality education. Not surprisingly, little hard evidence exists to support these claims or to justify OEO's faith in the benefits of competition and free enterprise in education. As the voucher concept in its present form is new and has not yet been tried, this apparent lack of any concrete basis for optimism concerning the generation of alternative schools does not automatically undermine the position of this supporting voucher plans. It does, however, make them quite vulnerable to attack by skeptics who assert that high costs, lack of expertise, and other obstacles to entry into the educational market will prevent development of good alternative schools, or that private enterprise hucksters will profit under the system at the expense of children, especially poor children.

In accordance with the Cambridge report's recommendation that any voucher system provide assistance to groups wishing to start new schools, OEO includes in its voucher budget some funds for a maximum of 10 schools at each of its demonstration sites at a level of $10,000 per school for a total of $100,000 per site. Debate continues over whether such aid will be sufficient to insure development of adequate alternatives.

One additional consideration concerning the availability of such alternatives is a question which can be raised concerning many issues in the voucher debate—how different would an OEO demonstration voucher project be from a voucher system designed and implemented by a local community in a nondemonstration setting, possibly without Federal support (and probably without close Federal supervision)? Even if sufficient alternatives existed or developed in OEO's demonstration projects, the question of whether the case would be the same in a nondemonstration setting would remain. While impossible to answer conclusively, this question is important to take into account.

All this is to say that OEO's optimism concerning the availability of alternatives under a voucher system seems grounded in little more than conjecture and shaky predictions. It is impossible to say with certainty that OEO and other voucher proponents are wrong in their expectations that alternatives will develop. But it is important to note that their optimism rests on no firmer ground than does the skepticism of voucher critics. Without alternative schools a voucher system cannot achieve OEO's objectives. Rapid development of those alternatives under such a system seems at best questionable.

INTEGRATION

Probably the most important arguments against voucher plans are made by those people concerned over the plans' potential impact on efforts to achieve racial and economic integration of students. On a purely theoretical level, the voucher concept and the goal of integration are not completely compatible. Vouchers are designed to increase parental choice in their children's schooling. In most situations, however, complete integration requires ratios which are antithetical to unrestricted parental choice. Mandatory busing to achieve racial balance in schools would be inconsistent with a system of parental choice.

A similar theoretical contradiction exists between the idea of free competition which underlies the voucher concept and the necessity for safeguards to prevent discrimination. If a school is to meet the needs and demands of education consumers in an open market, it must remain free of government regulation which would unduly impair its ability to respond to market pressures. On the other hand, conceding that some consumers would prefer schools which discriminate among applicants and students on the basis of race and economic status, some control of schools' policies clearly is necessary if such discrimination is to be prevented. This realization prompts the antidiscrimination safeguards built into the Cambridge model. The key question to those committed to achievement of integration is whether or not those safeguards will be effective.

Those who answer this question negatively point to the similarities between proposed voucher systems and the freedom-of-choice plans adopted by many Southern school districts in the midsixties to circumvent desegregation requirements. OEO concedes that the mechanics of parental choice in the context of a voucher system would be similar in design if not in intent to those of freedom-of-choice plans in the South. One OEO spokesman who is working on the voucher projects admitted that parental choice theoretically could result in greater segregation of students than now exists. The Cambridge report asserts, however, that its suggested safeguards will prevent use of vouchers as a route to resegregation and predicts that its proposed voucher model should produce "at least as much mixing of blacks and whites, rich and poor, clever and dull, as the present system of public education."

The report points out that parents' willingness to send their children to integrated schools will depend at least in part on whether a variety of schools exist offering different programs and teaching styles to attract students of all races and economic groups. Another important point concerning integration and available alternatives involves the location of those alternatives. Existing "good schools," whether public or private, are most commonly found in higher-income sections of school districts. These sections are also frequently the white sections of the districts. Even if some new alternative schools develop in low-income and minority communities, the majority of high quality alternative schools is still likely to be found outside these communities. Therefore, if they wanted to attend these schools, disadvantaged students and minority students would have to bear a disproportionate share of the burden of travel and inconvenience necessary for achievement of integration under a voucher system. This burden is one which low-income and minority families are increasingly less willing to assume.

Although it acknowledges that the nature of parental choices under a voucher system would play a major role in determining the amount of integration achieved, the Cambridge report concludes that Government efforts to increase integration should not be aimed at directly influencing those choices. This would be inconsistent with support for increased parental control. Instead, the report emphasizes effective recruitment of both blacks and whites by all schools as the crucial factor in achieving integration. The compensatory vouchers for students from low-income families (among which minority families would be over-represented) would be the key to such recruitment. Students with these higher value vouchers would be especially desirable applicants to schools, according to the report. To the extent that parents are opposed to integration under any circumstances, however, such incentives would be ineffective. The Cambridge report acknowledges this.

The Cambridge report's voucher model delegates a great deal of power to the local Education Voucher Agency (EVA). Each community would design its own administrative structure to perform numerous important functions. Among them: establishing and enforcing standards to govern advertising by schools and distribution of information to assist parents in making their choices, regulating suspension and expulsion of students from schools, designing and administering parent counseling services. These and other functions delegated to the EVA in the Cambridge model would be extremely important in achievement of integration within a voucher system. For example, the type of counseling available to minority families would greatly influence the likelihood that they would select integrated schools outside their immediate neighborhoods.

To deny that many opportunities for both informal and overt pressure exist within the voucher framework of parental choice would be naive. A well-designed system administered by an EVA truly dedicated to achievement of the maximum possible degree of integration might be able to minimize and overcome these pressures. That may well be the case in the demonstration project which OEO now intends to fund. But it is crucial to look beyond such federally sponsored experiments established in accordance with strict Federal guidelines and operating under close Federal supervision in communities chosen at least in part because some potential problems were unlikely to arise there. In a rural southern community where private schools are already draining off many white students from the public system, it is hard to imagine a voucher plan which would not strengthen the private schools and further weaken the public system already suffering from declining public support. In a northern community which uses zoning to keep low-income residents out of middle-income areas, it is hard to imagine an EVA which would administer a voucher system with the kind of fairness ond aggressiveness necessary to ensure students from low-income families free access to alternative schools in higher income areas.

If opportunities for abuse would exist under a voucher system, the inevitable question which follows is what remedies for such abuse would be available? Since vouchers, even in a nondemonstration setting, would probably include some Federal money, any voucher system would have to comply with title VI (of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) standards or face termination of Federal funds. While it seems clear that title VI would apply under a voucher system, the problems of enforcement would probably be somewhat different than they are within the present educational structure. In the South where dual school systems existed, the mechanics of title VI enforcement under a voucher system would probably be about the same as they are now. However, enforcement would probably be more difficult because HEW would have to deal with possible failure of individual voucher schools to comply with title VI standards as well as the possibility of systemwide discrimination. Establishing standards of compliance would probably be more difficult on this kind of individual basis. In the area of de facto segregation, once vouchers and the accompanying element of parental choice were introduced, tracing a segregated attendance pattern to official action would be problematic at best. All in all, institution of a voucher system would almost certainly complicate title VI enforcement.

OEO admits that the structure of proposed voucher models does provide opportunities for discriminatory action by those operating the systems. While admitting that there would be many ways for an EVA to work against the best interests of poor children and minority children, an OEO spokesman asserts that the answer to this problem is parental pressure. The same spokesman grants that the level of political organization necessary to enable parents to exert such pressure on school authorities does not exist today among most low-income or minority groups in most school districts. He asserts, however, that an increased sense of parental power would result from issuance of vouchers and that parents would exert effective pressure within a voucher system.

Given the opportunities for discrimination and the other potential obstacles to achievement of integration already discussed and given the probable extent of available remedies under such a system, the question is one of risks and priorities. Vouchers constitute a definite risk to achievement of maximum integration of students. The risk is not small. Whether those in positions of power in the education field decide to take that risk will depend, first, on the priority they assign to integration as an educational and social goal and, second, on their assessment of vouchers' potential benefits.

DISPARITY OF REVENUES

Among the most difficult dilemmas facing American education is the disparity in State and local revenue allocations between rich and poor districts. Reform of the educational system, if it is to have any major impact on the education of the disadvantaged, must address this problem of differential spending. Vouchers as currently proposed cannot deal in any very significant way with disparity of revenues between school districts in a State or between States in the Nation. No voucher systems on a scale large enough to incorporate districts of widely differing wealth are currently planned, nor do voucher proponents in OEO see such systems as realistic possibilities in the foreseeable future. Thus, while voucher plans could have some impact on equalizing educational expenditures within single districts, there is little chance that vouchers could help resolve the disparity of revenues dilemma.

PARENTAL AND COMMUNITY CONTROL

Voucher proponents assert that their proposed system would greatly increase parental control in education and would assist efforts to achieve community control of schools where that was the goal of neighborhood residents. Exactly how meaningful would be parental choice among alternatives, how strong parental influence on educational policy, and how great the power of the low-income parent under a voucher system would depend, however, on several important factors. Some of these factors have already been mentioned. First, meaningful choice would be impossible without existence of a reasonably wide range of alternative schools. The likelihood that such alternatives would develop under a voucher system has already been discussed.

Second, the structural aspects of the specific voucher system would play a major role in determining whether it strengthened the voice of parents in educational matters. For example, the mechanics of the annual school admissions process as well as the nature and extent of EVA efforts to make these mechanics sufficiently clear and not overly difficult or intimidating to parents would greatly affect the probability that parents would take advantage of any new alternatives open to their children as a result of vouchers.

A third consideration concerning the power of the parent within a voucher system relates to the impact that individual parents, each making personal decisions about their children's schooling, could have on the policies of a particular school or on the actions of the local voucher agency. In all probability, parents could produce changes in specific policies only by acting cooperatively. Yet, if a parent elected to send his child to an alternative school outside his immediate neighborhood and in which his child would be part of a racial, ethnic, or economic minority, the prospects for that parent's cooperation with other parents would probably be slight. Similarly, if voucher schools did succeed in attracting truly diverse student bodies, prospects for cooperation action by parents separated geographically, racially, and economically would probably not be great.

This discussion of the need for cooperation among parents if they are to affect educational policy suggests the close ties of parental control under a voucher system to the whole question of community control under such a system. Proponents are convinced that vouchers would stimulate and support the development of community controlled schools. Two principal questions arise concerning these predictions. First, would entry into the educational market by parent groups be sufficiently difficult to preclude development of many community schools? Second, how is parental cooperation under a voucher system to be stimulated, achieved, and sustained in order to permit parents to act effectively in the kind of "watchdog" role mentioned earlier in the discussion of integration?

In answer to the first question, voucher proponents point to the budget of OEO's proposed demonstration projects. As already mentioned, it incorporates the Cambridge report's suggestion that some money be included to support growth of new schools. But this supply of money is by no means unlimited, nor would it or a similar supply from some other source necessarily be available in the context of nondemonstration voucher projects. Aside from money, there are other possible obstacles to entry into the educational market—lack of educational expertise among parents, especially among low-income parents; opposition from organized teachers' unions; barriers imposed by a local voucher agency controlled by the existing bureaucracy with its vested interest in supporting existing schools to the exclusion of new ones. All of these obstacles form the basis for serious reservations about the ease with which community groups, especially those in low-income and minority areas, could enter the educational market and control their own schools. This is not to deny, however, that vouchers do at least provide an institutional mechanism which groups overcoming such obstacles could employ to achieve such control.

In answering the second question—that concerning the likelihood of community cooperation—voucher proponents are extremely vague. With the success of the system depending so heavily on parental pressure, the ability of parents (particularly low-income and minority parents) to organize and voice their opinions would be essential. While admitting that poor and minority parents are unlikely to organize under the present system, voucher proponents assert that such parents would organize under a voucher system when they had tangible (i.e., money) power. This optimism concerning the likelihood of "spontaneous generation" of parental cooperation seems poorly grounded in fact. Here again, the newness and untested nature of the voucher concept prevents its dismissal for this reason alone. Proponents' reliance on such a shaky basis for expectations concerning such a key element in the success of the voucher system cannot be ignored, however.

All these factors considered, voucher plans appear to offer an institutional framework within which parental and community control could possibly be strengthened. To conclude, however, that such an outcome would inevitably result from institution of a voucher system would be premature. The obstacles to that outcome are sizable and not as easily ignored, avoided, or overcome as the system's supporters indicate. Vouchers have little apparent potential for harm in the area of parental and community control. But while they represent no significant danger, vouchers' positive impact in this same area is by no means assured. Much would depend on the design of each specific voucher system concerned.

QUESTIONS OF SCALE

Central to consideration of almost every other issue raised by voucher proposals is the issue of scale. How large must a voucher system be in a specific setting to achieve certain of its objectives? How large is too large for the achievement of others? Although vouchers on a metropolitan or statewide scale are politically unfeasible at the present time, for a variety of reasons, important questions of scale still remain. Even within the framework of existing school districts there is room for voucher systems of widely varying size.

The scale of a voucher system would affect the availability of alternative schools. A large area with a heterogenous population could be expected to generate and support a greater number and diversity of such schools than a small homogenous area. This would be one positive effect of large scale.

Similarly, in relation to integration, large size has advantages. The larger the voucher district and the more diverse its population, the greater would be opportunities for socioeconomic and racial mixing of students. Concerning integration, large scale raises significant problems, however. Of crucial importance is the whole question of transportation.

Even if a voucher district were large enough to include a heterogenous population and to support a sufficient number and variety of educational alternatives, it is likely that these alternatives would not be evenly distributed throughout the district. As mentioned earlier, alternatives (especially integrated alternatives) would be less likely to be found in low-income and minority areas of the district. Thus, if socioeconomic and racial mixing of students were to occur, convenient and easily available transportation would be essential. As noted earlier, the Cambridge report declares that the EVA must pay transportation costs for all students to attend the school of their choice. While OEO agrees that effective free transportation would be crucial to the success of its proposed demonstration projects, an OEO spokesman could point to no actual plans for insuring that such transportation will be delivered. Without convenient, easily available transportation for children wishing to attend schools outside their immediate neighborhoods, socioeconomic and racial mixing of students will not occur in large-scale voucher systems.

Consideration of problems of scale must also include discussion of several bureaucratic problems which would probably grow in importance with the size of the voucher district. Among these is the effect of a large bureaucratic system on the likelihood of increased parental and community control. The larger the voucher system, the more complex will be the administrative machinery necessary to support it and the more impersonal will be its relations with individuals. Just as the shopper is likely to receive more personal attention at the corner grocery store than at the big supermarket, the education consumer is likely to receive more personal attention in the context of a small voucher system than in a massive one. Parents' interest and participation in their children's education is likely to increase with their perception of their own efficacy. The larger and more impersonal is the education bureaucracy, the weaker that sense of efficacy among parents is likely to be. Thus, the larger the scale of the voucher system, the greater would be the chance that an impersonal, inflexible bureaucracy would discourage parental interest and participation. Similarly, the larger the system, the greater would be the likelihood of bureaucratic inflexibility and the smaller would be the likelihood of innovation and experimentation in education. These negative aspects must be balanced against the benefits of large scale; that is, greater availability of alternatives and greater opportunities for racial and socioeconomic mixing of students. To use the consumer analogy again, while service in the supermarket may be impersonal, the selection of goods is wider and the diversity of shoppers is greater than at the corner grocery.

All this is to say once again that voucher systems may produce different results in different communities depending on the design of the system and the character of the community. Both of these factors must be considered together in judging the probable effects of any proposed system.

Reform Role

Proponents view proposed voucher systems as perhaps the most catalytic development in educational reform in years. The whole free-market, competitive rationale behind the voucher concept is based on the contention that the way to stimulate innovation is to make it profitable. Forced to achieve and maintain high levels of academic performance among their students in order to survive financially, schools would be under market pressure to employ new techniques and innovative programs where old ones had failed, say voucher supporters. The most serious objections to this argument deal with what many people see as the failure of private enterprise to respond to the needs of poor people. If competition and private enterprise work against the best interest of poor people in existing markets as many critics contend, there seems little reason to expect a different outcome in the education field. But such criticisms are as vague and difficult to substantiate as are the claims of the system's proponents. Vouchers remain part of a theoretical concept. Until the system is tried, few facts will be available to substantiate the arguments of either proponents or critics. For this reason, opposition to a demonstration project is quite different from opposition to widespread institution of voucher systems.

To some, the private enterprise context of voucher plans is part of what might be called the we'll-try-anything-once response to education problems. Faced with fast-growing problems and slowly growing public support, reformers look for new approaches which might produce important results without major cost increases. "More of the same" in education seems an unsatisfactory attitude. Some voucher proponents argue that even if their plans proved infeasible or otherwise ineffective on a massive scale, voucher systems would be valuable as reform catalysts to provoke new educational debate. If the debate up to the present point is any indication, this seems unlikely. The furor surrounding voucher proposals has been primarily political rather than educational in nature. Proponents and critics have divided on what are largely political issues. Once again, however, the value of vouchers, here as reform catalysts, is impossible to determine in the abstract. Once again, the argument of those supporting demonstration projects is difficult to refute.

Performance Standards

As implementation of voucher plans on a demonstration basis becomes more of a probability than a possibility, one of the most important concerns of voucher critics as well as of the idea's proponents must be provision of adequate performance standards. If demonstration projects are to prove anything about the idea's value as an educational reform, there must be some way of measuring its impact on the education of children. More importantly, outside of the demonstration context, if voucher systems are to increase opportunities for real parental choice in education, some reliable method of measuring the quality of education offered by a given school must be found. Without effective performance standards, competition and choice can be based on nothing more than commercialism and unsubstantiated claims.

The use of standardized tests as the exclusive measure of a school's effectiveness—or, in other words, of a child's progress—is widely criticized. Voucher proponents admit the need for more qualitative measures, but few concrete proposals exist. OEO emphasizes the difficulty of measuring quality in the education field. Its spokesman stated that specific mechanisms for measurement of performance under a voucher system had not yet been designed, but that such mechanisms would be developed and would go beyond routine measures such as standardized tests. This acknowledgement of the need for qualitative measures is not particularly meaningful, however, in the absence of specific plans for their development.

POLITICAL PROSPECTS

To date, the voucher debate has been primarily a political debate. This is not to say that important educational issues have not been considered and discussed. But rather, that in the absence of any observable examples of voucher systems in operation, supporters and critics have divided along quite predictable political lines and have presented quite predictable political arguments. On the antivoucher side are the well-established organizations of teachers and school administrators, the organizations committed to separation of church and state, and the organizations with strong civil rights concerns. The provoucher camp contains Catholic leaders concerned over the financial crisis in their parochial schools, the education reformers from the Center for the Study of Public Policy, and administration spokesmen in OEO.

So far no real tests of the legislative strength of either side in the voucher debate have occurred on the national level. An antivoucher coalition's support for an amendment to the OEO authorization bill barring experimentation with voucher plans came to nothing. Such an amendment was soundly defeated in the House Education and Labor Committee and never even came up on the Senate side. This cannot be considered an extremely significant test of strength for either side in the voucher debate, however, for two reasons. First, neither side made very strenuous efforts to support or defeat an antivoucher amendment. Second, support or opposition to a minor amendment dealing with demonstration projects is not a good indicator of eventual support or opposition in Congress for major legislation dealing with broad institution of voucher systems.

One important point to remember in looking at the future of the voucher concept is that in most States implementation of voucher systems would require State enabling legislation as well as approval of the local communities in which the systems were to operate. The same coalitions supporting and opposing vouchers on the national level can be expected to function on the State and local levels. Particularly significant would be the organized opposition of teachers. OEO admits that a system which meets with the unequivocal opposition of a local teachers' organization has little or no chance of success. With the strength of such organizations constantly growing, this is not an unimportant observation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

While vouchers raise serious questions for the civil right and education communities, opposition to OEO funding of demonstration projects appears to be unjustified both "politically" and "philosophically." At this point, the projects are virtually certain to receive OEO approval and appropriations. In addition, opposition to experimentation with a new educational concept is a difficult position to defend philosophically unless the concept is clearly without value or promises to be so destructive that even limited testing of it cannot be justified. Vouchers do not qualify as such a concept.

If opposition to experimentation is an untenable position in this case, what role should groups vitally concerned with civil rights and then education of the disadvantaged take in the continuing voucher debate? The seriousness of vouchers' possible negative effects and the gravity of the risk that these effects will occur warrant assumption by such groups of a visible, public role in that debate. The most reasonable position at this stage in the controversy appears to be to assume the role of "gadfly" focusing on the dangers inherent in voucher systems and demanding constant monitoring of demonstration projects to insure that these dangers are dealt with should they materialize. Given the problems involved in voucher proposals, skepticism seems a well-justified, reasonable approach.

More specifically, several points should be raised in response to voucher proposals:

1. Performance standards must be established against which the effectiveness of voucher plans in improving the education of children, particularly of disadvantaged children, can be measured. Acknowledgment of the need to develop such standards is not enough. If demonstration projects begin before meaningful qualitative standards are formulated, the projects will be of only limited value as tests of the voucher concept's viability.

2. Conscientious attempts to measure community reaction to the voucher system throughout the duration of the demonstration projects will be crucial. Claims of increased parental control under such systems cannot be allowed to stand without concrete support obtained through sampling of parental attitudes. (The method used for such sampling will be extremely important.)

3. The availability of alternative schools must show hard numerical improvement if claim of voucher proponents are to stand. The number and variety of available schools mut be periodically meaured.

4. Vouchers' effect on integration must be watched carefully. The question of whether and to what extent integration of students increases or decreases under a voucher system must be measured in precise numerical terms. The activities of those charged with monitoring integration and with enforcing antidiscrimination safeguards under the system must be constantly scrutinized. Tough enforcement at the national level (by HEW's Office of Civil Rights) as well as at the local level (by the community's Education Voucher Agency) will be essential.

5. Demonstration projects may not provide a totally accurate indication of how voucher systems would operate in nondemonstration settings. The possibility that answers to many of the previously raised questions may be different outside the demonstration context must always be kept in mind.

All of these points are extremely important. More important than any one of them individually, however, is the need to raise questions and reservations about vouchers and their potential effects in very specific terms. To state simply, "vouchers will promote segregation," or "vouchers will destroy the public schools," is of little use. Questions and objections must be well defined. Criticisms must be directed at specific results. Otherwise, they will stimulate only vague and general reponses. Serious problems can be easily glossed over by the high sounding and, no doubt, sincere rhetoric of OEO spokesmen. If questions, objections, and criticisms are well defined and specific, however, they can make demonstration projects valuable tests of this proposed reform. In the voucher debate, the role of the skeptic is a crucial one.

APPENDIX

PROPOSED VOUCHER MODELS

The Cambridge report examines quite systematically the most commonly proposed economic models for voucher plans. It measures each model against a two-part standard which it establishes as the criterion for any plan deserving OEO support. According to the report, any such plan should satisfy two objectives—first, "to improve the education of children, particularly disadvantaged children," and second, "to give parents, and particularly disadvantaged parents, more control over the kind of education their childen get." While this standard may not be completely adequate as a test for the acceptability of a voucher plan (or while OEO's interpretation of such phrases as "to improve the education of children" may not be universally accepted), any model which fails to measure up to the Cambridge report's standard would almost certainly be unacceptable to those who would demand even more in the way of antidiscrimination safeguards, assurances of parental control, etc. Thus, a brief summary of the report's rejection of all proposals but its own will serve as an adequate discussion of their defects

UNREGULATED MARKET MODEL

This is the plan advocated by Milton Friedman. The Cambridge report correctly concludes that use of this model would "redistribute resources away from the poor and toward the rich, and would exacerbate the problems of existing public schools without offering them any offsetting advantages."

UNREGULATED COMPENSATORY MODEL

This plan is the same as Friedman's model except that it provides for making the value of vouchers higher for children from low-income families. The value of the voucher would decrease to a certain basic level as family income increased. As the Cambridge report notes, however, it is unlikely that the compensatory amount added to the vouchers of poor children by legislators would be as large as the differences in purchasing power between low- and middle-income families.

Even if this were not the case, the middle-income majority would exert constant political pressure for increases in the value of its vouchers. Thus, this model would in practice come to resemble Friedman's completely unregulated market. (One example of this kind of pressure is the effort to expand the definition of poverty in title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act.)

COMPULSORY PRIVATE SCHOLARSHIP MODEL

This plan also resembles Friedman's in all respects except that it would require schools to provide enough scholarships so that no student's family had to pay more than it could afford. Since all schools feel a need for more funds than they have, however, it would be to their economic disadvantage to accept low-income applicants. Such a plan for technically compulsory scholarships would in practice become one of voluntary scholarships, and again the system would come to resemble the unregulated market model.

EFFORT VOUCHER

Under this plan, parents would have a choice of sending their children to schools at different expenditure levels, the lowest level being roughly that of present public school expenditure. The parent would receive a voucher about equal to the per pupil cost at this lowest level, and would have the option of supplementing that voucher if he wanted his child to attend a school on one of the more expensive levels. This system would be combined with a compensatory scheme so that a parent's economic "effort" in educating his child would be measured relative to his income. Such a system, concludes the Cambridge report, might lead to greater parental choice, but would also result in a wider separation between the "best" and the "worst" schools and would "exacerbate the inequalities in outcomes of schooling." In addition, it would penalize children whose parents had little interest in education.

EGALITARIAN MODEL

This plan would give a voucher of equal value to each student and would prohibit schools from charging tuition in excess of the voucher. This would equalize educational expenditure within the voucher district, but would not necessarily equalize educational resources, according to the report. Since it often costs more to provide a given educational resource to a poor child than to a middle-class child, equal vouchers would probably mean unequal resources. In addition, it would be to schools' economic advantage to admit students who were "easy to educate." This would result in admissions preference for academically talented, well-behaved children.

ACHIEVEMENT MODEL

Under this plan, the value of a student's voucher would be determined not by the student's economic qualifications but by the "success" of the school in educating him. A school's income would be determined by how much progress its students need. That progress would be measured by standardized tests. The difficulty of separating aptitude from achievement in such tests, the questionable relationship between high test scores and later success, and the importance of socioeconomic status and race as determinants of test results, are all reasons why this model is found unacceptable in the Cambridge report.

The report discusses several other models as well, including plans for vouchers limited to public schools and for vouchers limited to private schools. Both of these systems would fail to foster the kind of competition among all available educational alternatives upon which voucher proponents rest their hopes for improvement in the quality of education. The first would leave all public schools under the control of the existing school bureaucracy, making innovation little more likely than it is under that authority today. The second, by excluding them from the voucher system, would do little to stimulate innovation in the public schools and would severely restrict the choices available to black families. Most existing white or integrated schools are public neighborhood schools. If vouchers were limited to private schools, public schools would continue to admit only neighborhood children, and these integrated alternatives would be off limits for children living in all-black area.

Analogous problems would arise under a voucher system limited to the poor. None but poor children would receive vouchers, and all other children would remain in their present schools. Since poor children would be a minority in most districts, and since better schools are most often in higher income areas, such a system would not significantly increase the number of attractive educational alternatives for disadvantaged students.

Having considered and rejected each of the alternative voucher models as either destructive in its effects or without major impact on the quality of education or the extent of parental control, the Cambridge report proposes its own voucher model. This model is the one around which OEO's interest has centered. Since OEO is the primary source of support for voucher experiments, this model or a variation of it currently appears to be the only one at all likely to be tested by any school district. For this reason, it merits the closest scrutiny.

REGULATED COMPENSATORY MODEL

Recognizing that "an unregulated voucher system could be the most serious setback for the education of disadvantaged children in the history of the United States," the Cambridge report proposes a system which it asserts would be sufficiently regulated to prevent such a setback but sufficiently free to encourage innovation. The system is designated as the regulated compensatory model.